History as Wonder by Hughes-Warrington, Marnie

HISTORY AS WONDER
History as Wonder is a refreshing new take on the idea of history that tracks the
entanglement of history and philosophy over time through the key idea of wonder.
From ancient Greek histories and wonder works, to Islamic curiosities and
Chinese strange histories, through to European historical cabinets of curiosity and
on to histories that grapple with the horrors of the Holocaust, Marnie Hughes-
Warrington unpacks the ways in which historians throughout the ages have tried to
make sense of the world, and to change it. This book considers histories and his-
torians across time and space, including the ancient Greek historian Polybius, the
medieval texts by historians such as Bede in England and Ibn Khaldun in Islamic
Historiography, and more recent works by Martin Heidegger, Luce Irigaray and
Ranajit Guha among others. It explores the different ways in which historians have
called upon wonder to cross boundaries between the past and the present, the
universal and the particular, the old and the new, and the ordinary and the extra-
ordinary. Promising to both delight and unsettle, it shows how wonder works as
the beginning of historiography.
Accessible, engaging and wide-ranging, History as Wonder provides an original
addition to the field of historiography that is ideal for those both new to and
familiar with the study of history.
Marnie Hughes-Warrington is a professor of history at the Australian National
University. She is the author of several historiography books, including Fifty Key
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with history as wonder
The idea of history is weird. It seems odd, and perhaps even paradoxical, that we
use a general label to describe the study of particular phenomena and change over
time. An interest in individual people, events and things is hard to square with an
abstract concept. Yet despite this, the idea of history has been with us for a long
time, and it persists. It does so for reasons that are not always appreciated. This
book offers an appreciation of the idea of history told through a history of history,
and it is an unsettling story.
I am not the first person to offer a history of history. Far from it. Credit for
that rests with people who long ago wrote, sang or drew acknowledgements of
other people’s stories about the past. But I do want us to think again about how
we might have settled into particular ways of telling the story of history’s past. To
start that journey, I want you to think of a thaumascope, a nineteenth-century
label given to an object that has been with us for arguably thousands of years. It’s
a small disc that you can cup in the palm of your hand. One side depicts one
image—a deer with legs extended, for example—and the other another image
such as a deer with legs contracted. Suspend the disk with two pieces of deer gut,
string, or wire, and then spin it. Spin the disk fast enough and the images com-
bine to suggest movement or synthesis. The deer appears to move; or a bird fills
what was an empty cage. The nineteenth-century billed this as a wonder, and
that seems a fair label. The science is simple, but the effect is attention grabbing
and even enthralling.
The history of history is like a thaumascope. Its components are individual his-
tories which are connected by writers and readers in ways that generate the effect
of a deer running or a bird being caged. The narrative generated can make so
much sense that it is hard to bring the individual pieces and the gaps in the story to
mind. Change the selection of histories and the outline of the narrative might
change, but the smoothness of the generated effect of the narrative remains. This
new narrative can also make so much sense that its components and gaps feel elu-
sive. How can that be? It seems like there must be a kind of ‘historyness’ that lurks
within this story making, helping us to join the dots and to fill in the gaps, and to
make sense of what we encounter. It could be that the human brain is hard wired
to think historically, and this may lead us to imagine alien or artificial forms of
intelligence that are history-less. But that is not the argument of this book. My
claim is a much simpler one, that historians since Herodotus (484–425 BCE) have
engaged with or responded to the efforts of thinkers who attempt to make general
sense of the world. Metaphysicians.
Metaphysics, wonder
It will be little comfort for you to hear that metaphysics is notoriously difficult to
define, and that not everyone thinks it is a good idea or worth doing. It is a slip-
pery beast, as elusive as the moving deer of a motionless thaumascope. One of the
first metaphysicians that we know about—Aristotle (384–322 BCE)—didn’t call
himself by that label, and he arguably didn’t set about to explain how it works. Yet
as we shall discover in this book, his Metaphysics is the means by which many his-
tories make sense, move if you like in the manner of a running deer. He set down
a kind of blueprint which encouraged the authors of the earliest written histories to
make sense of the world by discerning universals through sensory perception of
particular phenomena. In this way, they thought of the universal as immanent or
inherent in phenomena. They looked for the general in the particular and set
down rules of engagement that they saw as dividing their efforts from those of
other or lesser writers such as paradoxologists or wonder writers, as I shall call them
in this book. Those attempts at distinction failed, for history was already entangled
with philosophy, and philosophy helped all kinds of writers to make sense of the
world. This is not to suggest that history has always been simply a part of philo-
sophy, and that this book should therefore be a history of philosophy. Historians
ask questions that are not always of interest to philosophers, and the other way
around. But historians took a steer from philosophical ways of thinking about
existence, knowledge and categories, and their endeavours to make the most general
sense of the world.
History remains indebted to philosophy in ways that are not always understood, or
even desired. That debt has been described as a ‘prison’ by Martin Davies, a ‘haunting’
by Jacques Derrida, and as generative of idle talk by Martin Heidegger.1 Knowing
about and refusing that debt, in their eyes, makes it possible to make sense of the world
in different, less settled ways; ways that might be fairer to people that have not been
treated well by the idea of history. Indeed, some people may even insist that we dis-
pense with the idea of history altogether for the sake of a fairer world. To take this
point back to my opening analogy: the thaumascope must be broken apart if history—
or a successor discipline—is to generate new ways of thinking.
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I do not agree with the most extreme of these views, for it is not the case that
historians have sleepwalked with Aristotle since Polybius (200–118 BCE), or that
Aristotelian metaphysics has been our only option. As the variety of histories and
philosophies canvassed in this book will show, people around the world have
looked to the past to make general sense of things. Islamic, Indian and Chinese
histories cannot be collapsed into an Aristotelian metaphysical frame, and
some European writings show wilful and wonky appropriations of Aristotelian and
other approaches to metaphysics. Other writers have diagnosed important gaps in
metaphysical thought and drawn upon ideas in philosophy of knowledge (episte-
mology), philosophy of being (ontology), ethics and aesthetics to refine or even to
reconfigure our general sense of things. It is easy to believe that you are imprisoned
by history when you ignore the global range and the weirdest texts produced in its
name. Sometimes the thaumascope wobbles. History bears the imprint of metaphysics,
but that imprint is not always neatly constructed.
Metaphysics, like history, persists, but it is neither simple nor singular. That does
not mean, however, that attempts to describe it are futile. Adrian W. Moore very
helpfully defines metaphysics as ‘the most general attempt to make sense of things’.2
He also takes care to step through the three major components of his definition.
First, metaphysicians are interested in categories or concepts, and some are more
specific in confining their interest to universals or what is necessary to make
sense of the world. Examples can include ‘time’, ‘change’, and ‘causation’. This is
the ‘most general’ component of his definition, and we find it from the earliest
days of metaphysics. Aristotle’s interest in the study of being in his Metaphysics sig-
nals this. Moore’s ‘general’ qualifier is also important for reasons that I intimated
earlier and which will become more fully apparent in this book: it is no easy feat to
separate the idea of history from say, the idea of literature or science, and it is no
easy feat to separate histories from other histories. In the first written histories, we
see writers struggle to draw and to hold the line between their efforts and those of
writers that they saw as different or even as less worthy. In chapter one, for
example, we will see Polybius set down the written motifs and conventions (topoi)
of a history, only for them to be appropriated and even parodied by para-
doxologists or wonder writers. Arguably, too, we see the reverse movement of
historians appropriating the topoi of paradoxologists in medieval Europe in chapter
two. Furthermore, as the example of the Chinese strange histories I will explore in
chapter four shows, the appropriation of historical topoi can be sharpened into the
edge of political criticism. Examples like these demonstrate the futility of defining
history by form and provide the justification for my inclusion of works well beyond
the range of texts typically covered in histories of history. Philosophy, para-
doxological wonder works, literature and film are canvassed, with the last of these
providing the major focus of chapter seven. Indeed, in chapter nine, we will find in
the examples of Ranajit Guha’s (1922–) and Rabindranath Tagore’s (1861–1941)
writings an invitation to experience the world through ‘everyday historicality’.
Moreover, their works remind us to think twice about the claim that the
twentieth century ushered in the democratization or fragmentation of history
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making and thereby a fatal challenge to totalizing ‘master narrative’ metaphysics.
All kinds of people have made histories for a long time, and it is not simply the
case that they were worthy writers ignored by the prejudices of their day. Some-
times they produced texts that neither their contemporaries nor we feel comfor-
table describing as history, even though they bear the form or the label. It is hard
to know what to do with a history that reports giant singing earthworms or Bul-
garian dwarf pirates, to give just two examples. That is an ongoing challenge for
the history of history.
We could of course argue that earlier historians just weren’t very good at his-
toriography—thinking about history—and that we now have the expert testimony
of writers like Richard Evans in the successful defence of Penguin Books and
Deborah Lipstadt against David Irving to thank for defining what an historian is.3 I
think, however, that Moore’s argument is different, because his suggestion that
metaphysicians attempt to make general sense of things will make it difficult or
perhaps even futile to disentangle it from other considerations like history. Put
clumsily, metaphysics is the framework, blueprint or DNA for history. It is what
gives a history shape. This is important because it signals that we might not be able
to make sense of the idea of history without metaphysics, or to draw neat boundaries
around history, literature, art, and so on.
Second is to note that the use of the word ‘attempt’ makes it clear that meta-
physics is a human endeavour and that it may be impossible to make general sense
of things. Metaphysics is not a simple discipline or science, and its knowledge is not
a done deal. That doesn’t mean that it isn’t worth doing, however, for nearly
everyone would grant that some notion of time is necessary for making sense of
the past. If you find it hard or even impossible to think of what a history would be
like without a notion of time, then you can see how deep-seated metaphysical
considerations can be.
Third, Moore notes that rendering things intelligible or understanding the ‘why’
of them is a broad endeavour. It can encompass understanding the idea of history
or figuring out how Ikea instruction diagrams work. But the use of the word
‘things’ reminds us that it is not about articulating self-contained abstract systems.
Again, Aristotle grounded his Metaphysics in being, suggesting that it is not the
study of abstract logic.4 This suggests again that history and metaphysics will be
intertwined.
Having set his definition, Moore prioritises three questions:
Are there ‘transcendent’ things and can we make sense of them;
Can we make sense of things in ways that are radically new; and
Are we restricted to looking for the sense that things already make?
All of these are important questions for understanding the idea of history,
because they challenge us to think about whether, for example, histories reveal
universals or whether they describe or create the past. None of these are easy
questions, and as the case of the question of whether historians create the past or
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simply describe it shows, they can also be challenging and even uncomfortable. I
therefore see Moore’s ideas as a useful starting point for revealing the entanglement
of history and metaphysics in the history of history. In selecting the texts that make
up this history, I have looked to histories and philosophies that either constitute an
attempt to make general sense of things, or that show evidence of an engaged,
reflexive, self-conscious exercise in making sense of history and or metaphysics.5
Moore is the first to admit that his study of metaphysics is limited.6 It is confined
to European texts from the early modern period onwards (1500–) and turns on his
three questions. He does not, for example, position metaphysics—as Aristotle
did—as the ‘first’ philosophy. This is an interesting and important idea, challenging
us to think about whether the idea of history will not make sense until we have
grappled with metaphysics first. This, as we shall see in chapter eight of this book,
was one of Jacques Derrida’s most persistent arguments, and the basis of his ethics
of how we ought to live.7 Other thinkers go even further with their interpretation
of ‘first’, insisting as Martin Heidegger did that we need to return to Aristotle to
historicise metaphysics. His ideas, and the counter ideas of Hannah Arendt, are the
focus of chapter ten.
Nor does Moore offer a view on the nature of metaphysical thinking, its epis-
temology. That is, how do we do metaphysics? This again turns out to be an
important consideration for the idea of history. Hegel once said that ‘the owl of
Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk’, meaning that we make
general sense of things historically.8 For him, historical thinking was necessary for
metaphysics. This sets up a potentially complicated sequence: we think historically
in order to understand metaphysics, in order to understand the idea of history.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Hegel saw history and philosophy as intertwined, but
not quite in the way that I suggested was the case for the earliest historians
like Polybius. One of the more ambitious ends of Hegel’s line of thinking is
R.G. Collingwood’s claim that historical-philosophical thinking has primacy as
a ‘mode’ of thought. I am not proposing to explore Collingwood’s idea in
this book, as it was the major subject of one of my earlier books.9
It will of course be argued that I am simply following Hegel’s view by opening
this book on the history of history with a discussion on metaphysics. In response, I
note that Aristotle had a different view, one which turns out to be important for a
history of history. Aristotle saw the first philosophy—metaphysics—as starting with
wonder, an activity of mind. As he explains in the first section of Metaphysics:
It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philoso-
phize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual
progression raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the
changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of
the universe. Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant
(thus the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of
wonders); therefore, if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy,
it is obvious that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for
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any practical utility. The actual course of events bears witness to this; for
speculation of this kind began with a view to recreation and pastime, at a time
when practically all the necessities of life were already supplied. Clearly then it
is for no extrinsic advantage that we seek this knowledge; for just as we call a
man independent who exists for himself and not for another, so we call this
the only independent science, since it alone exists for itself (1.982b).
Plato wrote about wonder ahead of Aristotle, noting that Socrates’ questions and
talk of general concepts made Theaetetus’ head swim. Aristotle takes a different
tack, arguing that we do not need a philosopher to lead us to philosophy. Rather,
Aristotle sees the start of the first philosophy in our wonder at changes that we
perceive in the world. Wonder is initiated by us, it is perceptual, and it takes flight
in ‘obvious perplexities’. Moreover, it arises in recreation and pastime, when our
every thought is not turned to survival.
That Aristotle saw our perplexity at changes in the world as the basis for wonder
and then philosophy deserves pause. That is not least because the first historians
also saw their work as focused on the recording of perceptual changes and as the
elucidation of universals. Indeed, they too were highly interested in wonder;
enough so that they sought to refine the boundaries between legitimate acts of
wonder by historians and the illegitimate attempts of other writers that they
unsuccessfully tried to dismiss. Significantly, too, wonder also plays a key role in
Islamic and Indian metaphysics, as this book will show. How it arises, though, and
what it leads to are not easily assimilated to the Aristotelian tradition. In the case of
Islamic thought, for example, wonder arises from appreciation of the aesthetic form
of writing and generates an enhanced sense of rational responsibility; in Indian
thought, wonder arises not from the apprehension of change or of novelty, but
from repetition, and it enhances metaphysical ‘attunement’.
It is the key argument of this book that wonder plays a critical part in the history
of history because it is a historiographically and metaphysically rich concept. The
earliest historians stressed the location of wonder at boundaries, thresholds and
limits of time, thought, feeling, experience and reality. That location has been
persistent and continues today. Wonder takes us from one understanding of the
world to another. It takes us from present to past. It takes us from the physical
world to the spiritual world. It takes us from the specific to the universal and vice
versa; from the habitual to the historical; from the old the new; from under-
standing things to understanding ourselves; from exclusion to inclusion and thereby
the unethical to the ethical. If you want to know where the cross-beams, con-
nection points and limits of history’s blueprint or thaumascope are, to put it cru-
dely, look at wonder. It is in this sense that I see wonder as the beginning of
historiography. Moreover, I believe that a greater appreciation of these features in
histories makes it possible to think of new ways of doing history. It is in this sense
also that I see wonder as the beginning of history.
Despite this rich tradition of thought, wonder has barely rated a mention in
contemporary research. In philosophy, Howard Parsons, Ronald Hepburn and
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John Sallis have offered definitional accounts,10 but wonder is generally treated
as a marginal concept that takes form at the hand of Descartes and then dis-
appears at the rise of modern epistemology. Wonder is collapsed into curiosities
and relegated to the sideshow, vaudeville performance or cinema, only to come
back in science, and in particular the entertainments of the Exploratorium or
Questacon. Philosophy and history are too rational, old or straitlaced, perhaps,
to do wonder now. This was much to Heidegger’s lament. If it has made a
comeback, it is thanks to feminist philosophers such as Luce Irigaray and Mar-
guerite La Caze. The implications of their work for the idea of history are
outlined in chapter eight of this book, although I note that their reading of
wonder begins with Descartes.
In history, it is wonders that have captured our attention, rather than wonder, as
with Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park’s highly-acclaimed Wonders and the Order
of Nature. Theirs is a narrative that it is all too easy to connect to the themes of
globalisation and possession. As I argue in chapters five, eight and nine of this book
wonder is not just an object in history, it is also a disposition exercised by people in
different times and places. Their thoughts and experiences remind us that histor-
iography and metaphysics are not just conservative, descriptive thought games.
History and metaphysics can be revised and reinscribed, and they can be in ways
that acknowledge peoples who are often treated as objects rather than subjects. It
can empower those people to make histories and to challenge whether we need
history in the ways in which the West has understood it. It can be, and arguably
ought to be, unsettling.
An unsettling history of history
So how to begin? I have decided to set this work in motion by revisiting con-
temporary histories of history. In combination, they contribute a narrative that is so
much in agreement as to be highly unusual in the field. Hence my description of the
history of history as a smooth running thaumascope. They align in at least four major
ways: first, they present developments in strict chronological order until the twentieth
century is reached, when thematic approaches take over; second, they turn on the
analysis of works by historical thinkers (roughly ‘great books by great men’, or more
unusually, ‘great books by overlooked women’); third, they begin with philosophical
histories made during the Enlightenment, or at a pinch, go back to Herodotus; and
fourth, they suggest the professionalization of the field in the nineteenth century and
then its democratization or disintegration at the hands of gender, postcolonial or
postmodern thinkers. An analysis of recent introductory contributions by Ernst Brei-
sach, Eileen Ka-May Cheng, Michael Bentley, Roger Spalding and Christopher
Parker, Georg G. Iggers and Edward Q. Wang and Anna Green and Kathleen Troup
confirms these four features and generates a master list of topics like this:
 Ancient Greek and Ancient Roman historians
 Christian Medieval historians
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 European Renaissance and Reformation historians
 European Enlightenment and Philosophical historians
 National and Scientific historians
 Economic historians





I have used the same list of topics for this book, but I have shaken up the sense
that they make in combination in three ways. First, I have interrupted the narrative
with an analysis of Islamic, Chinese and Indian histories and metaphysics. I have
done so, as I noted above, to ensure that history is not seen as a simple derivation
from ancient Greek thought. Moreover, these traditions of thought suggest ways of
making general sense of things that can fruitfully enrich our understanding of the
idea of history today.
Second, in line with the discussion on the general nature of metaphysics earlier
in this introduction, I have not attempted to draw a strict boundary around history
and therefore to separate it from other kinds of writing or thought tradition.
Wonder writing, histories, philosophies, literature and film jostle together. More-
over, I have also tried to include a range of historians, from those you would
expect to see in an introductory work on historiography—such as Leopold von
Ranke—through to the writers of fine histories that have previously been neglec-
ted, through again to works that we might be less proud to call our own. These are
books that flopped at market or which were sensationally successful on account of
contents that would not be out of place in a Buzzfeed quiz or a Reddit forum
today. To borrow an example from Edward Feser to explain this, if thinkers have
produced the abstract notion of a Euclidean triangle, then they have also produced
the hastily drawn triangle on the plastic seat of a moving bus.11 Finding these
histories has been fun and reading them has been at turns amusing, disturbing,
challenging and even trying. Regardless, they are worthy of inclusion because
they suggest the same disposition towards general sense making that we see in the
books that customarily serve as shorthand for the history of history. They reflect
the imprint of metaphysics, and sometimes even its wilful and playful appropria-
tion. Historiography is all the richer for their consideration, as is the history of
metaphysics.
Third, and finally, I have rethreaded the narrative by means of a focus on
wonder. That, in itself, has been a revelation. As I have acknowledged in this
book, I did not notice the dragons in the Shiji of Sima Qian or von Ranke’s Ahnen
or intuitive cognition until I started researching this book. Once you notice details
like this, though, you begin to see the history of history in a different way, and as
I argued above, you appreciate wonder as the beginning of history and of
historiography.
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Chapter One opens with Polybius’ unsuccessful attempt to steer history clear
of the ‘unworthy and unmanly’ efforts of paradoxologists or wonder writers. His
Histories, we will discover, argues for the discernment of universals in particular
phenomena, thereby showing his mutual interest with Plato and Aristotle in
understanding what is knowable and what is unknowable. Moreover, like Plato
and Aristotle, he argues for wonder in his account of how historians make sense
of phenomena. But he also calls upon wonder to highlight when he is not sure
about the knowledge claims of other historians. In the Histories and in Ancient
Greek historiography a double function for wonder was thereby established,
applying to knowledge in good faith and knowledge not in good faith. In signalling
the second in the manner of literary or rhetorical conventions or topoi, Polybius
opened the door to overlap with, and parody by, the writers of paradoxologies or
wonder works.
In Chapter Two I argue that the kinds of judgements that Polybius made about
the idea of history continued in medieval Europe. Historians Gerald of Wales,
Bede (682–735 CE) and Gervase of Tilbury (1150–1228 CE) attempted to make
general sense of things in the light of the metaphysical writings of Augustine of
Hippo (354–430 CE), Thomas Aquinas (1225–75 CE) and Roger Bacon (1214–94
CE). They saw history as a means for discerning universals, which like Aristotle
they considered to be immanent, in things. Additionally, they still set boundaries
between the knowable and the unknowable. But they also expanded the lines of
thought that Polybius set down, by drawing upon medieval metaphysics to chart a
detailed account of wonder as rational and as a form of mental restraint. And they
saw themselves as having solved Polybius’ dilemma of judging claims to knowledge
by asserting that while some things are unknowable to us, nothing is unknowable
to God. This, I will argue, provided them with the opportunity to emphasise ethics
as well as epistemology in the pursuit of metaphysics, for if an historian could not
judge if a claim to knowledge was in good faith, God certainly could. Chapter
Three sees us take a twist in our tale. I bring Aristotle’s Poetics to the forefront, and
with it, affective and physiological notions of wonder at work in the pre-modern
Islamic world. I appreciate that in some ways, ‘Islamic world’ is a clumsy coverall
title for a broad and sophisticated range of Arabic, Berber, Syriac and Persian works
that emanated from North Africa through to the East Mediterranean, through to
the courses of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers and beyond. I have, however,
used it as it has most currency still in histories of history. I will argue that the
Arabic translation of Poetics from a Syriac intermediary text epitomises the ‘the
strange and the transferred’ uses of language that Ibn Rushd (also known as Aver-
roes) (1126–1198) pinpointed as triggers for wonder. This will be new territory in
English-language historiography, taking us from Ibn Khaldun’s (1332–1406) well-
known thoughts on history as both form and substance to his assertion of affective
and charismatic experiences of wonder in prophecy. Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts on
wonder, I will argue, help us to relocate him in a world in which para-
doxographers, historians and metaphysicians not only saw the experience of
wonder as the means of revealing the universal in the particular, but as the main
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means for judging the beauty of speech in histories such as Muhammad ibn Jarir al
Tabari’s (838–923 CE) History of the Prophets and Kings. In this way, I will argue
that Islamic historiography is generative, rather than conservative, as commentators
have been inclined to see it.
Chapter Four opens with dragons and scans official and unofficial Chinese his-
tories to highlight the interest of historians in being in harmony with an immanent
world, and of growing into an understanding of that world by speaking, but more
importantly, by being silent and therefore being open to and a part of it. We will
also, however, see historians speak out when harmony ossifies into social and
political practices that suggest close mindedness to the immanent world. We will
see them speak out obliquely, as Sima Qian (145–86 BCE) did in his Shiji, and we
will see them speak out through wonders, as authors of ‘strange histories’ like Duan
Chengshi (ca. 800–63 CE), Pu Songling (1640–1715), Yuan Mei (1716–97) and Ji
Yun (1724–1805) did. Therefore, we will see a historiographical tradition that is
interested in the immanent, which expresses views on how to discern the imma-
nent, and which assumes it has a role in opening peoples’ minds to an appreciation
of the general sense of things.
Early-modern historians continued ancient Greek traditions of using sense per-
ception to discern universals. But as I argue in Chapter Five, they also enhanced
those earlier conjunctions of history and metaphysics by insisting upon the
exhaustive categorisation of the most basic kinds of things in our world, including
emotions. Jean Bodin’s (1529/30–1596 CE) Method for the Easy Comprehension of
History provides a clear example of this. Bodin wrote history not just for the sake of
describing what he took to be the actual structure of the world, or to possess that
world, but because he saw categorisation through history as necessary for the
rightful operation of mind, the self, and society. This, as it will be argued through
an analysis of the historical works of Walter Ralegh (c. 1552–1618) and Nathaniel
Wanley (1638–80), and the philosophers Francis Bacon (1568–1621), René Des-
cartes (1596–1650) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), established what I call a
‘triple skip’ from metaphysics to epistemology to ethics via history.
Chapter Six unfolds Leopold von Ranke’s (1795–1886) and G.W.F. Hegel’s
(1770–1831) thoughts on the interconnection between history and philosophy
and illustrates how their interleaving of wonder, intuition and thought was also
expressed in a much wider range of works than is typically acknowledged, from
the metaphysical universal histories of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Sarah
Josepha Hale (1788–1879), to the paradoxological histories of Daniel Defoe
(1684–1731), and William Howitt (1792–1879). This interest in interconnection,
I argue, stems from their desire to explain how we might gain an understanding
of the universal from concrete, particular, historical phenomena and their varying
determinations to see the ‘leap’ from one to the other through the more or less
rational experiences of the sublime, intuition, and spirit. In the case of von
Ranke, there is an argument for the superiority of history over philosophy in
explaining the universal. But this argument, it will be shown, bears fewer radical
implications than the historical embodiment of intuition as female in Hale’s
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world, or its realisation in the ghosts, revenants and poltergeists of Defoe and
Howitt’s spirited histories.
What happens to our attempts to make general sense of things if sensory per-
ception changes? Chapter Seven charts the rise of scepticism about perception in
written and filmic histories, and tests whether there was a knock-on effect to
wonder. All of the thinkers canvassed in this chapter—Lynne Kirby (1952–), Tom
Gunning (1949–), Jonathan Crary (1951–), Mary Ann Doane (1952–), Walter
Benjamin (1892–1940) and Roland Barthes (1915–1980)—argued that modernity
ushered in seismic shifts in seeing and knowing. Yet I will also show that in their
hands, wonder maintained a relatively stable metaphysical function as the gateway
to the consideration of the contingent. This, I will conclude, generated new
thinking about the historicisation of metaphysics ushered in by Hegel, where the
speed of change for immanent universals may vary.
The ethical implications of our attempts to make general sense of things through
history is the focus of Chapter Eight. It picks up from Chapter Seven in high-
lighting the interest of writers such as Merry Wiesner-Hanks (1952–), Joan Wallach
Scott (1941–), Lynn Hunt (1945–), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Hélène Cixous
(1937–), Luce Irigiray (1930–) and Marguerite La Caze (1964–) in revisionary,
rather than descriptive metaphysics. That is, they seek to move from outlining the
most basic features of things to making sense of things in new ways. The driver in
this case is the question of how we ought to make sense of the world, as seen in the
examples of gender history and gender metaphysics, and in historiographical
and philosophical reflections on the uncomfortable implications of ‘un homing’
ourselves through wonder to acknowledge others and to show them hospitality.
Chapter Nine considers whether the acknowledgement of what some post
colonialists call the subaltern—the traces of peoples ‘without history’ within the
evidence record of the coloniser—implies the need to walk away from historio-
graphy as we know it and towards an aesthetic ‘historicality’ in which the possibi-
lity of wonder is reclaimed. Ranajit Guha lays this path by showing the affinity of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics with the philosophy of Abhinavagupta (950–1015 CE, also
known as Abhinava) in Rabindranath Tagore’s (1861–1941) idea of passing
through the threshold limit of wonder to experience latent historicality. Romila
Thapar (1931–) navigates to a sense of historicality via very different means: her
idea of a Western ‘scientific’ idea of history. As we shall see, the key explanation
for this difference of route is her professed need for protection from historio-
graphical interference from the state, violent threats, and colonial portrayals of
India as a timeless land of Europeanised wonder. I will argue that the common link
between these two writers—and Tagore—could be their refraction of classical
Indian metaphysics, and in particular the metaphysics of light developed from var-
ious sources such as Kalidas̄a ̄ (fl. 5th century CE) by Abhinavagupta. That meta-
physics argues for immanence in all things, including history, and ourselves, as
discerned by attunement to wonder.
In Chapter Ten, I ask whether Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) and Hannah
Arendt’s (1906–1975) different approaches to the connection of history and
Introduction xxi
metaphysics provide us with the means to deal with extraordinary events such as
the Holocaust. I will argue that they do not, on the grounds that Heidegger’s
reading of the opening of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an invitation to dwell apart with
the ordinary and to make it inscrutable, and Arendt’s recuperation of responsibility
in a philosophical-political realm through consensus metaphysics, prioritise the
ordinary over the extraordinary. They, like many thinkers before them, treat the
extraordinary as the edge case or as the focus of a curiosity that at least generates
what Heidegger calls ‘idle talk’ and at worst, eternal damnation. I therefore ask
whether the Holocaust might be seen as a new beginning for wonder, and there-
fore for historiography.
Finally, in a very brief conclusion, I reiterate that the corpus of works in this
book are not an example of ‘everyday’ historiography or ‘everyday’ metaphysics,
but a demonstration of the variety of forms of entanglement of history and meta-
physics and of the historiographical and metaphysical richness of wonder.
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SENSE AND NON-SENSE IN ANCIENT
GREEK HISTORIES
Plato | Herodotus | Thucydides | Phlegon |
Polybius | Aristotle
The ancient Greek writer Polybius (200–118 BCE) had a very clear idea of what
historians should not do. Surely, he writes:
… an historian’s object should not be to amaze his readers by a series of
thrilling anecdotes; nor should he aim at producing speeches which might have
been delivered, nor study dramatic propriety in details like the writer of a
tragedy: but his function is above all to record with fidelity what was actually
said or done, however commonplace it may be.
(The Histories, 2.56)
They should not try to enthral their readers, they should not make things up and
they should not give people and events a dramatic backstory. They should tell it
like it was, no matter how ordinary or even insignificant the resulting narrative.
Polybius’ stern words seem a long way from the engaging and even epic
beginning given to the study of history in books such as Ernst Breisach’s Historio-
graphy: Ancient, Medieval and Modern:
The Homeric epics, now innocuously enshrined in the treasure house we all
call Great Literature, were in centuries past sources of inspiration and pride.
The ancient Greeks found them endlessly fascinating, edifying, and particularly
useful for the educating of the young.1
This past for history as ‘heir to epic poetry’ is woven with mythical heroes
and guides for good or moral living.2 It sounds like a fitting start for a dis-
cipline: ‘fascinating, edifying, and particularly useful’. But as historians today
appreciate, the past is rarely a straightforward story of heirs and successors.
Myth and epic poetry were part but not all of an ancient world in which
texts, images, performances, memories and accounts of geography were
exchanged and circulated.3 People told stories, recited poetry, sang and
recounted events for understanding and entertainment and to keep track of
relationships, victories, offences and even debts. Those stories shifted in form
and content as the languages and cultures of Europe, Africa and Asia collided
and coalesced in the Hellenistic world that emerged from the wake of Alex-
ander’s conquests. It was in this world that the western idea of historians and
of histories emerged.4
The historians of the Hellenistic world did not have university history depart-
ments, school syllabuses, or historiography texts to guide them in their work.
What they did have were images, oral accounts and other texts upon which they
could comment. In writing history, they often told their readers what they
thought about the efforts of their predecessors and contemporaries. They made
judgements about whether other works were good histories or even histories
at all.
It was by judgement that historians worked to define their discipline. This in
itself was a significant act, for it is not beyond the bounds of possibility to believe
in a world in which everything that is called a history is accepted as a history. This,
as we already know, was not Polybius’ world. He discriminated between histories
and other written works, and between good and bad histories. How he did so
marks what is arguably the beginning of our story of the relationship between
history and metaphysics. In this chapter we trace that beginning to three particular
judgements that Polybius made about history: first, that it is concerned with the
universal; second, that we can discern universals through rigorous acts of sensory
perception; and third, that while our own sensory perceptions are to be trusted
more than the claims of others, our perceptions have limits. So far so good, until
we get to wonder. Polybius, as we shall see, did not see all experiences of wonder
as equal. Plato (c. 427–347 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) might have
positioned wonder as the beginning of philosophical thinking, but their scanty
descriptions of the nature of wonder left a lot to be desired. In their wake,
Polybius struggled not only to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate
claims to wonder—thereby making it extremely difficult to divide history off
from ‘idle and unprofitable’ paradoxology or ‘wonder writing’ (Histories 1.14)—
but also to pin down when he thought it was right for him to seek recourse in
wonder in his own writing. In so doing, he encountered both the sheer difficulty
and slipperiness of metaphysics in ways that exceeded the experiences of his
predecessors, Herodotus and Thucydides. This chapter charts that struggle, and in
so doing exposes the mutual interest of historians and philosophers of the ancient
Greek world in finding the limits of our attempts to make the most general sense
of things. In particular, it introduces questions about what is knowable and what
is unknowable, what is accessible and inaccessible to sensory perception, what is
natural and what is supernatural, and what is universal and what is particular.
In short, it introduces Polybius to us as an historian who was interested in
transcendence.
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Historiography begins with history, or philosophy?
Polybius’ description of how not to write history is one of many examples of his-
toriographical judgement from the Hellenistic world. Polybius was not the first
Western historian: we give credit to Herodotus (c. 484–c. 424 BCE) for that
achievement. Polybius’ Histories were, however, important in explaining the tran-
sition of Rome from republic to empire to a Greek world that had developed from
the conquests of Alexander.5 Moreover, his work is distinguished by the sheer
number and range of comments he offers about the works of earlier and con-
temporary historians, many of which do not survive today. His Histories are a
compendium of historiographical shadows.
Polybius’ views about other historians are not concentrated in an introduction or
what we might call a literature review. They are peppered throughout The Histories
in a way that suggests that history is defined via the aggregation of arguments for and
against other historians. The quote that I opened this chapter with, for instance, can
be found towards the end of his account of the first Punic War between Rome and
Carthage (264–241 BCE). The prompt for his comments is the need to explain to
his readers why the histories of Aratus and Phylarchus diverge, and why he places
more credence on the claims of the former than the latter. The problem with
Phylarchus’ account, he tells us, is that it is driven by the ‘unworthy and
unmanly’ purpose of bringing the past ‘vividly before his readers’ (2.56).
Yet Polybius’ work is not simply an aggregation of snipish judgements, carried
by the assumption that argument by volume is a winning strategy. He knew what
he liked and what he didn’t like, and those preferences reflected three key judge-
ments about the idea of history that I introduced at the start of the chapter. The
first of these, we recall, was that history concerns the study of universals; the
second that discernment of universals is best achieved via rigorous acts of sensory
perception; and third that sensory perception has limits. If The Histories is a com-
pendium of historiographical shadows, it is also a reflection of philosophical sha-
dows. My grounds for claiming this, as we will see below, is that the substance of
his claims owes more to Aristotle—whom he does not credit—than to a Plato he
credits for a revolution in thinking.
Polybius’ interest in universals is first declared in book one, chapter three, with
the claim that his predecessors had presented world history as ‘a series of dis-
connected transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their
localities’. They see only parts, when there is the whole to be understood:
… it has always seemed to me that men, who are persuaded that they get a
competent view of universal history from episodal history, are very like per-
sons who should see the limbs of some body, which had once been living and
beautiful, scattered and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as
actually beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself … some
idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge and clear
comprehension cannot (1.3).
Sense and non-sense in Ancient Greek histories 3
This is a significant set of claims by Polybius, and it is worth unpacking. History,
he suggests, is not singular. While particular individuals engage in particular acts,
and particular phenomena come into being, or change, or disappear, historians do
not just describe those particularities. This is more than just the observation that we
use words like ‘horse’ or ‘soldier’ to describe particular phenomena; what he wants
historians to do is to discern the ways in which phenomena reflect or suggest uni-
versals. That Polybius saw universals as in things was not a given. He could have
opted to argue—following Plato in Republic—that universals are separate from
particular objects, and that philosopher kings—not historians—are needed to tell us
about their existence. But he didn’t, opting instead for the Aristotelian view that
universals exist in re, in things. Moreover, the excerpt above suggests that they can
exist in things that appear to be quite different to one another. This is therefore not
a simple case of us, for example, applying the label ‘soldier’ to two different men.
Quite different events can be like the parts of a body, and Polybius wants us to see
the whole body.
The universal or ‘body of history’ that Polybius discerns, which makes all phe-
nomena ‘incline in one direction’, is Tyche or fortune. This does not mean that
Polybius is a predeterminist: a believer that historical outcomes are controlled by
fate (1.63; and 18.28). Rather, his claim is that we can see fortune at work when
we step back and consider the broad sweep of events, just as we can see the skills
and decisions of individuals at work when we consider smaller-scale events (1.4;
2.35). He is, consequently, quite critical of historians who automatically see fortune
at work in smaller-scale events because they fail to give credit for human skill. This
is seen, for instance, in his acknowledgment of the achievements of the Roman
general Scipio Africanus in book ten, and of the wider Roman leadership in
book eighteen:
Now all other writers represent [Scipio Africanus] as a man favoured by for-
tune, who succeeded in his undertakings contrary to rational expectation, and
by the mere force of circumstances. They consider apparently such men to be,
so to speak, more godlike and worthy of admiration, than those who act in
every case by calculation. They do not seem to be aware of the distinction
between credit for good fortune and credit for good conduct in the case of
such men; and that the former may be assigned to any one however com-
monplace, while the latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent cal-
culation and clear intelligence: and it is these last whom we should look upon
as the most god-like and god-beloved. (10.2)
… it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their
differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off
the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not
put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as
the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes,
may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they
deserve. (18.28)
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Polybius’ clever play between historical scales secures a place for human will and
thought in writing about the past. Here we arrive at his second judgement about
the idea of history, which concerns sensory perception. Universals are not beyond
particulars and not beyond our understanding of them. But how does that under-
standing arise? Socrates’ interlocutors got there as a consequence of his ‘midwifery’,
and Plato consequently suggested that philosopher kings are needed to help us
discern more than the shadows of universal forms. Polybius, like Aristotle, holds
that we can get there on the basis of our own thought. We do not need the phi-
losopher kings. And like Aristotle, again, Polybius sees that thought as taking shape
from perceptual sensations (see Aristotle, De Sensu, 1.436b.10–12, 16–17; also De
Anima ii.2.413b.4–7; ii.3.414b6–9, 434a30–b4). Indeed, Aristotle’s and Polybius’
writings share an interest in empirical description, with the key distinction between
their writings turning on the former’s interest in natural phenomena and the latter’s
interest in human action.
Polybius does not offer an account of how sensory perception works physiolo-
gically, as Aristotle does in works like De Sensu. His interest, rather, is in the senses,
and more specifically, what he sees as the three perceptual bases for historical
knowledge: that which is seen, that which is heard, and that which is read
(12.27.1–4). Moreover, he holds that there is a hierarchy of the senses in historical
research. That which is seen provides the most accurate and certain knowledge
while that which is read provides the least accurate and least certain knowledge.
This hierarchy of ways of knowing is no less significant a revolution in thought,
Polybius tells us, than Plato’s claim that ‘human affairs will not go well until phi-
losophers become kings or kings become philosophers’. This is because the
achievement of ‘proper’ historical knowledge will require historians to break their
dependency on written reports and thus on other historians’ claims to knowledge
(12.28). Historians will need to see things for themselves, as witnesses, and to use
their previous experiences to actively make sense of what they see (20.12; 7.25.4;
27.28). Reading about the past, on the other hand, is equivalent to seeing the
shadows in Plato’s allegory of the cave: whatever glimpse we gain of events is
dependent on the skill and judgment of the writer in telling us about them. His
point is that our knowledge ought not be dependent on that of others. To settle
for less than our own sense making and judgement in the writing of history is to
settle for history ‘without eyes’, as he explains in book one:
For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if
you take truth from History what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale.
Therefore, one must not shrink either from blaming one’s friends or praising
one’s enemies; nor be afraid of finding fault with and commending the same
persons at different times. For it is impossible that men engaged in public
affairs should always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong.
Holding ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we must as his-
torians make statements and pronounce judgement in accordance with the
actions themselves (1.14).
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Polybius’ commitment to the idea of historical knowledge as perceptual sense making
is reflected in his decision to write about a period that he experienced and about places
to which he travelled (4.2; 29.14; 10.9; 30.4; 3.26). At the same time, however, he
acknowledges that he has provided a somewhat ideal picture of the acquisition of
knowledge. Historians cannot always be in the right place and the right time to wit-
ness events and regions can be too remote or too dangerous to access. They cannot
also be expected to be fluent in all of the world’s languages. This is where sense
making by hearing comes in. If historians are unable to witness an event, then they can
build up an account of what happened by critically interviewing witnesses. If that is
not possible, it is only at that point that the historian resorts to sense making by read-
ing, but they must think carefully about the plausibility of what they read to achieve as
accurate an understanding of the past as possible (3.58; 12.28;12.25; 27.5).
Just as there are limits to the experiences of historians, so too there are limits to sense
making and therefore to historical knowledge. This is Polybius’ third judgement about
the idea of history. This is not simply an acknowledgment that historians might not
have the background or linguistic skills to account for what they see. Polybius has a
more fundamental point to make: some phenomena seem to defy understanding and
rational explanation. So far, so reasonable, but this is where Polybius strikes serious
difficulties in trying to explain the historian’s craft. Those difficulties arise, as we shall
see, from Polybius’ faith in his own visual perceptions as certain and his use of wonder
to denote the limit of the knowable rather than the beginning of the knowable.
Polybius’ first call upon wonder is to signal the boundary of his ability to explain
his visual perceptions. He trusts what he sees, but he does not know why he has
seen what he has seen. He writes:
Those things of which it is impossible or difficult for a mere man to ascertain
the causes, such as a continuous fall of rains and unseasonable wet, or, on the
contrary, droughts and frosts, one may reasonably impute to God and Fortune
in default of any other explanation; and from them come destruction of fruits,
as well as long-continued epidemics, and other similar things, of which it is
not easy to find the cause (37.9).
In the context of Polybius’ account of knowledge, this is historical non-sense.
Then he does something very interesting: he labels this experience as wonder and
characterises it as being ‘overwhelmed with astonishment’, horrified and even
‘struck dumb’ by the scale and the strangeness of some events (1.63; 31.4; 7.17).
These are events that cannot be rendered sensible by any prior experience. They
mark the limits of historical explanation. Or do they?
Wonder as beginning: philosophy
One person’s limit can be another person’s beginning. Both Plato and Aristotle tell
us that wonder marks the beginning of philosophy. Plato’s most extensive state-
ment on wonder can be found in Theaetetus, his dialogue between Socrates and a
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young student of mathematics whose name is captured in the title. The dialogue
turns on the question ‘what is knowledge?’, to which Theaetetus makes four
attempts at an answer. His first attempt is to suggest that knowledge can be defined
by reference to examples of it. Socrates rejects this view as a diversion, because
examples presuppose an understanding that a definition of knowledge is intended
to offer. The second to fourth attempts propose that knowledge is sense percep-
tion; that knowledge is true judgement; and that knowledge is true judgement
with an account. No resolution about a ‘right’ definition of knowledge is achieved
by the end of the text.
The discussion on the second definition of knowledge is significant, for it is in
here that we see the designation of wonder not as a last resort in sense making, but
as the point of departure for philosophical thought. The problem with sense per-
ception, Socrates informs us, is that it is not infallible. We can be mistaken in
conclusions about what we see, hear, smell and feel. Eyewitness accounts can
differ, and even be irreconcilable. This point forms the backdrop for Theaetetus’
declaration in section 155c that ‘I am lost in wonder when I think of all these
things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim’.
Socrates’ reply takes the form of an affirmation that says some interesting things
about the nature of knowing:
this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the
only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of
Thaumas made a good genealogy. (155d)
Here we see wonder as connecting the human with the divine—denoted by the
use of the term thaumazein and its connection with Iris, the messenger of
the gods6—which was also the case in Polybius’ Histories. But the discovery of the
divine is not through phenomena that no-one understands. Rather, Theaetetus’
head swims because he realises that he cannot get a grip on a concept that people
appear to use with ease every day. Wonder can be prompted by objects, events or
experiences that are at hand, familiar, or that are so commonplace as to be taken
for granted. Here Plato highlights the potential for a lack of mental effort with the
familiar, and not just things that are new to us. Polybius thought that we should
work hard to establish an understanding of events and phenomena from other
times and cultures; Plato also wants us to labour just as hard on the things that we
appear to take for granted.
The idea of the familiar made strange in Plato’s writings applies by extension to
our own thoughts. Wonder arises in our everyday experiences, and is thus a part of
our present. But it also aids our thinking about our own past experiences and
thought. As Socrates explains in Cratylus:
I myself have long been wondering at my own wisdom, and I distrust it. So it
seems to me that we must re-examine what I am saying. For being deceived
by oneself is the most terrible thing of all: when the deceiver is not absent
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even for a little while, but is always there, how could that not be fearful?
Hence one must, as it seems, frequently turn around to what has been said
before, and try, as that famous poet has it, to ‘look forward and backward at
the same time’. (428d1–8)
Wonder is a remedy against the orthodoxy of everyday thought, and against being
enchanted by our own thoughts. Wonder is thus an aid for knowledge and a form of
protection against reliance on the thoughts of others and the comfort of assuming
that our own knowledge is certain.
Plato’s account of wonder is such that the unknowable is not necessarily implied.
Wonder can be triggered by the familiar or the strange. This is not the case for
Polybius, who restricts his discussion of wonder to unknown, but also potentially
unknowable phenomena. Recall Polybius’ examples of rains that are difficult or
impossible to explain. Difficulty suggests that it is possible, albeit with more effort,
information, or assistance. What Polybius means by impossible is harder to discern. It
could mean unknowable, or it could mean not knowable with certainty. As
Polybius connects this sense of impossibility with being awestruck, this does not
seem to be a case where certainty is at stake. It is, I believe, an encounter with the
unknowable. This is not a case of Meno’s paradox, of searching for something that
you do not know about (Plato, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno,
Phaedo). We know about the rains in his example, we just may not ever be able to
understand why they happened. This is not a scenario included in Plato’s discussion
of wonder, suggesting either that he did not hold perceived phenomena to be
unknowable, or he did not see wonder as helping in this case. There either is no
issue with Polybius’ examples or there is such an issue that recourse to wonder will
not solve it.
Grappling with this problem further takes us to Aristotle who, like Plato, posi-
tions wonder at the beginning of philosophical thought, as is clear from his
Metaphysics:
It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philoso-
phize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual
progression raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the
changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of
the universe. Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant
(thus the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of
wonders); therefore, if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy,
it is obvious that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for
any practical utility. The actual course of events bears witness to this; for
speculation of this kind began with a view to recreation and pastime, at a time
when practically all the necessities of life were already supplied. Clearly then it
is for no extrinsic advantage that we seek this knowledge; for just as we call a
man independent who exists for himself and not for another, so we call this
the only independent science, since it alone exists for itself (1.982b).
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Aristotle’s opening assumption is that humans desire to know, and that they desire not
only knowing particular things, but also the activity of knowing itself. That is, we
desire knowing as much as the known.7 Knowledge starts with sense perception and
knowledge of facts (knowing that) but proceeds via two kinds of wonder to consider
knowledge of first principles (knowing why something is the case): ‘obvious perplexities’
(aporiai) and then ‘greater matters’. Aristotle cites a range of examples of obvious per-
plexities, including soltices, automata and the mathematical case of needing a number
that is both odd and even for the diagonal of a square with sides equal to one (1.983a).
These examples suggest that wonder might be experienced in a range of contexts,
from geometrical calculation to sense perceptions of human-made and natural phe-
nomena. The geometry example might lead us to conclude that wonder is triggered
by being confronted by illogical claims, but the examples of the soltices and automata
suggest that we might also be taken aback by not being able to explain why something
happens (as might be the case with soltices) or that our explanations for ourselves
and the world do not stack up (as the self-movement of automata might challenge a
definition of ‘life’).8 Importantly, what these examples have in common is that they
are not unknown to us, and there is no intimation of them being unknowable.
Aristotle’s examples of greater matters are all large scale: the changes of the
moon and the sun, the stars, and the origins of the universe (1.982b). They are not
mutually exclusive with obvious perplexities. This is not simply the case because
soltices are included in the examples for obvious perplexities: Aristotle makes it
clear that we go from one to the other via a ‘gradual progression’. The idea that we
experience a ‘gradual progression’ of instances of wonder signals a distinctive deci-
sion by Aristotle about the relationship of wonder and knowledge. The experience
of wonder is disruptive. Yet it develops in a gradual manner. It could be, for exam-
ple, that it develops in a manner akin to Aristotle’s view of how we arrive at an
appreciation of universals. That is through repeated perception and the mental
activities of grouping memories together and of generalising from particulars
(Metaphysics, 980b29), as he explains somewhat cryptically in Posterior Analytics:
When one of the undifferentiated things takes a stand, the first universal is in
the mind for although one perceives the particular, perception is of the uni-
versal, e.g. of man but not of Callias the man. Again a stand is taken in these,
until the undivided, that is, the universal stands, e.g. Such and such an animal
stands, and in this same way (100a15–b3).
This suggests that the development of wonder is not itself disruptive or a form of
non-sense. Rather, Aristotle presents it as a part of the development of knowledge.
It is not outside of or prior to knowledge. It is a kind of knowing, and more par-
ticularly, knowing what you do not know. Conversely, the gradual development
of knowledge rests upon the disruptive power of wonder. In short, sense is what it
is because of non-sense.
Aristotle’s account of wonder fills in epistemological details that are missing in
Plato’s account. But he too directs his attention to the familiar and the unknown
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but not to the unknowable. This is a problem for Polybius, who resolves in the
end to credit these phenomena to Fortune or the gods. He trusts what he sees, but
he cannot make sense of it. Moreover, he does not see these phenomena as pro-
viding an opportunity for learning: his job is to provide an authoritative account
for his readers to learn. So he talks of wonder to signal what is unknowable. This
creates a new problem for Polybius, which Plato and Aristotle do not address in
their accounts of wonder. Plato and Aristotle talk about wonder in contexts of
knowledge in good faith. Polybius, on the other hand, is clearly aware that people
do not always claim knowledge in good faith. To understand this distinction,
think about these three scenarios: you can credit a phenomenon to Fortune or
the gods on the grounds of having made an effort to explain that phenomenon; or
on the basis that you do not want to put in the effort to explain that phenom-
enon; or on the basis that you have included that phenomenon in your narrative
for reasons other than seeking historical truth. Polybius locates his own efforts in
the first scenario, but he is not sure that other historians’ efforts should be simi-
larly designated. They could, for example, be writing to Aristotle’s instruction on
wonder in Rhetorics:
when the right moment comes, one must say, “And give me your attention,
for it concerns you as much as myself”; and, “I will tell you such a thing as
you have never yet” heard of, so strange and wonderful (3.14).
The distinction between these three cases matters for Polybius, and not being able
to tell them apart worries him because recourse to wonder may signal surrender to
various base tendencies or temptations,9 as he explains in his account of the diffi-
culties of writing remote histories in book three:
And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the world, whether
compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way of a personal inspection
were only begun: for some of the regions were utterly barbarous, others unin-
habited; and a still greater obstacle in way of gaining information as to what he
saw was his ignorance of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a
still greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account of what he
had seen and despising all attempts to glorify himself by traveller’s tales of wonder,
to report for our benefit the truth and nothing but the truth (3.58).
Historical thought is hard work, and the achievement of excellence is rare (33.6–8).
Like reading, it can only be mastered through consistent effort and determination
and the exercise of moderation (47.4–11).10
Polybius interprets moderation as a decision not only to hold back from
including some information, but also as a holding back in writing style. The less
thrilling or vivid a history, the more likely it is to reflect careful and critical thought
worthy of a philosopher king. By this measure, he saw his own work as outstanding
(20.3–4). But his work, as the example of the unknowable from above reminds us,
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was not devoid of wonder. So, what could he do to signal the distinction between
good histories and bad ones?
What Polybius tried to do, like Herodotus and Thucydides before him, was to
solve the problem stylistically. As we noted at the start of this chapter, Polybius
suggested a moderation of writing style, and in sparsity of recourse to wonder as an
explanation. As the next section—a comparison with the style of Herodotus and
Thucydides—will show, he did exercise restraint in mentioning wonder. But all
three historians took a further step and used wonder as a rhetorical convention or
motif to signal their scepticism about other historians’ claims. Here was an oppor-
tunity to generate clear ground for history. The problem with this approach was
that it was easily parodied, however, as the final part of this chapter will show.
Wonder and the style of history
As I noted at the outset of this chapter, Polybius was not the first historian. Nor
were his efforts unusual: The Histories lists a large number of contemporary and
antecedent histories. Most of those histories have not survived, and ironically, we
are reduced to understanding them through the words of Polybius alone. Two of
the most extensive histories that have survived from the ancient Greek world are
The Histories of Herodotus and the History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides
(c.460–c.395 BCE), and these are the works that we will take as the focal point for
our comparison with Polybius’ text.
One of the most striking things that emerges from a consideration of the two
Histories and the History of the Peloponnesian War is the scarcity with which wonder—
Thaumazein and its cognate concepts—is mentioned. But it is still present. There are
97 mentions in a corpus of around 312,000 words for Polybius; 79 in a corpus of
around 185,000 for Herodotus; and 21 mentions in a corpus of just over 150,000
words for Thucydides. Furthermore, of the 97 uses of Thaumazein in Polybius’ His-
tories, fewer than 10 are typically rendered as the English word wonder by various
translators. More commonly, they are presented as surprise (e.g. 1.78; 3.33; 3.57;
4.42; 15.20; 36.8); astonishment (e.g. 2.63; 3.61; 12.15; 21.38); admiration (e.g. 3.61;
4.82; 5.12; 9.8; 12.3); terror or alarm (e.g. 5.18; 6.56; 38.4); or puzzlement (11.27;
21.1). These cognates give us the sense of the novelty of wonder, of being struck,
confused or puzzled by something never seen before. More importantly, wonder is
something that people other than Polybius experience. The historical agents of The
Histories, like Hamilcar, experience wonder, as do historians like Phylarchus and
historians in the abstract. In 34.4, for example, we see that the poet Pytheas uses
vivid detail to ‘give pleasure or [to] rouse wonder’, whereas in 1.63 we gain a sense
of historians being rightly struck by events of a scale never seen before:
Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles of an Anti-
gonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of their fleets, would we
may well believe have been overwhelmed with astonishment at the hugeness
of these proportions if they had to tell the story of this war.
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On the whole, though, we gain a sense of the wonder of others as absurd and as
readily rectified by sensible consideration (e.g. 2.63).
Whereas Polybius frames wonder as resulting from a lack of mental effort by
others, Herodotus describes at least ten wonders that he has experienced. As
Christine Hunzinger has noted, this is just one type in a wide range of wonders
in The Histories. 11 Wonder is used to denote the recognition of unparalleled
human ingenuity, by which Herodotus means works of enormous scale or of
intricate craftsmanship. Consider for example his account of the Shrine of Leto in
book two and the breastplate gifted to the Lacedaemonians by King Amasis of
Egypt in book three:
In Buto there is a temple of Apollo and Artemis. The shrine of Leto where the
oracle is, is itself very great, and its outer court is sixty feet high. But what
caused me the most wonder among the things apparent there I shall mention.
In this precinct is the shrine of Leto, the height and length of whose walls is all
made of a single stone slab; each wall has an equal length and height; namely,
seventy feet. Another slab makes the surface of the roof, the cornice of which
is seven feet broad. (2.155)
The Lacedaemonians then equipped and sent an army to Samos, returning a
favour, as the Samians say, because they first sent a fleet to help the Lacedae-
monians against Messina; but the Lacedaemonians say that they sent this army
less to aid the Samians in their need than to avenge the robbery of the bowl
which they had been carrying to Croesus and the breastplate which Amasis
King of Egypt had sent them as a gift. This breastplate had been stolen by the
Samians in the year before they took the bowl; it was of linen, decked with
gold and cotton embroidery, and embroidered with many figures; but what
makes it worthy of wonder is that each thread of the breastplate, fine as each
is, is made up of three hundred and sixty strands, each plainly seen. (3.47)
Wonder also arises from contemplating the scale or diversity of natural features, as
with the size of Lake Moeris (2.149) and the richness of the Scythian environ-
ment (4.53). It is seen in lands on the margins of the world (e.g. 3.101–106;
3.116), but it is also used to describe the qualities of singular individuals—the
remarkably brave or audacious—who are known to us (e.g.. §2.121), and
instances of intervention by the gods. Wonder is for Herodotus, Hunzinger
concludes, anything but ordinary.12
Jessica Priestley has also credited Herodotus with the view that wonder is sub-
jective: one person’s ordinary can be another person’s extraordinary.13 This view is
conveyed in a distinctive stylistic feature in The Histories that Polybius appears to
have also adopted: wonders that cannot be verified or that are not believable are a
matter of what others say. We see this, for example, in Herodotus’ description of
the Corinthians recounting Arion’s travels by dolphin (1.23); Chersonese stories of
dried fish appearing to come back to life (9.120); Greek accounts of Heracles
giving sexual favours to a half woman, half snake in order to free his horses from
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her (4.9); and in descriptions of the motives ascribed to Alcmeonidae in book six
and Artemesia and the Telines in two chapters in book seven:
It is a wonder to me, and I do not believe the story, that the Alcmeonidae
would ever have agreed to hold up a shield as a sign for the Persians out of a
desire to make Athens subject to foreigners and to Hippias; for it is plain to see
that they were tyrant-haters as much as Callias (son of Phaenippus and father
of Hipponicus), or even more so. (6.121)
I find it a great wonder that a woman [Artemisia] went on the expedition
against Hellas: after her husband died, she took over his tyranny, though she
had a young son, and followed the army from youthful spirits and manliness,
under no compulsion. (§7.99)
Now it makes me wonder that Telines should have achieved such a feat, for
I have always supposed that such feats cannot be performed by any man but
only by such as have a stout heart and manly strength. Telines, however, is
reported by the dwellers in Sicily to have had a soft and effeminate disposition.
(§7.153)
In these examples, wonder functions as a form of scepticism about the claims of
others. Herodotus uses the term to alert us to the distance between his views and
those of others.
This leads us to an interesting question: if Herodotus did not believe some of the
claims that he encountered, why did he nonetheless still include them in The His-
tories? Detlev Fehling answers this question by assuming that Herodotus’ attribution
of accounts to others is nothing more than a rhetorical device used to present his
own materials in an engaging manner.14 Whether Fehling’s claim is true or not,
however, the impact of Herodotus’ style is such that we are steered for or against
conclusions about the reality or probability of events. Herodotus expresses doubt,
caution and outright scepticism about a wide range of phenomena, including those
that are not described as wonders (e.g. 2.123; 4.195.2; 6.105.3; 7.37.3; 152.3). He
also offers alternative versions of events on more than 125 occasions. Instances
where he offers alternatives include those where there are conflicting accounts and
where he offers his own thoughts on an event. Some alternatives are posed to be
dismissed immediately (e.g. 3.9.2) but others are left open to the reader’s judge-
ment (e.g. 3.122.1; 5.45.2). Generally, however, he makes a choice on behalf of
the reader (e.g. 2.146.1; 4.11.1; 8.94.1–4, 19). Herodotus exercises judgement, but
he does so in a way that shows his readers the ways in which he works through
others’ claims.
In The Histories of Herodotus and Polybius, both the workings and the conclu-
sions of the historian are presented for their audiences to consider. This is the case
whether phenomena are described as wonders or not. Some people’s claims to
knowledge are not believable because it is clear that these claims stem from a desire
to entertain the audiences of histories, or from a lack of effort in seeking out the
truth. Other claims to knowledge cannot be sustained or dismissed outright,
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because they rely upon evidence from the margins of the world that is not easily
corroborated. Still other claims to knowledge are legitimate, because they can be
attested through sensory experience. Finally, some claims to wonder are legitimate,
because the writer of the history attests that nothing of their kind has ever been
seen before. Herodotus and Polybius thus share in common an acknowledgement
of legitimate, illegitimate and inconclusive claims to both knowledge and wonder.
Where they differ is in the balance of these kinds of wonder in their works. The
far-ranging ethnographic sections of Herodotus’ Histories, for instance, take us to
wonders from the margins of the world; whereas Polybius’ history of events that
are close at hand allows him to minimise claims to wonder. This difference is
important for Polybius: the historian is not a passive recipient of information, but
an active participant in ensuring that history makes sense. He did not write history
at the scale of Herodotus because he did not believe that it could rest on certain
sense making. But he did not dispense with wonder, either.
The connection of the discipline of history with the mental activity of making
sense is also seen in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Aside from a
handful of examples where Thucydides employs the idea of wonder to express his
admiration for the achievements of individuals or groups (e.g. 1.138; 7.56; 2.39;
and 2.41), the term more commonly denotes a state of disbelief or even anger
about the unjust actions of others. This is seen in book three:
[I] wonder at those who have proposed to reopen the case of the Mityle-
nians, and who are thus causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty,
by making the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his
anger blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the
wrong, it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will
be the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that
the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes
injurious to the allies (3.38).
More importantly, wonder is associated with phenomena that are at both the
margins of the world and of historical research:
We all know that that which is farthest off and the reputation of which can
least be tested, is the object of admiration … (§6.11).
Herodotus is often assumed to be the target of comments like these, and of Thu-
cydides’ more general complaint about entertaining histories in the introduction to
his work:
To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be
perhaps not delightful. But he that desires to look into the truth of things
done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again,
or at least their like, shall find enough herein to make him think it profitable.
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And it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession than to be rehearsed for
a prize (1.22)
It is not hard to see why we might assume that the focus is Herodotus, given his
declaration in the first book of The Histories to record the ‘astonishing achievements
both of our own and of other peoples’ (my emphasis, 1.1.1). But Herodotus was not
the only historian who had some interest in the astonishing, as Polybius’ work attests.
More importantly, we should not assume that they were directed solely at an his-
torian. Historians criticised or praised the efforts of other historians, but they also
criticised or praised the efforts of other kinds of writers, including paradoxology.
What others say: mocking, with geese
Paradoxography—the compilation of wondrous phenomena—originated in the
Hellenistic world with writings such as Kallimachos of Cyrene’s (c. 305–240 BCE)
A Collection of Wonders from the Entire Earth Arranged by Locality and Antigonos of
Karystos’ (fl. 240 BCE) Wondrous Researches. By the third century AD, over 20
compilations of wonders had been produced, including two more extensive works
that still survive: Phlegon of Tralles’ Book of Marvels and On Marvellous Things
Heard, which has been attributed to Aristotle with little solid evidence.15 The
format employed in these wonder works is that of a compilation of very brief
reports of phenomena, and sometimes the reports are arranged thematically. Sec-
tions 25–6 and 28 of On Marvellous Things Heard, for example, tell us about
remarkable mice:
It is said that in the island of Gyaros the mice eat iron (25).
Men say that among the Chalybians, in an islet situated beyond them, gold
is collected by mice in large numbers: wherefore also, as it appears, they rip up
those that are found in the mines. (26) …
Men say that in Cyrene there is not merely one sort of mice, but several
kinds differing both in forms and in colours; for some are broad-faced, like
mustelae, and some like hedgehogs, which they call ‘echines’. (28)
As these examples suggest, paradoxographies list the wonderful qualities of the
natural world, including unusual insects and animals, lakes and rivers, stones and
fires, but human achievements are sometimes included as well. Two of the 178
items in On Marvellous Things Heard, for example, foreground human phenomena:
the temporary madness of a theatre goer in Abydos and of a wine merchant in
Tarentum (31–2):
It is said that a certain man in Abydos being deranged in mind, and coming
into the theatre during many days looked on (as though actors were per-
forming a play), and applauded; and, when he was restored to his senses, he
declared that that was the happiest time he had ever spent.
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Moreover they say that at Tarentum a certain wine-merchant was mad at
night, but sold his wines during the day: he also kept the key of the cellar
attached to his girdle, and though many tried to steal it from him and get
possession of it, he never lost it.
The interesting thing about these two examples is that they foreground experiences
of people moving from states of being in or out of their senses: neither man is
wholly sane nor wholly mad. This is a contrast with the physical phenomena in On
Marvellous Things Heard, which have a constancy in their wondrous features.
In Phlegon’s Book of Marvels we see this fascination with liminal beings writ
large: centaurs, revenants, mothers who give birth to animals, and hermaphrodites
are the overwhelming focus of the text. Moreover, in distinction from On Marvel-
lous Things Heard, we gain a sense of Phlegon positioning these phenomena as
problematic. Occasional authorial interjections in descriptions of these cases indi-
cate that Phlegon saw liminal beings as a threat to social order. The sex change of a
maiden in Antioch, for example, leads the Emperor to take pre-emptive action
against the possibility of evil:
A maiden of a prominent family, thirteen years of age, was good-looking and
had many suitors. She was betrothed to the man whom her parents wished,
the day of the wedding was at hand, and she was about to go forth from her
house when suddenly she experienced an excruciating pain and cried out .…
At around daybreak of the fourth day her pains became stronger, and she cried
out with a great wailing. Suddenly male genitals burst forth from her, and the
girl became a man. Some time later she was brought to the Emperor Claudius
in Rome. Because of the portent he had an altar built on the Capitoline to
Jupiter the Averter of Evil (6.2–4).
In the case of a woman who gave birth to a two-headed baby, corrective social
action is taken more rapidly:
In Rome a certain woman brought forth a two-headed baby, which on the
advice of the sacrificing priests was cast into the River Tiber (25).
Much of the Book of Marvels and On Marvellous Things Heard have the tone of what
we might now call tabloid reporting or belong in Ripley’s Believe it or Not, but the
above examples show that there are intimitations that they also offer instruction in
social norms and boundaries.
Paradoxography has been characterised as a ‘problem’ for historiography in the
Hellenistic world and even as a ‘parasitic growth on the tree of historic and natural-
scientific literature’.16 In large part, I believe that this judgement stems from the
verification conventions that overlap between history and wonder works. In On
Marvellous Things Heard, for example, items are often introduced with the generic
phrase ‘Men say’ or ‘they say’. These phrases suggest that the author did not just
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make up the text: the claims originated with others and are recorded by the writer
in the manner of an historian. At the same time, though, ‘Men’ or ‘they’ would be
less convincing to a writer like Polybius than a named source that can be checked
via interview or reading or seeing the phenomena for yourself. By his measure, the
author has settled for the easy road of a vivid account over the hard toil of locking
down historical evidence.
But these are not the only verification phrases used by the author of On Marvellous
Things Heard, and this is where the clear distinction between history and wonder work
begins to unravel. On the matter of a man who apparently died and came to life again
after sleeping in a tomb on the Island of Aeolus (one of the Lipara Islands), for instance,
the writer makes it clear that while the story is likely ‘fabulous’, one cannot write
about the place without mentioning it (101). The author raises doubts about the
account in the manner of Herodotus or Thucydides saying ‘it makes me wonder’ or ‘I
wonder at those who propose’. Moreover, in other sections of the work, the author
names the sources for claims—for example, Xenophanes in item 38—and even attests
personally that phenomena have taken place (130). A wonder writer can use the
testimonies of others and their own acts of sense making just as an historian does.
Phlegon’s approach to verification claims reinforces the overlaps in approach: he
collates multiple examples of the same phenomenon (e.g. eight examples of giant
skeletons in sections 11–19); declares his hand as a witness, and invites readers to
inspect the evidence for themselves (e.g. the remains of a Saunian centaur in the
Emperor’s palace in Rome in sections 34–5). Of these kinds of verification, Phle-
gon’s claims as witness come closest to the descriptions of historical sense making
preferred by Polybius. In book one, for example, we hear him say that the
appearance of the revenant Philinnion ‘was quickly heard through the city and was
reported to me’ (1.13); and in book four he attests that in the case of the sex
change of Aitete from female to male, ‘I myself have seen this person’ (4.9).
As Emilio Gabba expresses it, the problem with these kinds of claims is that they
generate the impression that they are a part of a history:
Sophisticated antiquarian learning and the citation of recondite sources con-
veyed to the reader an impression of scholarship, which was in many cases
simply a further element of fantasy.17
The problem as Gabba frames it is that wonder works in some ways resemble his-
tories and there is a risk that audiences will not be able to distinguish truth from
titillation. Gabba has some grounds for this complaint. This potential confusion—
and fear about audiences being duped—is exploited humourously in the Greek-
speaking Assyrian writer Lucian of Samosata’s ‘True History’ of a journey to the
moon with the help of geese, written in the second century:
… I think it does students of literature good, after hard and serious reading, to
relax their minds and to invigorate them further for future efforts .… For they
will be attracted [to my work] not only by the exotic subject-matter and the
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charm of the enterprise, and by the fact that I have told all manner of lies
persuasively and plausibly, but because all the details in my narrative are
amusing and covert allusion to certain poets, historians, and philosophers of
old, who have written a lot of miraculous and fabulous stuff .… So as I too
was vain enough to want to leave something to posterity, and didn’t want to
be the only one denied the right to flights of fancy, and since I had nothing
truthful to report (not having experienced anything worth recording), I turned
to lying. Thus I think that by freely admitting that nothing I say is true, I can
avoid being accused of it by other people. So, I am writing about things I
neither saw nor experienced, nor heard about from others, which moreover
don’t exist, and in my case could not exist. My readers must therefore entirely
disbelieve them (1.1–4).18
Lucian leaves us wondering whether ancient histories and philosophies are just an
elaborate rhetorical ruse.
If paradoxography fed parasitically upon the form of verification claims of historians,
then the option of distinction still remained through means of content. That is, his-
torians could achieve clear ground from paradoxography by means of what they wrote
about, not just how they wrote about it. Polybius’ declared intent to rein history in to
perceptual sense making is such an act of distinction. But he, like Herodotus and
Thucydides before him, left open a place for wonder. Granted that it was restricted to
phenomena that were inexplicable to everyone and that the focus of their works was
not solely upon wonder. But in granting wonder any role at all, this meant that at least
in theory, historians and paradoxographers could report on the same phenomenon and
use the same verification conventions to do so. Paradoxography was not parasitic to
history, feeding off it as an ancillary genre. Paradoxography and history shared an
interest in wonder and an entangled set of verification conventions, and history had
little hope of achieving clear disciplinary ground.
Entangled
Polybius’ attempts to manoeuvre history clear of the ‘unworthy and unmanly’
efforts of entertainment writers such as paradoxologists failed. History and fiction
were arguably entwined before Herodotus set down his Histories, and there is now
an extensive and impressive body of research on the continuing relationship
between the two fields.19 But this chapter has also highlighted a lesser appreciated
form of entanglement, between history and metaphysics. Polybius’ Histories suggest
an attempt to make general sense of the world. He did so in a way that explicitly
acknowledged the efforts of Plato, but which also bore some of the same interests
as Aristotle in discerning universals in things. Polybius shared a mutual interest in
understanding transcendence; asking questions about the relationship between the
particular; and what is knowable and what is unknowable. But he also took a steer
from Aristotle in positioning perceptual knowledge as the means by which uni-
versals could be apprehended. Moreover, like Plato and Aristotle, he made a place
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for wonder in his account of the nature of perceptual knowledge. History and
metaphysics were for him interconnected, but the connection fell short on account
of wonder. Plato and Aristotle located wonder at the beginning of philosophical
knowledge; Polybius positioned it as the limit of historical knowledge.
Why that happened comes down, I think, to his positioning of himself as the
purveyor of certain knowledge. Polybius wanted to record the knowable, and so
he restricted his Histories almost entirely to events that he witnessed. But he strug-
gled to account for things that he saw as unknowable, and called upon wonder.
Moreover, in not being sure about the knowledge claims of others, he called upon
wonder again. A double function for wonder was thereby established, applying to
knowledge in good faith and knowledge not in good faith. And in signalling the
second in the manner of literary or rhetorical topoi, he opened the door to overlap
with, and parody by, the writers of paradoxologies or wonder works.
History and fiction were reconnected, but not for reasons of shared form alone. They
reconnected because of Polybius’ attempts to make general sense of the world, in the
manner of a philosopher. History was arguably born from literature, and so was entan-
gled with it. But as we have also seen, a mutual interest in sense-making connected the
efforts of the historian with that of the philosopher, and that mutual interest persists.
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2
WONDERFUL AND CURIOUS
HISTORIES IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE
Gerald of Wales | Bede | Gervase of Tilbury |
Augustine of Hippo | Thomas Aquinas |
Roger Bacon
Gerald of Wales (1146–1223) thought that the best gift for a king was a history
of prodigies and wonders. Better than any gift of gold or a falcon or hawk, that
history would provide the king and his successors with an abiding glimpse of the
‘secret and distant freaks’ that resulted from nature tiring of making the ‘true and
the serious’ (The History and Topography of Ireland, dedication). By this measure,
The History and Topography of Ireland is a remarkable gift, replete with accounts of
geese born from barnacles (1.11); incorruptible kingfishers (1.13); soil that is
toxic to reptiles (1.23); islands that are deadly to women (2.4); hybrids that result
from bestial acts (2.23); as well as tales of a woman with a beard and a mane
(2.20); a stone that is mysteriously filled with wine every day (2.30); and a
werewolf that sought communion from a priest (2.19). And it was a serious
historical gift, as he explains:
I shall have to write some accounts which will seem to the reader utterly
impossible, or quite ridiculous. But, with the help of God, I will insert
nothing in my book the truth of which I have not elicited with the
greatest diligence either from my own firm belief or the authentic testi-
mony of most trustworthy men … What I have witnessed with my own
eyes, that I assert firmly and without hesitation. But what has only reached
my ear through others, which I am slower to believe, that I do not affirm,
but only relate. (2.1)
The History and Topography of Ireland is history but not as we know it. Moreover, as
Gabrielle Spiegel has argued, it does not seem to be history as we want it to be.
Medieval histories like that of Gerald of Wales appear to have a long list of short-
comings, which Spiegel encapsulates in the following summary:
[a] low level of literary achievement, approaching at times narrative unin-
telligibility; a weak notion of historical evidence; lack of sense of anachronism;
propagandistic intentions; substitution of symbolic interpretation for causal
analysis; and vulnerability to invasion by fiction, forgery, myth, and miracle,
not to mention genuine demons.1
Spiegel sees these features as arising from the fundamental equation of history with
that of a perceptual field ‘to be seen and represented instead of constructed and
analysed, an object more of perception than of cognition’.2
If medieval historiography was a perceptual activity, then it might be considered
an extension on the sense-making efforts of ancient Greek historians. In the last
chapter, I outlined how historians such as Polybius worked to build up a body of
history theory or historiography by documenting their acceptance or rejection of
particular histories. Moreover, I noted how Polybius drew upon the ideas of phi-
losophers like Plato and Aristotle to emphasise the importance of relying only upon
only our own mental efforts and senses in understanding the past. This led Polybius
to present history as based on sense making, and to reserve the use of concepts like
wonder for phenomena that exhausted attempts at sense making.
Wonder marked the limits of knowledge for Polybius. But for philosophers like
Aristotle, it also marked its beginning. Polybius and Aristotle shared an interest in
understanding the universal, but Polybius struggled to clarify how we might dis-
criminate between genuine and false claims to understanding. He struggled because
while he knew that his own claims about the past were rigorous, other historians and
wonder writers (paradoxographers) who were less rigorous by his account employed
the same topoi: methods for making and sustaining an argument. Both, for example,
authenticated accounts through the use of eyewitness rhetorical devices such as ‘I
saw’, ‘I witnessed’. That is, an historian and a paradoxographer might write exactly
the same sentence, but their level of effort and intention in writing that sentence
might differ markedly. Hence Polybius’ resolution to treat history as a discipline in
which we can only ultimately trust what we see for ourselves.
We have no evidence to conclude with any certainty that Polybius was familiar
with the ideas Aristotle or Plato expressed about the role of wonder in reason. And
even if he were to have been familiar with their claims, they would likely have
done little to assuage his scepticism. This was to change in medieval Europe, when
Aristotelian and Platonic notions of reason and wonder were adopted and adapted
in the service of Christian devotion and redemption. In theory, the endpoint of
philosophy and history alike became a right relationship with God that was driven
by an effort of reason and will known and judged by God. Historians and philo-
sophers had the task of seeing and understanding the universal and knew that even
if they deceived others about their efforts, they would not be able to deceive God.
Moreover, they had an obligation to warn others about the eternal consequences
that flowed from weakness of reason or will.
The consequences of this shift in endpoint from reason to union with God
through reason and strength of will were important for history. We might see
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medieval histories as ill-disciplined combinations of the event and the fantastic, but
that combination was driven by an increasingly confident ability to discriminate
devotional wonder from sinful curiosity. Vestiges of that distinction remain with us
today. In this chapter, I am going to unpack these claims through an examination
of the works of three British historians—Gerald of Wales, Bede (682–735 CE) and
Gervase of Tilbury (1150–1228 CE)—in the light of the metaphysical writings of
Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), Thomas Aquinas (1225–75 CE) and Roger
Bacon (1214–94 CE).
Caroline Bynum has described medieval European historiographical views of
wonder as cognitive, not meant to be imitable by audiences, and perspectival.
Moreover she, like Axel Rüth, sees these views at play across the porous bound-
aries of history, philosophy and what we might call ecclesiastical paradoxology (e.g.
miracle accounts and hagiographies).3 In this chapter, I will affirm that medieval
thinkers saw wonder as a rational function. Bynum’s second claim—the question of
whether wonder acts were not meant to be imitable by readers—is best tested by
an analysis of reception, as has been done with Aviad Kleinberg’s analysis of medieval
canonisation depositions. There is much more work needed on sources of this kind,
but Kleinberg’s work is enough to show us that peasants and elites did not always
hold the same views on what phenomena could be rightly designated as wonders
and whether they were singular.4 On Bynum’s third claim that wonder is per-
spectival—I might consider something as a wonder, you might not consider it a
wonder—I will chart a distinctive course by arguing that differences in opinion were
not ultimately accepted by medieval philosophers and historians such as Gerald of
Wales and Gervase of Tilbury. Rather, I will dig deeper into their distinctions
between wonder and curiosity and note that the former was seen as a kind of epis-
temic constraint that promoted a rightful view of the universal. This was set against
the addictive captivation of curiosity as an overconcentration on material or sensible
phenomena. In so arguing, I will recognise later on in this chapter the first steps of
Neil Manson’s work on epistemic restraint and presentations of curiosity as a vice.5
Moreover, I will show that more can be said on the variations of views of
wonder and curiosity within and across medieval historiography and philosophy. In
particular, I will highlight differences over whether the inclusion of a wide variety
of phenomena in a history promotes rational engagement, and whether wonder
always operates at the beginning of rational processes. A closer inspection of med-
ieval philosophy will also highlight how writers extended classical notions of
wonder, as with Augustine’s claim that wonder has social as well as individual
consequences; Thomas’ positioning of curiosity as an incomplete subsidiary of
wonder; and Bacon’s identification of wonder with particular academic disciplines.
Finally, I will round out the chapter by showing through the case of miracle nar-
ratives that Polybius’ problem of distinguishing legitimate claims to wonder on the
basis of topoi persisted, but for medieval European writers judgement of difference
could be achieved by God.
In simple summary, I will argue that the kinds of judgements that Polybius made
about the idea of history continued in medieval Europe. Medieval historians
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attempted to make general sense of things. They saw history as a means of dis-
cerning universals, which like Aristotle they considered to be in re or present in
particular phenomena. They held that rigorous sense perception was the key to
discerning those universals. And they still set boundaries between the knowable
and the unknowable. But they also expanded the lines of thought that Polybius set
down, by drawing upon medieval metaphysics to chart a detailed cognitive account
of wonder as rational and as a form of mental restraint. And they saw themselves as
having solved Polybius’ dilemma of judging claims to knowledge by asserting that
while some things are unknowable to us, nothing is unknowable to God. This
provided them with the opportunity to emphasise ethics as well as epistemology
in the pursuit of metaphysics, for if an historian could not judge if a claim to
knowledge was in good faith, God certainly could.
The severe discipline of history
That medieval histories like The History and Topography of Ireland were often framed
as a gift might lead us to assume that they were ephemeral aggregations designed to
entertain and affirm royal or mercantile audiences. Indeed, there are five editions of
The History and Topography of Ireland, with versions three and five dedicated to two
different patrons: William de Vere and King John respectively.6 Recent research,
however, has emphasised the role of these works in exploring larger themes such as
the nature of knowledge and belief, change and social order and disorder. Two
recent, notable contributions on The History and Topography of Ireland are Caroline
Bynum’s careful analysis of Gerald’s werewolf story in light of medieval anxieties
about shapeshifting, and Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park’s account of Gerald’s
distinction between wonders as the result of nature acting ‘against her own laws’
(1.2) and horrors as arising from immorality and social disorder.7
Daston and Park designate The History and Topography of Wales as a travel narra-
tive on the grounds that Gerald preferred to write only about things that he had
seen for himself.8 At first sight, this is a reasonable conclusion given Gerald’s
declaration reproduced at the opening of this chapter to ‘assert firmly and without
hesitation’ by only reporting on the things that he had witnessed on his travels to
Ireland as royal clerk and chaplain for Henry II (Second Preface). Eyewitness claims
ground Gerald’s account of contemporary natural phenomena such as geese born
from barnacles and the ability of ospreys to hover:
I have often seen with my own eyes more than a thousand minute embryos of
birds of this species on the seashore, hanging from one piece of timber, covered
with shells, and already formed (1.11)
It is wonderful how these birds—and I have often witnessed it myself—
hover in the air over the waves supported by their wings … (1.12).
But a common feature of both of these claims is the idea of their veracity stemming
from Gerald having observed them more than once, over a period of time. This
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suggests that his observations of even natural phenomena are not just con-
temporary, but are historically grounded.
Gerald’s preference for multiple observations helps his audience to rule out the
possibility that his conclusions depend on particular environmental or human
conditions, such as poor light or a fever. They also allow Gerald to dispel doubts
and to speak ‘without hesitation’ about the past. Written evidence, by contrast,
only allows the historian to speak with probability as it offers only ‘precious stones
among the sands on the seashore’ (First Preface; 2). It does not provide us with
anything more than that which we can outline, as he argues of the flood described
in the Bible:
… it appears to be a matter of doubt how, if nearly all perished in the
flood, the memory of these events and of their arrival could have been
preserved. However, those who first committed to writing these accounts
must be answerable for them. For myself, I compile history; it is not my
business to impugn it. Perhaps some record of these events was found,
inscribed on a stone or a tile, as we read was the case with the art of music
before the flood. (3.1)
So too, the oral accounts of others are perishable, for there is ‘nothing so firmly
fixed in the mind’, Gerald argues, ‘that it is not lost by neglect and the lapse of
time’ (3.3). Witnessing means being able to check and to verify; listening and
reading leave us vulnerable to the gaps and shortfalls in knowledge of others.
Gerald’s insistence that only our own eyewitness claims can provide certain
knowledge does suggest that The History and Topography of Ireland is more of a
contemporary travel or geographical work than a history. As we saw in the last
chapter, though, eyewitness evidence also played a critical role in histories of the
ancient Greek world. We recall in particular Polybius’ argument that the sense of
seeing provides the basis for the most accurate and certain historical knowledge.
This was coupled with a call for restraint in claims to wonder unless all other
attempts at explanation had been exhausted.
Like Polybius, Gerald saw himself as the purveyor of a strenuous and austere
approach to the writing of history. This is evidenced in his insistence in 3.25:
There are some things which shame would prevent my relating, unless the
course of my subject required it. For a filthy story seems to reflect a stain on
the author, although it may display his skill. But the severity of history does
not allow us either to sacrifice truth or affect modesty; and what is shameful in
itself may be related by pure lips in decent words.
This claim to serve the severe discipline of history might be hard for us to reconcile
with the many wondrous phenomena that Gerald describes, including the
description of the bestial acts that follows the quote above. Indeed, it is not difficult
to imagine Polybius condemning The History and Topography of Ireland as an idle
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and unprofitable paradoxographical or wonder work. So how do we make sense of
his claims to authenticity and certainty, made throughout the work (e.g. 2; 2.13;
2.33)? Useful clues are provided in the words translated as ‘required’ and ‘severe’.
Required connotes a compelling demand; severity connotes gravity and austerity
rather than geniality or elaborateness. Gerald feels that the demand of his work is
such that he has no choice but to outline Irish acts of bestiality. His and our shame
and modesty have to be put aside to meet this demand.
That demand is not the same as that underpinning Polybius’ Histories: the use of
rationality to discern the work of the universal idea of fortune at play in the
material world. Gerald was also interested in the work of the universal in the
world, but his universal was God, not fortune. God, he tells us, possesses ‘universal
knowledge and freedom from error’ (1.5) and it should not surprise us ‘that won-
ders should be discovered, related, and written concerning his works, who made all
things according to his will; and with whom nothing is impossible’ (2). It is by the
privileges of reason and intellect that we are able to gain some inkling of God’s
designs, even when they appear to be monstrous (1.9). This, for Gerald, was
demonstrated by the metaphysician and theologian Augustine of Hippo in City of
God, who argues that the varying and even monstrous appearances of humans belie
the hand of one creator who is not confused by material differences in phenomena
(City of God, 16.8). We humans, however, understand only material intimations of
the universal, and we must demonstrate the strength of will in rational constraint to
appreciate that. As Gerald explains in 1.9:
Beware then, lest in thus employing your intelligence you become as though
you had no understanding. Beware, lest abusing the privileges of reason and
intellect, through which, by the merciful goodness of the Creator, you excel
all beings under the sun, you justly forfeit them .… The Lord knoweth
the thoughts of man, that they are but vain … search not into things that are
above thee, nor inquire into those that are mightier than thee; but meditate
always on what the Lord hath commanded thee, and in many of his works
be not too curious.…
… Why is your heart so lifted up, and your eyes raised on high, that you
are conversant with wonders and with miracles which are above you? Does
your pride so separate you from the love of God, that while you are wise in
that which is above knowledge, and aspire to still higher attainments, you turn
aside from the path of the humble?
At stake here is redemption from sinful pride that stems from us not being able—as
Gerald again refers to Augustine—to resist ‘a foe within’ that ‘confirms our pro-
pensity to evil’ (1.8).
History for Gerald finds its basis in sense perception and in severe restraint from
intellectual overreach. In short, he is interested in the role that history can play in
answering questions about transcendence, but its answers lie within boundaries.
Importantly for our purposes, the touchstone test of intellectual overreach plays out
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in Gerald’s use of the words ‘curiosity’, ‘wonder’ and ‘miracle’ in the passages from
1.9 reproduced above. Curiosity, we sense, is something to be avoided because it
entails a form of unconstrained inquisitiveness that leads to error and to sin (see also
1.11), whereas wonders and miracles are from God. This distinction is important
because it marks a turn from Polybius’ claim that legitimate and illegitimate claims
to wonder can be distinguished solely on the basis of intellectual effort. For Poly-
bius, genuine appeals to wonder are made only after every other explanation has
been exhausted, and they mark the limits of knowledge. Wonder also marks the
limits of knowledge in Gerald’s history, but that limit is one that we impose upon
ourselves. More specifically, it suggests an ability to develop the right kinds of
knowledge: not second guessing the mind of God and not getting carried away by
material appearances. This is seen in his discussion of the example of geese born
from barnacles on branches to highlight our predilection to get caught up with
anomalous or rare phenomena. If you read carefully, one can see the imprint of
Aristotle’s thoughts on wonder at work:
The first creature was begotten of clay; this last is engendered of wood. The
one, proceeding from the God of nature for once only, was a stupendous
miracle; the other, though not less admirable, is less to be wondered at,
because imitative nature often performs it. But human nature is so constituted,
that it holds nothing to be precious and admirable but what is uncommon and
of rare occurrence. The rising and setting of the sun, than which there is
nothing in the world more beautiful, nothing more fit to excite our wonder,
we pass by without any admiration, because they are daily presented to our
eyes; while an eclipse of the sun fills the whole world with astonishment,
because it rarely occurs (1.11).
What flows from these passages is a signal that glimpses of the universal are to be
marked with the term wonder (admiratio) or miracle (miracula) and, and that a
mistaken focus on the surface differences in phenomena are to be marked with
the term curiosity (curiositas). In distinction from Polybius, therefore, Gerald had
terminology to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate claims to wonder.
Against curiosity, for wonder
Gerald’s references to Augustine of Hippo suggest that his distinction between
wonder and curiosity might not have been novel or even confined to the discipline
of history. To establish whether Gerald’s views are novel, I begin by looking at
authors whom he cites as historical sources: Gaius Julius Solinus (fl. 357 CE), the
author of a chronological and geographical account of wonders called Polyhistor;
Orosius (385–420 AD), contemporary of Augustine and author of Seven Books of
History against the Pagans; Isidore of Seville (560–636 CE), author of the summa
of all things known, Etymologiae; and Bede (672–735), author of Ecclesiastical History
of the English People. As a second step, I will look to the metaphysical philosophies
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of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon, before assessing whether med-
ieval histories were simply a form of miracle or devotional narrative.
Of these four sources, Solinus and Bede provide us with some comment on the
nature of wonder. Before I outline their views, however, it is worth noting that
the other sources are not devoid of interest. Orosius’ Seven Books of History Against
the Pagans includes an account of a serpent’s skin nearly 37 metres in length, which
‘for a time remained a wonder to all’ in Rome (4.8.15). In addition, Orosius
indicates that the start of his research was marked by a ‘confusion’ that stemmed
from his assumption that ‘the disasters of our present time seemed to rage beyond
what could have been expected’ (1.1.12).9 So too, in Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies
we find not only a reassertion of the ancient Greek view of history as things seen—
‘history is about times which we see, and annals are about years unfamiliar to our
age’ (1.44.4)—but also a distinction of fable from history—on the grounds that
their contents are ‘contrary to nature’—that would seem to rule out much of
Gerald’s work as history (1.44.5).10
Things being contrary to nature is the focus of much of Solinus’ Polyhistor. 11 His
stated aim is to gloss things known and to tarry ‘in things more strange’ in order to
achieve a variety of content that will ‘ease the weariness of readers’ (Preface). This
is not to lift the burden of reason from readers, for Solinus sees it as a mark of the
human to exceed all other animals in understanding and capacity of wisdom. The
operating assumption here is that variety enhances audience engagement, rather
than diminishing it. Moreover, he aims to hold audience attention through
greater—rather than lesser—wonders, as he explains in the case of likenesses
between people who are not related:
Now who so bends his mind to consider the causes of likenesses, shall perceive
the wonderful disposition of the workmanship of nature. For sometimes such
likenesses belong to some stocks, and descend from issue to issues, into the
succession …. But this is the lesser wonder if we consider those things that
have been seen between mere strangers (4).
This highlights Solinus’ interest in the sensible world of appearances. There is,
however, no universal at play in the sense of Fortune in Polybius’ history or the
revelation of God in Gerald’s The History and Topography of Ireland, just the pre-
vailing assumption that variety engages readers.
This brings us to Bede. Over 300 years before Gerald dedicated The History and
Topography of Ireland to Henry II, Bede narrated a history of the English church and
the Anglo Saxon people in which remarkable events abound. Prayers quell fires
and epidemics (1.19; 4.14), people and horses are cured of maladies in the places
where saints have died (3.9) and the martyrdom of saints is described in forensic
detail (1.7). People, objects and places evoke wonder in the author and others who
witnessed them first hand (1.7; 2.10; 3.8; 3.9; 3.10; 3.13; 3.17; 3.25; 4.9; 4.10;
4.12; 5.22). Consider, for example, the ‘favours and miracles’ associated with the
bones of Oswald, a King of ‘wonderful piety’:
28 Curious histories in pre-modern Europe
The water in which the bones had been washed was poured away in a corner
of the cemetery, and from that time on the very earth that had received this
venerated water has the saving power to expel devils from the bodies of those
who were possessed .… The abbess [Queen Osthryd] … asked that she might
be given some of this healing dust; and when it had been given her, she tied
it up in a cloth, and she put it into a little casket which she took away with
her .… Some while later, a guest visited her abbey who was often horribly
tormented by an evil spirit during the night hours .… he was suddenly pos-
sessed by the devil and began to cry out, grind his teeth, foam at the mouth,
and toss his limbs in wild contortions .… a priest therefore employed exorcism
and did all he could to allay the sufferer’s frenzy; but all his efforts were useless.
When there seemed no hope left of easing his frenzy, the abbess suddenly
remembered this dust, and told a maidservant to go at once and fetch the
casket containing it. As soon as she returned from her errand and entered the
porch of the house where the possessed man lay writhing, he immediately
became silent, laying down his head as though to sleep, and relaxing his whole
body .… saying ‘I am now restored to health and in my right mind’ (3.11–12).
Dust cures for demonic possession are not a feature of histories as we know them
today. Nor does it escape our attention that the power of dust exceeds that of a
priest, which is surprising given Bede’s status as the author of a number of Christian
devotional texts. It could be that the point of the passage is to highlight the won-
ders of the natural world, as with Gerard of Wales’ history. Bede, like Gerard of
Wales, attested to the faith-driven efforts of his labours, noting in his preface to the
History that any inaccuracies stemmed from a shortfall in the efforts of others:
… from the period at which this volume begins until the time when the English
nation received the Faith of Christ, I have drawn extensively on the works of
earlier writers gathered from earlier sources…. With regard to events in the var-
ious districts of the province of the Northumbrians, from the time that it received
the Faith of Christ up until the present day, I am not dependent on any one
author, but on countless faithful witnesses who either know or remember the
facts, apart from what I know myself .… Should the reader discover any inac-
curacies in what I have written, I humbly beg that he will not impute them to
me, because, as a true law of history requires, I have laboured honestly to transmit
whatever I could ascertain from common report for the instruction of posterity.
Regardless of what we might think about Bede’s motives for transferring the
burden of accuracy to others, his claims do reinforce the Ancient Greek view that
the claims of others cannot be viewed with certainty.
Bede’s views on the nature of wonder—as distinct from descriptions of won-
ders—are seen most clearly in his inclusion of a letter from Pope Gregory to
Augustine of Canterbury in which we are warned of the pride that takes root in
the frail mind after the performance of multiple wonders:
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My very dear brother, I hear that almighty God has worked great wonders
through you for the nation which He has chosen. Therefore let your feeling
be one of fearful joy and joyful fear at God’s heavenly gifts—joy that the souls
of the English are being drawn through outward miracles to inward grace; fear
lest the frail mind becomes proud because of these wonderful events. (1.31)
Here we find the suggestion echoed in Gerald’s work that repeated recourse to
wonders might challenge our strength of will and generate sinful vanity. So too,
there is the contrast drawn between ‘outward miracles’ and ‘inward grace’, the
former lowering our sights from the universal to ‘private and temporal joys’ (1.31).
Unlike Gerald, though, Bede encapsulates his reflections under the rubric of
wonder, without distinguishing it from sinful curiosity.
This leads us to consider whether the distinction between wonder and curiosity
presented by Gerald emanates from a roughly contemporaneous history, or whe-
ther it is philosophy, theology or some other approach to writing that we have to
thank for its origin. On the question of history, a promising candidate is provided
in Gervase of Tilbury’s extensive Otia Imperialia (‘Recreation for an Emperor’)
which dates from around 1209–14, roughly ten years before Gerald’s death.
Dedicated to the Holy Roman Emperor Otto IV, Otia Imperialia is divided into
three sections, focused on history, geography, and marvels and miracles. Gervase’s
interest in wonder, though, is not confined to the third section, as the example of
his claim for a sea in the sky in section one attests:
A strange event in our own time, which is widely known but none the less a
cause of wonder, provides proof of the existence of an upper sea overhead. It
occurred on a feast day in Great Britain, while the people were straggling out
of their parish church after hearing high mass. The day was very overcast and
quite dark on account of the thick clouds. To the people’s amazement, a ship’s
anchor was seen caught on a tombstone within the church wall, with its rope
stretching up and hanging in the air … (1.13).
So too we learn of the claim ‘not to be repudiated’ of women transforming into
serpents and men into wolves (1.15); pygmies that are old by the age of seven,
five-metre high giants who fight griffins, one-footed sciapodes, and Scythian
women who have boars’ tusks, hair down to their ankles and cows’ tails (2.3–4). It
is in section three that Gervase explains the inclusion of these accounts, noting that
his is not an idle work:
our primary purpose is to present the marvels of every province to our dis-
cerning listener, in order that His Imperial Highness may have a source of
refreshment for his thoughts when a clear interval of leisure is his, according to
the dictum: ‘Interrupt your cares with gladness now and then’. To be sure, it is
not proper that an emperor’s leisure should be contaminated with the prating
babbling of players; on the contrary, the crude falsehoods of idle tales should
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be spurned, and only those things which are sanctioned by the authority
of age, or confirmed by the authority of scripture, or attested by daily eye-
witness accounts, should be brought to his venerable hearing in his leisure
hours. And since the human mind is always keen to hear and lap up novelties,
the oldest things will have to be presented as new, natural things as mir-
aculous, and things familiar to us all, as strange (3, preface).
Wonders are presented not as an idle distraction, but as triggers for departure from
habitual patterns of thought. In the manner of Solinus, Gervase views variety as a
way of enhancing engagement and not as a way of being excused from rational
deliberation. He is also careful to stress the rigour and Christian sanction under-
pinning his selection of materials, which sets them aside from ‘prattling’ and ‘idle’
chatter. Effort of research is important for him as it was for Polybius, but he has
Christian scripture as a guide in addition to reason. Significantly, his view of marvels
also builds upon his distinction between miracles and marvels in 2.23:
… both result in wonderment. Now we generally call those things miracles
which, being preternatural, we ascribe to divine power, as when a virgin gives
birth, when Lazarus is raised from the dead, or when diseased limbs are made
whole again: while we call those things marvels which are beyond our com-
prehension, even though they are natural: in fact the inability to explain why a
thing so constitutes is a marvel.
Miracles are of God and explicable to God alone. This point is reinforced with a
reference to Augustine of Hippo in 3.2 in an account of the weakness of the
human mind and will:
We have recorded these things concerning the properties of stones in order
that our limited understanding may marvel at what we are unable to explain,
due to the ignorance of our weak nature. For, as Augustine says, when we talk
about divine miracles, past or future, which we do not have the power to
demonstrate to them in practice, unbelievers demand an explanation from us
which we are not able to give. Miracles, indeed, are beyond the capacity of
the human intellect.
These views are roughly in alignment with those of Gerald in The History and
Topography of Ireland, but again there is no distinction between curiosity and wonder,
simply a distinction between marvels and miracles. Gervase’s reference to Augustine,
as well as the use of Gerald as a source for a description of barnacle geese in 3.123,
suggests that he was unlikely to have been the progenitor of the distinction between
wonder and curiosity in Gerald’s The History and Topography of Ireland. To gain some
traction in answering the question of whether this distinction was particular to
medieval historiography, therefore, the logical next step is to consider the views of
the thinker to which both Gerald and Gervase refer: Augustine of Hippo.
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Reason, wonder and the universal: metaphysics
The fifth century writer Augustine of Hippo was a key driver of medieval efforts to
adapt ancient Greek philosophy to Christian thought. He was the author of over
100 titles, 200 letters and 400 sermons which ranged from contemplation of the
relationship between the sensible world of ephemeral phenomena to the intelligi-
ble world of permanent realities to a consideration of the embodiment of the soul
in humans. As part of his reflections on the relationship between the sensible,
material world and the universal, Augustine noted that it was appropriate to con-
sider the role of wonder because God in the human form of Jesus saw and won-
dered at the faith of believers (Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees, 1.8.14;
cf. Matthew 8:10).
Augustine believed that we are susceptible to focus on the sensible world of
material phenomena at the expense of contemplation of the universal (Confessions
4.15.24). This is a form of moral danger, because our belief that the material world
provides us with everything we need to navigate life casts us adrift from knowledge
of God (City of God, 13.14–15). This moral danger is played out every day in even
very simple acts of seeing. In a manner akin to Polybius, Augustine considers seeing
as a path to either the contemplation of the universal or of entertainment in the
fleeting. Moreover, like Polybius, Augustine sees the destination of our perceptions
as determined by the degree of intellectual effort that we invest. Sight of the uni-
versal thus hinges on rational engagement. In a refinement to ancient Greek
thought, though, Augustine also considers the endpoint of sight as reflecting
mental and moral restraint: we do not give in to temptations such as laziness, lust
or vanity.
Augustine’s distinction between the two endpoints for seeing is clearly reflected
in his use of the terms wonder (admiratio) and curiosity (curiositas). Augustine uses
the latter term more than the former in Confessions and City of God, and associates
it with adjectives such as unlawful, sacrilegious, illicit, pernicious, excessive, dis-
eased, idle and impious. This is because curiosity, as he explains in Confessions
10.35, results from a lack of restraint and mental effort. It is worth quoting the
passage at length:
… there pertains to the soul, through the same senses of the body, a certain
vain and curious longing, cloaked under the name of knowledge and learning,
not of having pleasure in the flesh, but of making experiments through the
flesh. This longing, since it originates in an appetite for knowledge, and the
sight being the chief among the senses in the acquisition of knowledge, is
called in divine language, the lust of the eyes (1 John 2:16) .… pleasure fol-
lows after objects that are beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savoury, soft; but
curiosity, for experiment’s sake, seeks the contrary of these—not with a view
of undergoing uneasiness, but from the passion of experimenting upon and
knowing them. For what pleasure is there to see, in a lacerated corpse, that
which makes you shudder? … From this malady of curiosity are all those
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strange sights exhibited in the theatre .… Hence, too, with that same end of
perverted knowledge we consult magical arts. Hence, again, even in religion
itself, is God tempted, when signs and wonders are eagerly asked of Him—not
desired for any saving end, but to make trial only … in how many most
minute and contemptible things is our curiosity daily tempted, and who can
number how often we succumb? How often, when people are narrating idle
tales, do we begin by tolerating them, lest we should give offense unto the
weak; and then gradually we listen willingly! … It is one thing to get up
quickly, and another not to fall, and of such things is my life full; and my only
hope is in Your exceeding great mercy.
In this passage we see curiosity depicted as both an active experiment of mind and
a passive surrender to the ‘idle tales’ of others and to other daily temptations. These
characteristics are not incompatible, because while all humans seek knowledge,
they are also called upon to exercise mental restraint in the face of impulses such as
voyeurism. Curiosity is thus a kind of knowledge, but a privative or incomplete
kind that speaks of weakness of will—called akrasia in ancient Greek philosophy—
or disobedience to the self. As Augustine explains in City of God:
There is nothing else that now makes a man more miserable than his own
disobedience to himself. Because he would not do what he could, he can no
longer do what he would. It is true that even in the Garden, before man
sinned, he could not do everything; but he could still do all he desired to do,
since he had no desire to do what he could not do. It is different now …. In
too many ways not to mention, man cannot do what he desires to do, for the
simple reason that he refuses to obey himself; that is to say, neither his spirit or
his body obeys his will (11.15).
All of these points would indicate that Augustine or an intermediary com-
mentary are likely the source for Gerald’s views on curiosity and wonder.
Importantly, this suggests a closer connection between metaphysics and history
than we saw in the first chapter. This makes sense given that philosophy was
Christian philosophy, and historiography, Christian historiography. But Augus-
tine and Gerald are not completely in lock step on the matter of wonder.
Augustine extends the analysis of curiosity further by characterising it as addic-
tive, ‘entangling the minds of men’ (20.8) and setting them on a destructive
path in the manner of the Emperor Julian:
… whose gifted mind was deceived by a sacrilegious and detestable curiosity,
stimulated by the love of power. And it was because he was addicted through
curiosity to vain oracles, that, confident of victory, he burned the ships that
were laden with the provisions necessary for his army, and therefore, engaging
with hot zeal in rashly audacious enterprises, he was soon slain, as the just
consequence of his recklessness … (5.21)
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Conversely, we reach the whole and highest object of thought—knowledge of
God—through constraint from impulses and rational consideration at God’s won-
ders (City of God, 9.45). When we give in to curiosity, we are less than we are able
to be, and on the path to nothingness: ‘no longer to be in God but to be in oneself
in the sense of to please oneself is not to be wholly nothing but to be approaching
nothingness’ (City of God, 14.13).
Additionally, Augustine suggests that curiosity is not only a problem for indivi-
duals; it is also potentially a social problem. This is because he sees our own
addictive surrender to weakness of will as entailing the temptation to encourage
others to do the same. My akrasia is thus also a social akrasia, and with this step,
Augustine transposes epistemology into social philosophy in a way that will be
picked up and further developed by Thomas Hobbes’ suggestion of an addictive,
politically destabilising view of curiosity. Even God is not protected from our
desire to seek signs and wonders, as we saw from the passage in Confessions above:
‘even in religion itself, is God tempted, when signs and wonders are eagerly asked
of Him’. Yet there is no indication that God succumbs, and this opens up the
possibility that not everything we take as a sign or wonder is taken as such by God.
Augustine’s suggestion that not everything is a wonder to God reflects the wider
medieval distinction between mirabilia (marvels) and miracula (miracles), as echoed
in Gervase’s Otia Imperialia. 12 Miracles stem from God; marvels do not. In his
Summa contra Gentiles, for example, the Italian philosopher and theologian Thomas
Aquinas (1225–74) designated monsters as being apart from the intention of God
and of nature (3.6.11), and evil as an accidental falling short of the good arising
from God (3.10.18; 3.14.3). As Thomas writes in Summa contra Gentiles 3.7.8:
The births of monsters are the result of lack of assimilation on the part of the
matter. Nor may this be attributed to some defect in the agent, if it fail to
convert poorly disposed matter into perfect act. There is a determinate power
for each natural agent, in accord with its type of nature, and failure to go
beyond this power will not be a deficiency in power; such deficiency is found
only when it falls short of the measure of power naturally due to it.
That deficiency finds expression not only in monsters of nature and of humanity,
but in a lack of effort to understand the causes of those phenomena.
Thomas, like Augustine, played a key role in disseminating and assimilating
ancient Greek philosophy—particularly that of Aristotle—for Christian con-
templation. He too sees wonder as an activity of thought, but he also qualifies that
proper wonder is a metaphysical search for causes and the ‘first cause’, God, as
metaphysics was the first philosophy for Aristotle:
… there is naturally present in all men the desire to know the causes of
whatever things are observed. Hence, because of wondering about things that
were seen but whose causes were hidden, men first began to think philoso-
phically; when they found the cause, they were satisfied. But the search did
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not stop until it reached the first cause …. Therefore, man naturally desires, as
his ultimate end, to know the first cause. But the first cause of all things is
God. Therefore, the ultimate end of man is to know God (Summa contra
Gentiles 3.25.11).
In seeking the first cause, God bestows beatitudo or a blessedness upon us that
allows us to achieve a happiness in which we see God and all things in God
(Summa Theologicae, prima secundae Q11.3–4). Curiosity, on the other hand, is a
lesser form of happiness that can lead us to assume that our needs are met by
consideration of subsidiary causes or sensible phenomena. In tune with Augustine,
this settling for a lesser kind of happiness reflects weakness of will. Curiosity, we
learn, is a form of sensual sloth as opposed to a form of rational engagement
(Summa Theologica, prima secundae Q35.4).
Importantly, Thomas also sees curiosity as incomplete knowledge. This suggests
that there is the opportunity for someone who rashly, lazily or ignorantly declares
something to be a wonder—Thomas cites the example of a peasant’s view of an
eclipse of the sun—to develop a fuller understanding, will permitting. In the prima
secundae of Summa Theologica, Thomas sets out in careful detail the ways in which
intellect, will and wonder coalesce in reason. As a first step, the intellect appre-
hends a phenomenon. If the intellect does not know the cause of that phenom-
enon, wonder triggers the desire for inquiry (Summa Theologica, prima secundae
Q3.8). This is in alignment with the metaphysical views of Plato and Aristotle.
Wonder also quells pleasure because the intellect does not know the cause of the
phenomenon (Q32.8). In a second step, the inquiry of intellect apprehends
the phenomenon as good and wills it. This does not mean that the intellect will
pursue action as a consequence of this willing: it still has to be judged whether the
action would be sinful, or whether there are a range of actions available before any
action is pursued.
Complexities of this process description aside, it is significant for our purposes
because it clearly presents wonder as a part of rational deliberation and as a con-
straint on pleasure. Curiosity, conversely, is the result when the will gives in to
pleasure. As the operation of will follows intellectual apprehension, curiosity is not
of equal mental status to wonder. Rather, it is a result that can follow an experience
of wonder. Thus, curiosity is subordinate to wonder.
In his account of reason, Thomas does not specify whether some intellectual
pursuits or approaches to education are better than others in holding the tempta-
tions of curiosity at bay. That was to be more the focus of a contemporary of
Thomas, the English philosopher and theologian Roger Bacon. Bacon’s application
of Aristotle’s ideas was to be found primarily in the fields of mathematics, the
natural sciences and linguistics. Bacon was heavily critical of the lack of commit-
ment of academics to the practical improvement of society and their slavish con-
formity to conventional approaches to thought. These failings left the masses
ignorant, and worse, tempted by the vanity of pseudo wisdom. Bacon outlined
these concerns in general in his Opus Maius, but in the letter Concerning the
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Marvellous Power of Art and Concerning the Nullity of Magic (hereafter Concerning the
Marvellous Power of Art) he takes specific aim at wonder as the refuge of the lazy and
the tool of the fraudulent and deceitful. As he argues:
There are those who, by quickness of movement and by the appearance of the
members, or by variations of the voice, or by subtlety of instruments, or by
shadows, or by playing upon popular opinion, propound to mortals many
wonders which do not have the truth of existence (p. 15).
Here we gain a sense of people performing in ways that aim deliberately to hold
others in thrall. These performative acts include forms of writing as well as non
verbal gestures: ‘in order that no one shall suspect them, with allusions they build
up high-sounding style and construct their mendacity under the form of a text’
(Concerning the Marvellous Power of Art, p. 19). Wonder comes to be associated thus
with stupefaction and obfuscation and is socially stratified. Peasants wonder, and
the educated—who are often not wise—like to keep things that way:
In this discussion distinction ought to be made between the common rabble
and the wise who are sharply set off from it. For, whatever is believed by all is
true, and similarly whatever is believed by wise men and examined carefully.
Therefore beliefs which are held by the many, beliefs which are commonly
held by the rabble, must necessarily be false—and I am speaking here of the
rabble which is distinguished from the wise in this discussion .… In the
common conceptions of the mind the crowd is in accord with the wise, but in
the proper principles and conclusions of the arts and sciences it is discordant,
and labouring with appearances runs off into sophisms and subtleties which the
wise reject altogether. Thus the crowd is in error in its opinions of proper and
secret qualities, and so is divided from the wise (Concerning the Marvellous Power
of Art, p. 39).
The root of the problem, as Bacon saw it, was a tendency to rely on authority and
on reason alone. The problem with authority is that it is a form of belief, not
understanding, and reason alone cannot help us to discriminate between true claims
and claims that appear to be true (Compendium Studii Philosophiae, 1.396). This, we
recall, was Polybius’ topoi problem. Bacon’s proposed solution is threefold: start
with the study of simple phenomena and progress to more complex matters; use
and create texts with very simple and straightforward language; and be satisfied
only with certainty that includes no doubt. The result is that we will begin to
appreciate the causes of phenomena, and to filter through appeals to wonder
(Concerning the Marvellous Power of Art, p. 26), much in the manner of Abelard of
Bath (fl. 1116–42) in Quaestiones naturales:
For the soul, imbued with wonder and unfamiliarity, when it considers from
afar, with horror, the effects of things without causes, has never shaken off its
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confusion. Look more closely, consider the circumstances, propose causes, and
you will not wonder at the effects.13
Bacon explains this through his dissection of the apparently wonderful case of a
long-lived farmer:
A farmer who was tilling his field plowed up a golden flask filled with noble liquor,
and, judging it to be the dew of heaven, he washed his face and drank with the
result that he was renewed in body and spirit and in the goodness of wisdom—and
from a ploughman he was made porter to the king of Sicily (p. 33–4)
Bacon navigates through the elements of the story, concluding that the prime cause
for the farmer’s long life was care for his health, not ancillary activities such as the
discovery of a golden flask in a field. Long life thus arises from individual respon-
sibility and is open to us all. Indeed even Aristotle would have lived longer, Bacon
quips, had ‘he not occupied himself with base pursuits’ (Concerning the Marvellous
Power of Art, p. 37).
Attention to scientific observation and cause and effect, however, does not
necessarily mean the dissipation of all claims to wonder. Rather, Bacon proposes a
new approach to wonder writing, one that respects the ingenuity of scientific
thought in inventions such as nautical instruments, telescopes, perpetual lamps,
gunpowder (Concerning the Marvellous Power of Art, p. 30). Bacon’s examples might
seem to hark back to Aristotle’s example of an automaton in his Metaphysics
(983a12–15) but each is included because they are understood rather than not
understood. Wonder here is thus fundamentally associated with an understanding
of the operations of reason, not its beginnings or its limits.
Across the writings of Augustine, Thomas, and Bacon we see agreement on the
association of wonder with the intellect rather than the passions and the splitting
off of curiosity as an incomplete operation of rationality that stems from weakness
of will. I also noted, though, differences in their views on whether wonder is
associated with the beginnings of the operations of reason. Importantly, too, I have
suggested that each amplified the concept of wonder: arguing that its operation
might have social as well as individual consequences (Augustine); that curiosity is
rightfully considered as an incomplete subsidiary of wonder (Thomas); and that
some academic activities are more likely to result in wonder than others (Bacon).
Although I have not offered a complete appraisal of medieval philosophies of
practical reason, the highlights I have sketched above suggest that it was Augus-
tine’s positioning of wonder as a legitimate operation of intellect and as dis-
tinguished from curiosity that was relayed in the histories of Gerald and Gervase.
This is not to say that their thoughts were in lock step with Augustine or indeed
even with one another. In particular, I noted the divergence between Gerald and
Gervase on the matter of whether the presentation of a variety of wonderful phe-
nomenon and thus the assumption of singularity engages the intellect or fires
curiosity. This leaves us to reconsider Bede.
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Interior authenticity: ecclesiastical paradoxology
As Rüth has argued, hagiographies and miracle collections were not so much a stan-
dalone genre in medieval Europe as a functional element across a wide range of writ-
ings. Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People, for example, contains enough in
the way of hagiographical elements to suggest that it functioned as a devotional as well
as an historical work. An important question is to ask why, and to test whether there
are any views on wonder in histories that were not transposed across to the wider
functional element of hagiography and miracle collection or the other way around.
We recall from the previous chapter Polybius’ difficulty in clearing space
between history and paradoxography or wonder writing. A key part of this diffi-
culty stemmed from paradoxographers employing similar or the same authenticity
phrases such as ‘I saw’, ‘I have often seen’, or ‘I have read’. This led Polybius to
seek refuge through the interiorisation of wonder as an expression of mental effort.
This was not particularly successful, because the signs of mental effort cannot
always be reliably discerned.
In medieval Europe, the overlap in topoi between histories and Christian wonder
works not only remained, but was kindled by ecclesiastical reforms contemporary
with Gerald of Wales’ The History and Topography of Ireland. These set out standard,
judicial criteria for Church recognition of miracles and canonisation.14 Satisfaction
of these criteria was determined on the basis of witness interviews and written
submissions. This shift prioritised manifest signs (signa) that an inexplicable, faith
affirming phenomenon had been observed with wonder by observers. These
changes were designed to shift recognition of saints and their wonders from local
practices to those set by Rome. Canonisation became a slow, expensive and often
quite political process, as Ronald Finucane has shown. But as Finucane has also
noted, sworn depositions about miracles suggest that peasants and the elite had
varying notions of how a miracle might be deemed authentic. 15 Moreover, by the
time that canonisation processes were formally codified by Rome, it was already
the case that written accounts of miracles reflected well-established topoi or meth-
ods that were used to construct and sustain argument. This meant that even if the
formal process of canonisation was slow or even ultimately unsuccessful, miracle
narratives could still be circulated and deemed authentic by their audiences.
Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People reflected and accentuated these
topoi long before Papal reforms in the thirteenth century. We first see this in the
preface, where he informs King Ceowulf that:
In order to remove all occasions of doubt about these things written, either in
your mind or in the minds of any others who listen to or read this history, I
will make it my business to state briefly from what sources I have gained my
information (Preface).
This is largely followed through in the body of the work, with just over half of the
76 miracle stories referring to written, eyewitness or unnamed sources. Other topoi
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include a description of location, the inclusion of any objects pertinent to the acts
of the holy person (e.g. a staff, a church buttress) and a description of the wonder
of others at the events. These markers of authenticity all have in common the
assumption that the audience can go to the location, the sources, the objects, and
the witness and check that the phenomena occurred in the way described.
What stands out about these methods of argument is that they function just as
well in an historical work as they do in an ecclesiastical work. This is why Bede’s
work works as both. It might be argued therefore that historiography was ecclesias-
tical in the middle ages. But in so arguing, we find ourselves back at the dilemma
experienced by Polybius. This is because it is possible to find these topoi used in non-
miracle stories in medieval histories, such as Gervase’s account of the bearded women
of Scythia. A further exterior mark of function might be seen in the Papal acceptance
of an account, but not all miracle stories were given such a mark of authenticity.
So we again find ourselves at the interiorisation of authenticity, which in the
case of philosophy and the histories of Gerald and Gervase was marked out
through the terms wonder and curiosity. Finding the signs of wonder versus curi-
osity was no less difficult for the audiences of medieval histories than it was for the
audiences of ancient Greek histories and paradoxographies. The difference in this
case, though, is that a judge in the form of God was able to sort the devotional
from the sinful.
Still entangled
Medieval historians, like ancient Greek historians, saw history as an activity of sense
making. Within that activity of sense making, the cognitive function of wonder
assisted in the revelation and contemplation of the universal. In this way, the pur-
suit of metaphysical answers emphasised understanding of mind, or epistemology.
Wonder also came to be seen as a restraint from the sinful interest of curiosity in
sensible phenomena. There were, though, differences of opinion about whether
inclusion of a wide range of ‘strange’ phenomena in histories would stimulate
rational engagement or test the weakness of will that led to curiosity. Significantly,
too, philosophers added to ancient Greek views on wonder, highlighting its social
as well as individual implications, the steps in rational processes that determined
whether wonder or curiosity would be achieved, and opportunities for developing
rightful senses of wonder in the academic world. Finally, the overlap in topoi
deployed in histories and paradoxologies from the ancient Greek world persisted,
with recourse to God being the determinant of whether a writer had displayed
rigorous, rational judgement.
In short, the metaphysical path that Polybius and ancient Greek historians char-
ted was sustained in medieval historiography. History was concerned with uni-
versals, rigorous sense perception discerned those universals, and there were
boundaries between the knowable and the unknowable. What differed was an
enhanced interest in epistemology to detail how wonder worked, and to address
the problem of judging other historians’ claims that had left Polybius so perplexed.
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3
THE WONDERS OF HISTORY IN THE
PRE-MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD
Al Tusi | Al Qazwini | Al Tabari | Ibn Khaldun | Ibn
Sina | Ibn Rushd
‘Abd-ar-Rahman Abu Zayd Muhammad Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) has long been
celebrated as a theorist of history with few or no equals. His is a well-established
reputation built upon arguments in the Muqaddimah for systematic thinking over
‘blind trust in tradition’ and a refusal to allow history to ‘move or charm the
reader’, ‘moralise or convince’, or to ‘serve any administration or government’
(Muqaddimah, I:78, 79). Yet Ibn Khaldun can still surprise us. This capacity for
surprise stems in part from the relative neglect of the much larger work for which
the Muqaddimah serves as an introduction: the Kitab al-‘Ibar (‘History of the
World’). Ibn Khaldun was not only a theoretician; he also applied that theory in an
extensive description of historical phenomena. Yet reflections on Ibn Khaldun’s
Kitab are sparse. Moreover, as this chapter will also show, analyses of the Muqaddi-
mah are also quite selective. Ibn Khaldun is not just the progenitor of a cyclical
theory of civilisational growth and decline, and of a rational, critical approach to
the writing of history. The Muqaddimah also outlines for us an account of wonder
(‘ajab) as an affective and physiological experience which connects the sensible,
particular world with that of the universal realm of God.
What role is there for surprise or even wonder in writing the history of histor-
iography? In chapter one, we followed Polybius as he set down three judgements
about the idea of history that intersected with the interests of metaphysicians.
History concerned universals, those universals were discerned through rigorous
sensory perception, and there was a boundary between the knowable and the
unknowable set by the limits of his visual perception. We saw him struggle to deal
with the question of whether claims made by historians were made in good or in
bad faith, and he opted for a plain writing style, infrequent recourse to wonder for
his own claims, and the application of a claim of wonder against the ideas of others
which he did not trust. He shared a mutual interest in the questions of metaphy-
sicians and worked himself into a tangle with wonder writers via his adoption of
wonder topoi. Chapter two outlined some subtle shifts in medieval historiography
and metaphysics that presented devotional acts of wonder as a means of accessing
the universal. Polybius’ call for self-regulation in historical knowledge claims was
still needed, but God became the judge of whether it had been achieved in good
faith. We might not be able to discriminate between the efforts of an historian and
a paradoxographer, but God can. Historiography changed, but not in a way that
would have made Theaetetus’ ‘head swim’.
Still, there was a sense of the relationship between history and metaphysics as
generative, of authors in both fields introducing and addressing questions that
suggested an enhanced, more detailed or even better understanding of how to
make general sense of things. Some of these writers saw themselves as describing
the actual structure of our thought about the world, whilst others had a more
playful take on recounting the past. Regardless, metaphysics and historiography
iterated. In this chapter we turn to pre-modern Islamic historiography (roughly
pre-1500 CE), which is rarely, if ever, explored in introductory histories of history
or general historiographical texts. An obvious explanation lies with translation: few
Islamic histories of the pre-modern world have been translated out of Arabic, let
alone translated into English. Even better known texts have only been translated in
part. It is for this reason that the introductory bibliography for this chapter contains
textual fragments and one translation into German rather than English. These
translations are invaluable, and this valuable work is finally gathering some pace in
the English-speaking world. But there might be another, more substantive reason
why Islamic historiography is neglected in Western texts, which has to do with its
having been characterised as fundamentally conservative rather than innovative.
Consider, for example, the judgement of Chase Robinson in Islamic Historiography:
Put very schematically, traditionalist cultures such as medieval Islam and Rab-
binic Judaism hold that knowledge is better conserved than it is created. In
particular, they hold that the best kind of knowledge is the wisdom of pious
and inspired forefathers, which, whether recorded in their day or generated
retrospectively by subsequent generations, can validate and guide the experi-
ence of the present. As distrustful of creativity as they are convinced of the
inerrancy of those who came before them, traditionalists are generally critical
about the present and nostalgic about a ‘golden age’ when men, acting in
accordance with fresh truths, accomplished great things. They do not revere
the past; they revere a past, and although the length and character of this past
differs from culture to culture, there is always an ever-widening gap between
the time of inspiration (or revelation) on the one hand, and the present time of
decay, on the other.1
It appears that on the basis of this appraisal that this will be a reiterative chapter on
the relationship between history and metaphysics, or at least a disappointing read
beyond a consideration of Ibn Khaldun’s contribution. Robinson’s judgment needs
further scrutiny, however, because it turns on an underlying assumption about the
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relative importance of what is called hadith in Islamic historiography. Hadith refers
to the corpus of knowledge we have of Muhammad’s ideas, including the chains of
transmission (isnads) through which that knowledge has passed, the transmitters
themselves, and the styles of transmission. This is more than a Biblical ‘x begat y’,
as might be found in the medieval Christian histories explored in the last chapter.
The introduction to Muhammad ibn Jarir al Tabari’s (838–923 CE) 39 volume
History of the Prophets and Kings provides us with a stark example. Here is one part
of a twenty-page isnad which outlines the views of Muhammad on the compara-
tively short lifetime of individuals compared to that of nations:
According to Khallad b. Aslam—al-Nadr b. Shumayl—Shu’bah—Qatadah—
Anas b. Malik: The Messenger of God said: When I was sent, I and the Hour
were like these two. We were told by the same Mujahid b. Musa—Yazid—
Shu’bah—Qatadah—Anas b. Malik—the Prophet, with the addition in this
hadith: and he pointed with the middle and index fingers.
According to Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Abd al-Hakam—Ayyub b.
Suwayd—al-Awza’i—Isma’il b. ‘Ubaydallah: When Anas b. Malik came to al-
Walid b. ‘Abd al-Malik, al-Walid asked him: What have you heard the Mes-
senger of God mention about the Hour? Anas replied: I heard the Messenger
of God say: You (pl.) and the Hour are like these two—pointing with his two
fingers (I: 178).
Over and over again we explore variations of interpretation of Muhammad’s
words, culminating with al Tabari’s summary judgment on the most persuasive
chain of transmission.
Al Tabari’s apparent predilection for isnads results in a history of the world that
Robinson appraises as preserving rather than as generative.2 It does not advance
knowledge of the past; it secures knowledge of the most acceptable version of a
past. This description of al Tabari’s work does suggest that Ibn Khaldun’s Muqad-
dimah might be an outlier in Islamic historiography. Ibn Khaldun not only uses far
fewer isnads; he also criticises mistakes that arise from uncritical acceptance of isnads.
We must remember, however, that the Muqaddimah is simply the methodologi-
cal preface to an historical work that does contain isnads. Moreover, hadith is not
the sole means by which we can judge the efforts of Islamic historians. There is
another story about transmission that this chapter seeks to tell. Given the direction
of the narrative in this book so far, which has emphasised the role of sensory per-
ception in discerning universals, it is a surprising one. That story has as its focus not
the corpus of knowledge we have of Muhammad’s ideas, but the corpus of
knowledge we have of Aristotle’s ideas. As I will argue, Ibn Khaldun’s account of
wonder in the Muqaddimah locates him in a pre-modern world in which ancient
Greek and Islamic ideas coalesced. The first major meeting of these two traditions
followed the absorption of Hellenistic colonies in the Umayyad empire (661–750
CE). By the time of the Abbasid empire (750–1258 CE), nearly all of Aristotle’s
texts had been translated into Arabic. A well known exception to this was
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Aristotle’s Politics, with the reason for its exclusion from the translated corpus
still being unknown.3 A lesser known exception, but a critical one for our
purposes, was the first half of the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This
book, we recall from chapter one, introduced the idea of philosophy as
beginning with wonder. Seven, or possibly even eight renderings of the Meta-
physics were produced in the major waves of Arabic translation between the
ninth and tenth centuries. None of these translations include the first half of
the first book, which means that it was not considered by key Islamic philo-
sophers such as Abu Nasr al Farabi (872–950 CE), Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn Ibn Sina
(also known as Avicenna) (980–1037 CE) and Abu I-Walid Muhammad Ibn
‘Ahmad Ibn Rushd (also known as Averroes) (1126–1198). Nor is there evi-
dence of it being available through other intermediaries, whether they were
philosophers or any other kinds of writers. As Amos Bertolacci has observed,
the focus of Arabic translators and commentators on Aristotle’s Metaphysics was
on the sections in which Aristotle set out his views on natural theology and
Plato’s forms. These sections aligned most closely with contemporary Arabic
discussions on theology and Platonism. 4
If the opening sections of Aristotle’s Metaphysics were not available to philoso-
phers, this means they were also not available to other writers such as historians and
paradoxologists. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that Islamic thinkers arrived
at a similar view of wonder independently. Pre-modern Islamic histories simply do
not consider the idea of philosophy as beginning with wonder. Yet pre-modern
Islamic historiography, paradoxology and metaphysics do not lack for references to
wonder. As we shall see in this chapter, Ibn Khaldun establishes a place for wonder
in the apprehension of God’s creation. For his, as for other pre-modern Islamic
accounts of wonder, we have to give primary credit to Arabic translations of
another work by Aristotle, the Poetics.
Up until now, Aristotle’s Poetics has lurked behind the scenes of this book,
taking a back seat to a consideration of the general sense of things articulated in
Metaphysics. Indeed it might be argued that I dismissed poetry all too abruptly in
chapter one. In this chapter I bring the Poetics to the forefront, and with it, affective
and physiological notions of wonder. Moreover, I will argue that the Arabic
translation of Poetics from a Syriac intermediary text epitomises ‘the strange and the
transferred, the altered, and the foreign’ uses of language that Ibn Rushd pin-
pointed as triggers for wonder.5 This is largely uncharted territory in historio-
graphy, taking us from Ibn Khaldun’s well-known thoughts on history as both
form and substance to his assertion of affective and charismatic experiences of
wonder in prophecy. Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts on wonder, I will argue, help us to
relocate him in a world in which paradoxographers, historians and metaphysicians
not only saw the experience of wonder as the means of revealing the universal in
the particular, but as the main means for judging the beauty of speech. In these
ways, I hope to show that Islamic historiography is not an act of conservation, but
rather a wonder of creation, and one that guides our attention towards European
views of wonder as a passion needing to be controlled.
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In summary, in pre-modern Islamic historiography we will discern the same
interest in history as a means for discerning universals. We’ll see a different take on
sensory perception, one that inverts Polybius’ hierarchical arrangement of knowl-
edge by certainty for earthly experiences, but one that upholds it in the case of
prophets who gain access to universal knowledge in connection with God. We’ll
see a permeable boundary between the knowable and the unknowable, made
possible by the argument that some individuals can get closer to God’s will via a
rapturous, affective experience of wonder. And we’ll learn that wondrous forms of
writing—as seen in poetry—help us learn not only about what is, but also about
what might be. That’s probably different enough from the previous chapters to
make all of our heads swim, but it reinforces the picture I have been building of
history and metaphysics as intertwined.
Blades with scabbards: history as form and substance
Ibn Khaldun’s Kitab is made up of three books: the first treats the nature of history
and society, the second the history of the Arabs and the third the history of the
Berbers. In the foreword to the first book, the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun stakes his
claim to a systematic analysis of history and society:
I chose a remarkable and original method. In the work, I commented on civili-
sation, on urbanisation, and on the essential characteristics of human social orga-
nisation, in a way that explains to the reader how and why things are as they are.
… As a result, he will wash his hands of any blind trust in tradition. (I:11)
Other works of history are ‘absurd’ by comparison, reflecting ‘partisanship for opinions
and schools’, uncritical ‘reliance upon transmitters’, ‘unfounded assumptions as to the
truth of a thing’, and a fawning attitude towards people of wealth and rank (I:9–71).
This is because historians are tempted by the ‘idle talk of storytellers’ or rhetoricians
(I:75). By this, Ibn Khaldun means a lazy satisfaction in the literal, sensible appearances
of phenomena—including the claims of earlier historians—over a relentless search for
the ‘essence’ of civilization that is ‘inspired by God’ (I:77, 83). The result is history as
form without substance, like a blade without a scabbard:
[Historians disregard] the changes in conditions and in the customs of nations
and races that the passing of time had brought about. Thus, they present his-
torical information about dynasties and stories of events from the early period
as mere forms without substance, blades without scabbards, as knowledge that
must be considered ignorance, because it is not known what of it is extraneous
and what is genuine. (I:9)
These historians, Ibn Khaldun argues, have forgotten to ‘pay attention to historio-
graphy’s purpose’, which is to get to the ‘inner meaning’ of historical events (I:63).
This entails, as he explains:
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speculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes
and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why of
events. History, therefore, is firmly rooted in philosophy. It deserves to be
accounted a branch of philosophy. (I:6)
In order to get to the truth, historians must look to the social, political, economic,
cultural and physical conditions that explain the rise and fall of ‘umran or civilisa-
tions (I: 11). When they look at ‘umran in this way, history ceases to be a branch of
rhetoric and takes on the interest of metaphysical philosophy in universals.
Ibn Khaldun’s invitation for us to consider universals is backed up with an
extensive analysis of how we can achieve knowledge of God’s creation. Much of
this analysis is found in chapter six of the Muqaddimah, but there are also passages of
particular interest to us in the sixth prefatory discussion. In agreement with Aris-
totle, Ibn Khaldun sees it as being in the nature of humans to seek knowledge. In
distinction from Aristotle, however, Ibn Khaldun does not see knowledge as arising
from the rendering of the familiar as strange through wonder. Rather, he sees us as
building upon the knowledge claims of those before us, or those who know more
than us. This means hadith, including consideration of chains of transmitters (isnads),
the transmitters themselves (ruwat) and the topoi and technical nomenclature of acts
of transmission (istilahat) (II:448–9). Respect for hadith does not entail blind
acceptance, though, for Ibn Khaldun sees us as only achieving knowledge when
we appraise transmission in a critical fashion.
As chains are only as strong as their links, so isnads are only as strong as the
knowledge claims from which they are built. Strong isnads use multiple, indepen-
dent knowledge claims for each link. Weaker isnads have missing links or links that
rest on dubious or unverifiable claims. An isnad is therefore not automatically
authoritative, and nor is the length of an isnad an indication of authenticity or
certainty. Neither the historian nor the historian’s reader can accept knowledge
that has been handed down. Through acts of ‘disparaging and authenticating’, they
learn to discern the truth of isnads by critically analysing the approach, probity,
accuracy, thoroughness and care of transmitters (II:449).
In chapter one, we learnt of Polybius’ insistence that we should trust only
knowledge seen with our own eyes. This reduced the scope of history to an
activity in which we make sense of contemporary or recent events. Ibn Khaldun’s
view of history differs markedly in that he is prepared to consider the knowledge
claims of others, past and present. This is because the methods of hadith include the
search for multiple accounts of the same event, testing whether a writer is reliable
across a range of claims, and a consideration of the form and content of claims.
Claims put through this level of scrutiny could provide a more certain account of
events than our own unexamined perceptual experiences. As Plato cautioned, we
place our own knowledge claims beyond question at our own peril. Moreover,
while Ibn Khaldun sees some forms of knowledge as being more certain than
others, his hierarchy does not culminate with eyewitness evidence of sensible,
worldly events. His view is the inverse of that promoted by Polybius: perceptual
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sense making focused on worldly phenomena is only seen as a preliminary step in
understanding (II:412–3). The highest form of knowledge is that achieved through
a direct, prophetic connection with God (I: 184, 196). Prophetic connection with
God is beyond the reach of most of us: only some individuals of naturally good
and innocent character are chosen to know the universal and to instruct others in
salvation (I: 184–5).
Apprehension of the universal is attained via what Ibn Khaldun characterises as a
‘leap’ into the angelic realm (I: 199). That leap, though, is not one into inimit-
ability, for God has to bring the universal ‘down to the level of human perceptions’
and translate inner perception to external sense perceptions (I: 184; 192–3; 196)
which take the form of
some speech sound the person (who receives the revelation) hears and is able
to understand, or in the [visual] form of an individual delivering the message
to him. (I: 185; 200)
Of these sense perceptions, vision lends itself to more perfect knowledge than
hearing in that it is clearer to the prophet and thus more readily transmitted to
others (I: 216). God communicating through sound, however, is more readily
understood by humans (I: 200). None of the senses are ultimately suited for the
perfect apprehension of the universal, however, because of their corporeality. This
is because the body is subject to fatigue (I: 210). Vision is thus not the pinnacle of
knowledge making, but more of a reminder of our limitations in trying to discern
the designs of God.
Wonder also plays a role in the transmission of prophetic knowledge. This is not
wonder in the Polybian sense of us having exhausted all other attempts at expla-
nation, or even the cognitive search for first causes favoured by Aquinas. Rather, it
is an affective, physiological state of inspiration in which we see the prophet faint,
swoon, choke, sweat or fall into a state of catatonia:
In the state of inspiration, they seem to be removed from those who are pre-
sent. This is accompanied by a feeling of being choked that looks like
swooning or unconsciousness but has nothing to do with either. In reality, it is
an immersion in (and) encounter with the spiritual kingdom …. During that
(process, the person that receives the revelation) shows inexplicable signs of
strain and choking (I:185; see also 201–2).
All of these physiological signs highlight not mastery of, but removal from the
ordinary, material world. In this state of immersion, prophets are able to work
wonders that reinforce the truthfulness of their claims at connection with God.
Wonders are defined as actions that are non-customary and impossible for other
humans to achieve, and are interchangeable with the idea of miracles (I: 188; 190).
The wonders of prophets are unusual, such as ‘ascending to heaven, passing
through solid bodies, reviving the dead, conversing with angels, and flying through
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the air’ (I: 191). False wonders are by Ibn Khaldun’s reckoning impossible, because
wonders imply ‘confirmation of truthfulness and right guidance’ (I: 190). Beyond
this circular suggestion, the idea of false claims to wonder are given no brook. Nor
can the miracles of the inspired person be confused with the claims of the insane,
for the latter have corrupt humours and are not deeply immersed in the senses or
are completely removed from sensory perception (I: 218).
Reconciling Ibn Khaldun’s critical view on ‘disparaging’ isnads with his appre-
ciation of the wonders of prophetic immersion in the angelic realm seems difficult.
An understandable temptation for those trying to reconcile these views is to note
that Ibn Khaldun’s views on wonder and prophetic knowledge are confined to the
sixth prefatory discussion of the Muqaddimah. This makes it all too easy to dismiss
the views as marginal to the work, or conversely, to argue for a rational Ibn
Khaldun and a religious Ibn Khaldun. In so arguing, we miss an important point
raised by Ahmad: that the interplay of philosophical and religious thought is a
hallmark of pre-modern Islamic writing.6
Ahmad’s conclusion is that Ibn Khaldun’s efforts ultimately tip in the direc-
tion of religious affirmation. It is important to note, though, that Ahmad’s view
is based on an analysis of chapter six of the Muqaddimah alone. A wider textual
analysis rewards us with insight into a critical feature shared across Islamic his-
tory, paradoxography and metaphysics: that the relation of religion and philo-
sophy is the ultimate responsibility of the reader, not the writer. This view,
which will be unpacked in the remainder of this chapter, provides an interest-
ing counterpoint to the all-seeing, judgemental God that was needed in the
European medieval histories to provide a caution against the shift from wonder
to unconstrained, sinful curiosity. This makes me question whether wonder can
be explained epistemologically without recourse to metaphysics. Do we need
something like Plato’s forms, or God, or an angelic realm to achieve a level of
comfort in seeking recourse to wonder? Or, put more simply, do we need
something other than ourselves to achieve certain knowledge? This is the point
at which we note that the absence of Aristotle’s metaphysical claim for wonder
is not a lack in Islamic thought, but a great opportunity to be surprised three
chapters into this story.
A poetic turn
Our starting point for considering Ibn Khaldun in context is the Persian historian
who appears to be his conservative inverse: al Tabari. While much has been writ-
ten in praise of Ibn Khaldun’s views on history, al Tabari has attracted very little
scholarly attention. Moreover, what little has been written about him is hardly
complimentary: we recall Robinson’s judgement that he sought to conserve a
particular view of the past, rather than to create one.
Robinson’s appraisal is understandable. The introduction to al Tabari’s 39
volume History of the Prophets and Kings hardly inspires confidence that we are in
the presence of a creative or even prophetic thinker:
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The reader should know that with respect to all I have mentioned and made
it a condition to set down in this writing of ours I rely upon traditions and
reports which I have transmitted and which I attribute to their transmitters. I
rely only very exceptionally upon what is learned through rational arguments
and deduced by internal thought processes. For no knowledge of the history
of men of the past and of recent men and events is attainable by those who
were not able to observe them and did not live in their time, except through
information and transmission provided by informants and transmitters. This
cannot be brought out by reason or deduced by internal thought processes.
This writing of mine may [be found to] contain some information, men-
tioned by us on the authority of certain men of the past, which the reader
may disapprove of and the listener may find detestable, because he can find
nothing sound and no real meaning in it. In such cases, he should know that
it is not our fault that such information comes to him, but the fault of
someone who transmitted it to us. We have merely reported it as it was
reported to us (I: 170).
Sentence by sentence, al Tabari appears to position himself as the servant of his
transmitters. He is a reporter rather than a judge, relying on a world created
by others.
Or is he? The absence of a prefatory discussion to History of the Prophets and Kings
makes it all too easy to conclude that al Tabari did not have—or want to have—
command over the claims in his work. On this measure, the History of the Prophets
and Kings is clearly not the Muqaddimah. Yet al Tabari’s work is not constructed
without care, and it does not lack for deliberation. It is simply the case that we
have to read all of History of the Prophets and Kings to discern al Tabari’s views. This
was one of the salient lessons of chapter one: that historiography is not a prefatory
activity alone. One of the things that Polybius taught us is that you have to look
throughout a work of history to gain a sense of an author’s stance on the discipline.
This is the idea of historiography by examples.
A close reading of History of the Prophets and Kings rewards us with a view of
wonder quite unlike anything we have seen in this work so far. While there are
only seventeen substantive references to wonder (‘ajab) across the 39 volumes, they
are very unevenly distributed. Half are to be found in volumes one to six, and the
other half are to be found in volumes 29 to 32. The references to wonder in
volumes one to six align reasonably well with Ibn Khaldun’s idea of prophetic
knowledge. As al Tabari puts it in volume four, God shows us wonders ‘only to
complete the proofs of his [manifest existence] for you’ (4: 806). These are
exceptional phenomena such as eclipses (1: 68) and the parting of the sea (3: 418,
421) and they serve to take us from ‘eavesdropping to overhear God’s inspiration’
to direct revelation. We gain the sense that questioning these phenomena amounts
to questioning the existence of God. This would explain in part al Tabari’s defer-
ence to his sources in his prefatory comments and would likely see us conclude
that he opted for religious apprehension over rational deliberation. These are views
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on wonder that are not unexpected given our earlier analysis of Ibn Khaldun.
From volume 29, though, a textual transformation occurs: the History of the Kings
and Prophets takes a turn towards the poetic. The frequency of poetic segments
increases, and those segments include claims to wonder. Consider these poetic
extracts from volumes 29, 31 and 32, which are worth quoting at length given
how unknown al Tabari’s work is today:
What a wonder is the changing of affairs
pleasing and unpleasing.
Time plays with men
and has running occurrences.
Because of Ya’qub b. Dawud,
the ropes of Mu’awiyah are fraying.
The disasters from ‘Afiyah have infringed upon Ibn `Ulathah the qadi.
Say to the wazir Abu ‘Ubaydallah,
“Do you have a future?”
Ya’qub is looking into affairs, and you are looking sideways.
You introduced him, and he rose above you.
That is the real inauspiciousness. (29: 464–5)
Why should we weep for you? Why?—because of [your] raptures,
Abu Muss [alAmin]? because of [your] promoting of amusement?
Because of [your] omission of the five [prayers] in their times,
in your eagerness for the juice of the grape?
For Shanif I do not weep;
as for Kawthar, the thought of his death gives me no grief.
You did not know what was the measure of [God’s] pleasure,
nor did you know the measure of [His] wrath.
You were not fit to rule,
and the Arabs did not grant you obedience as ruler.
You who weep for him, may the eye
of whoever caused you to weep have wept only for wonder!
Why should we weep for you?—because you exposed us
to manjaniqs, and at times to being plundered,
And to people who made us their slaves—
because of them the tail seeks to gain power over the head—
In torment and wasting siege
that blocked the roads, so that there was no way to [obtain]
one’s needs? (31: 939)
Praise be to God for the authority which he has given to you since you
departed from your specified purpose!
Indeed, we and all our dependents remind ourselves with pride of your con-
duct in engaging in battle and granting peace, and we show immense
wonder at the qualities bestowed on him [`Abdallah] [by God] of severity and
leniency in their appropriate places.
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We do not know of any ruler over a body of soldiers or subjects who acts so
equitably between them as you do, nor of
anyone who grants forgiveness, to persons who have
caused harm or shown rancor towards him, from a position of superior
strength as you do. How rarely do we see a
nobly descended person who does not give up control of
his affairs [that is, throw away his own personal talent or
potential], relying rather upon what his forefathers have
passed on to him! And the one who is given good fortune,
material sufficiency, ruling authority and governmental
power does not simply cleave
what has fallen to his
share in abundant quantity, so that he falls short in being
able to cope with what is before him. (32: 1097)
The first extract—from volume 29—suggests a view of the past akin to Polybius’
historical sense making. In this case, we look beyond the experiences of particular
individuals and discern how changes in leadership can influence the fortunes of
groups. The final line also makes it clear that antecessors can overshadow pre-
decessors. Neither of these claims indicates a conservative disposition: the historian
is capable of discerning the universal across sequences of particulars, and the future
may overshadow the past. The second and third extracts—from books 31 and 32
respectively—make it clear that wonder is rightfully used to describe exceptional
events. To be clear, these uses of wonder do not mark a bold departure from those
of the ancient Greek philosophers in chapter one of this book. What is unusual is
their appearance in poetry. Some of these poems are by other authors, but some
reflect the hand of al Tabari. Moreover, it is important to note that wonder makes
its appearance only in poetry in the later volumes of History of the Prophets and Kings.
Is it by accident that wonder is clothed in verse?
The wonders of creation
Al Tabari does not explain his use of poetic extracts to account for contemporary
events in the History of the Prophets and Kings. It is a textual shift that only becomes
apparent when you look at the work as a whole. As such, it is a salutary reminder
of how little we might be able to conclude about Ibn Khaldun’s views of history
by reading the Muqaddimah alone. Moreover, the lack of explanation for this shift
within the History of the Prophets and Kings encourages us to look to other text types
to see if we can discern whether this was something al Tabari did on his own, or as
part of a wider body of thought. A good place to start are the intertwined interests
of paradoxologists and then metaphysicians.
Persis Berlekamp has demonstrated that there was an outpouring of Arabic,
Persian and Turkish paradoxologies or wonder works between the thirteenth and
nineteenth centuries that worked to induce wonder (‘ajab) as a sense of astonishment
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at the Divine.7 How wonder connects—if at all—to the nature, scope, certainty and
sources of knowledge—is something that Berlekamp leaves us to discern from a
contemplation from the texts themselves. The best known of these works is the
Wonders of Creation and Oddities of Existence (hereafter Wonders) by the thirteenth-
century Persian writer Abu Yahya Zakariya’ ibn Muhammad al Qazwini (1203–83).
Al Qazwini’s work, in turn, appears to have been influenced by Muhammad ibn
Mahmud ibn Ahmad al Tusi’s text of the same name.8
Al Qazwini’s carefully structured account of the universe opens with four pre-
faces on the key terms of the title. In al Qazwini’s muqaddimah, wonder is defined
as ‘the astonishment that befalls a person because he lacks knowledge about the
cause of a thing or knowledge of its effects’ (p. 26).9 This he explains through the
example of a beehive, the geometric properties of which seem remarkable given
that bees do not have a knowledge of mathematics or make use of a compass or
ruler. The efforts of bees are a sign of God’s work in the world—they are a
wonder of God’s creation—and our wonder is an avenue to contemplation of
God. All of creation may evoke wonder, from the actions of people to stars, rocks
and trees, animals and insects. Phenomena do not need to be what Qazwini calls
‘oddities’: unusual or unheard of phenomena such as monsters or different kinds of
angels to stimulate contemplation of God (pp. 234–42). The only limit to our
ability to wonder at God’s creation comes from our treatment of phenomena as
familiar: for example, as al Qazwini notes in the case of camels, we see them so
often that they are no longer considered strange. The limits of wonder are thus not
limits of explanation, but limits in our capacity to be struck by the remarkable
works of God.
Travis Zadeh has seen in al Qazwini’s Wonders an affinity with ancient Greek
paradoxographical wonder works.10 Although an interesting idea, Qazwini’s work
diverges in approach from the ancient Greek texts in at least two significant ways.
First, his definition of wonder is far more inclusive than the unusual and unique
items highlighted by Greek writers. This difference is deliberate and important:
Qazwini sees the limits of wonder as set only by the reader’s capacity for aston-
ishment, not by the judgement of the author about which particular phenomena
are to be explained by recourse to wonder. All phenomena reflect the work of
God, therefore all phenomena can trigger the experience of wonder. Second,
Qazwini’s account of the features of the known universe is prefaced by comments
on the nature, reliability and limits of knowledge. It is not simply a list of phe-
nomena of the kind we see in ancient Greek texts. Consequently, his use of textual
markers—topoi—to signal the source and quality of the information is part of a
more systemic consideration of the nature of knowledge. His prefatory remarks
outline preferences for the acquisition of knowledge, and underline the chief
message of the work: that contemplation of God flows from the sight of the reader.
As with Ibn Khaldun and al Tabari, Qazwini’s reflections on knowledge stem
from a consideration of hadith, but they also reflect the preference of Ibn Khaldun
and ancient Greek historians for evidence attained by sight. Sight can be spiritual as
well as literal, as al Qazwini explains:
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The inner eye of insight opens to him and he sees every aspect of wonder, the
mention of which is impossible to articulate completely, for even if he
expressed just a bit of it to someone else, this other person would not believe
him (p. 27).
Here we see sight positioned as preferential to speech. This preference for sight,
though, does not stem from the insistence of ancient Greek writers like Polybius
that we can trust only the things that we see. Rather, al Qazwini and Ibn Khaldun
prefer sight on the grounds that it is the most effective means for God to com-
municate to humans. This makes it clear that the way that the reader sees the text
is critical, as he explains:
I call God the Almighty as witness that there is nothing from these [mar-
vels], which I have invented. Rather, I have written everything down as I
have come across them. If you look at these [marvels] with an accepting
eye, then [the eye] would be dimmed to every defect. But if you viewed
[them] with an eye of indignation, then the shortcomings would be many.
The eye of the generous is blind to the blemishes and his ear is deaf to the
shortcomings (p. 5).
While al Qazwini’s commitment to accuracy is a necessary condition for the con-
templation of the works of God, this extract suggests that his work serves as a base
condition for the efforts of the reader. The reader is not passive; the same text may
be considered with an ‘accepting eye’ or with an ‘eye of indignation’. This is an
interesting point: we can well imagine being struck by one passage in one reading
of a text, and by another passage in a subsequent reading. Such a variation in
experience lends weight to the view more explicitly articulated in Ibn Khaldun’s
Muqaddimah that any dependence on corporeality will mean that human knowledge
of God is not inimitable.
If reader engagement is the primary determinant for the experience of wonder,
then we might well expect that al Qazwini treats the reliability of other’s claims to
knowledge—like his own—as a background or even ancillary consideration in the
development of knowledge. This is the case, with him clearly telling us not to get
caught up on trying to verify everything we read or hear. If God is capable
of anything, then our minds have to be open to the possibility of encountering
anything. Think about it rationally, he instructs us:
I have mentioned matters which the disposition of a negligent idiot might
reject, but that the soul of a rational man could not deny. Although these
affairs may be far from well-known customs and ordinarily witnessed events,
nothing should be deemed too great for the power of the Creator or the
cunning of creation and everything therein. They are the marvels of the art of
the Creator, which are either perceivable by the senses or intelligible by the
intellect, for which there can be no doubt or imperfection concerning them;
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or they are elegant tales ascribed to transmitters, for which I have no
responsibility concerning their authenticity; or they are strange properties for
which a lifetime would not be enough to test them, and thus it would make
little sense to ignore all of them, since there is doubt concerning just some of
them (pp. 4–5).
You could expend a lifetime trying to explain a phenomenon, worry about the
accuracy of reports of phenomena from distant places and quibble with the rheto-
rical flourishes of historians, or you could appreciate rationally that God is
remarkable. This does not mean that al Qazwini is skeptical about the knowledge
claims of others, or that he has no respect for hadith. His thoughts are simply a
reminder that the experience of wonder in God’s creation is our responsibility.
Al Qazwini’s views on knowledge set out contours of argument that are also
present in Ibn Khaldun. Both suggest that all manner of phenomena may be
explained by recourse to wonder on the grounds that they are the work of God.
Both privilege sight as a means of contemplating the acts of God, and both see
corporeality as ruling out the inimitability of human knowledge. Yet al Qazwini
and Ibn Khaldun also diverge on at least two points that are of interest to us. First,
where al Qazwini’s preface positions us all as being capable of wonder, Ibn Khal-
dun makes it clear that prophets wonder at the universal with a level of skill far
beyond that of most people. This sets up an instructional role for prophets, which
means that the experience of wonder is not the responsibility of al Qazwini’s reader
alone. As we see in the excerpt from the Muqaddimah that opens this chapter, God
has chosen certain individuals, and those individuals are to acquaint us with God’s
work in the world.
Second, Ibn Khaldun is much more taxed by the certainty of the knowledge
claims of transmitters. This is because mental acts of ‘disparaging and authenticat-
ing’, and the discernment of the truth of isnads by critically analysing the approach,
probity, accuracy, thoroughness and care of transmitters (II:449), are not separate or
ancillary to our wonder at God. The active, seeing, reader does not accept the
claims of others: they need to engage themselves in order to achieve the mental
virtuosity needed to appreciate the universal. These differences suggest that Ibn
Khaldun’s work is without precedent. Such a conclusion, though, rests on a
tenuous knowledge of contemporary and earlier paradoxological, historical and
philosophical thought.
Diagnostic work by Zadeh suggests al Tusi’s Wonders of Creation and Oddities of
Existence (hereafter Wonders) as a precedent for Qazwini’s Wonders, and in particular
the passage on the validity and certainty of knowledge reproduced above. Al Tusi’s
prefatory comments on knowledge are as follows:
We have gathered this book from what we have seen hidden in books and
from what we have heard from globe-trotters and world-travellers. Some of
this is such that it is not necessary for anyone to stand as witness to it, for it is
self-evident, such as the heavens, the moon, and the sun—which is greater
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than all the wonders. On the margins of these, we have set down a “za” for
“zahir” self-evident. Some of these are in need of proof (burhan), which can be
reached in only a long period of time, such as the talismans of Byzantium and
al-Andalus. Next to these, we have placed on the margins “ba” “ayn” for
“ba‘id”, remote. Some of these the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet dis-
cuss; for these we have placed a “sad dal” for “sidq”, authentic. The mention of
some of these wonders is transmitted through established authorities (mutawatir)
in books. On the margins of these, we have marked a “mim ‘ayn” for “ma’ruf”,
well-known. Some of these marvels we have heard of by way of world-
travellers, for which we have no decisive (“qati’”) proof and thus they
cannot be said to be blatant lies (durugh). On the margins of these we have
marked “shin ba’ ha’” for “shubha”, uncertain. For to deny such a thing is an
evil characteristic. When somebody reports on the wonders of Byzantium,
al-Andalus, Qandahar, or Multan, if you were to request proof of their
authenticity, it would be impossible to verify (“tashih”) it all in one
lifetime.11
The similarities between the two texts are apparent: both stress the existence of
self-evident knowledge, note the challenges of verifying reports from distant places
and conclude by noting that proof for some phenomena would require more than
a lifetime of work. But the two passages are not identical, and there are two dif-
ferences worth highlighting at this point in our discussion. First, al Qazwini expli-
citly positions God as capable of creating anything. This is an important prefatory
comment in a book on wonders, as it legitimises all of the phenomena included
and suggests and other phenomena may also be considered. There is no legitima-
tion akin to this in al Tusi. Second, al Tusi’s work presents a scale of certainty for
hadith: zahir (self-evident); burhan (in need of proof), ba‘id (remote); sidq (authen-
tic); ma’ruf (well-known); qati (lacking in decisive proof); durugh (blatant lies) shubha
(uncertain); and tashihit (open to correction or verification). Here there is a tighter
connection with Ibn Khaldun, although the latter presents a much simpler scale of
three points: sound sahih (sound); hasan (good); and da’if (weak). Ibn Khaldun’s
scale, we note, lacks a reference to the self-evident. This is likely in keeping with
his emphasis on the mental effort of knowledge and contemplation of God.
Nothing is to be taken for granted. This might indicate a diminished role for
wonder in the Muqaddimah; a suspicion further compounded by the restriction of
discussion of wonder to the prefatory section on those with prophetic powers.
What al Tusi and al Qazwini do have in common is the assumption that the
burden of responsibility for contemplating God does not rest with the author
alone. Their judgement that verification can sometimes take more than a lifetime
reminds us that we can sometimes let ourselves become tangled in chains of isnads
at the expense of respecting God’s creative hand in the world. If something is
wonderful, we should appreciate it as such without wringing our hands at the
technical deficiencies in descriptions of that phenomenon. This casts an interesting
light on Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah as a technical text in which the desire to
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disparage authorities might be seen as a failure to distinguish the wood from the
trees. Or, more bluntly, Ibn Khaldun may be guilty of writing history as form
without substance. Moreover, it may lead us away from reading al Tabari’s
description of his efforts of ‘mere’ reporting (I: 170) as a disavowal of responsibility
and towards the more generous reading of it as recognition of the responsibility of
the reader.
We have ascertained that there may be some alignment between al Tabari and
paradoxographical views of reader responsibility. What we still do not have,
though, is an explanation for why al Tabari included poetry in his History of the
Prophets and Kings, and why Ibn Khaldun provided an affective and physiological
account of wonder.
The key to filling these two explanatory gaps is the power that al Tusi and al
Qazwini ascribe to the form of a text in either guiding or distracting a reader from
the contemplation of God. Theirs is an important insight, for we recall the diffi-
culties that Polybius had in discriminating the efforts of historians and para-
doxographers because of overlapping topoi. This was left unresolved until the
insertion of an overseeing, judging God, in medieval histories.
The poetics of wonder
Polybius wrote in a world in which Aristotle set down a role for wonder in his
Metaphysics. The Metaphysics, however, is not the only text in which Aristotle
contemplated a role for wonder. Poetics is also an important source for Aris-
totle’s views, and in the case of the pre-modern Islamic world, it provides the
primary explanation for an affective view of wonder that recognises the power
of textual forms.
The Poetics provides an explanation of the nature and impact of verse. A key
observation of the text is that poetry is imitation. By this, Aristotle does not mean
to relegate the role of the poet to that of cipher. Rather, poets create worlds which
exercise our cognitive powers of recognition. In this way, poetry is like philoso-
phy, and unlike history, for ‘[p]oetry tends to express universals, and history parti-
culars’ (51a).12 Importantly, this distinction does not turn on form, for ‘it would be
possible to turn the works of Herodotus into verse, and it would be a history
in verse just as much as in prose. The distinction is this: the one says what has
happened, the other the kind of thing that would happen’ (51b).
Yet form is not unimportant, because Aristotle sees rhythm and melody as
naturally pleasurable to people (48b), and the experience of wonder is important if
a verse is to impact on its readers or auditors (52a). That experience of wonder is
emotional. Two things are likely to evoke that emotional experience of wonder.
The first is reversal—the presentation of ideas or events that are the opposite of our
expectation—and the second is the illusion that the ideas or events in a verse hang
together regardless of any reversals (52a). Here we see the assembly of materials for
general sense making (the illusion of connection) amplified in its effectiveness by us
encountering something unexpected (reversal). Importantly, there is no suggestion
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that a reversal turns on an oddity, as al Qazwini would describe strange or unique
phenomena. Indeed, a reversal can involve the novel juxtaposition of two con-
ventional phenomena in a way that triggers contemplation of the universal.
At the opening of this chapter, I noted Bertolacci’s work in highlighting the
absence of the opening part of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the presence of his Poetics
in pre-modern Islamic thought. This is borne out when we consider the works of
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). The work of these two writers, it
turns out, provide the keystone for explaining Ibn Khaldun’s affective view of
prophetic wonder, and al Tabari’s notion of poetic citation of wonder.
Ibn Sina’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle (hereafter Commentary) provides
more than a simple restatement of ancient Greek views on knowledge and wonder.
Ibn Sina’s Poetics builds on his wider philosophical presentation of thought as the
movement from things present or realised in our mind to things not present or yet
to be realised in our mind (Remarks and Admonitions, 5:5:340) and evil as arising
from a deficiency or incompleteness of thought (The Metaphysics of Avicenna (Ibn
Sina), 37). Wonder strikes us in poetry when an image prompts our recognition of
a universal or we encounter a strange phenomenon (Commentary, 62). Poetry thus
needs to be ‘deflected from the usual’ and ‘congenial to the soul’ if impact is to be
achieved (Commentary, 63). Importantly, Ibn Sina connects Aristotle’s thoughts on
wonder with those of poetic genres, noting that the experience of wonder can be
positive and negative, ‘leav[ing] in the soul an astonishing effect of distress or
pleasure (Remarks and Admonitions, 6.1.362). Consequently, we must be open to
contemplation of the universal via the praiseworthy and pleasant and the abomin-
able and horrifying. All of this gives us the sense of wonder as stimulated by what
Ibn Khaldun calls ‘substance’. But in accordance with Aristotle, Ibn Sina also
sees wonder as elicited by what he calls ‘poetic artifice’: internal rhyme, metrical
proportion, decoration and inversion (Commentary, 64). As he puts it:
The wonder-evoking in either sound or sense is of two types: (1) it may be,
without artifice, and in this case the wording itself is eloquent and yet without
“art”, or the meaning itself is unusual not through art but due to the strange-
ness of its imitation and imaginative representation; or (2) the wonder may
originate in a simple or composite artifice in either wording or meaning’
(Commentary, 64).13
This opens the way for us to recognise the effect of the way in which universals are
presented to readers, which Ibn Khaldun would describe as form. Form and sub-
stance are not therefore mutually exclusive or an inhibitor in the contemplation of
the universal.
Ibn Rushd echoes many of Ibn Sina’s ideas but extends the idea of wonder
through the concept of taghyir or alteration. When a poet aims at clarity, he tells us,
‘he brings forth the familiar nouns; and when he wants wonder and pleasure, he
brings forth the other sorts of nouns (Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s
Poetics, 124). These ‘other sorts of nouns’ are ‘the strange and the transferred, the
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altered, and the foreign’ (Averroes’Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, 124). By this
he means ambiguous terms, unusual words, foreign or loanwords, and even invented
words or neologisms. To explain this, he uses the analogy of foreign visitors:
just as the inhabitants of a town experience awe and reverence when seeing
foreigners come upon them, so is the case with strange words when they
happen upon the ears of the listener. Therefore, he who desires to succeed in
these two arts [—rhetoric and poetry—] must make their speech strange. The
beauty of altered words […] depends on the degree of their strangeness.14
Use of the unfamiliar has to be moderated, though, suggesting an optimal middle
course between the banal and the strange. His advice for all of us is that:
the poet must not so indulge in his use of unfamiliar nouns that he is on the
verge of making a riddle or so indulge in familiar nouns that he moves away
from the path of poetry to trivial discourse. (Averroes’ Middle Commentary on
Aristotle’s Poetics, 124)
This reinforces an observation from the previous two chapters, that frequent recourse
to wonder suggests a lack of mental discipline, and even a predilection towards sin.
Ibn Rushd also builds out Aristotle’s and Ibn Sina’s views on kinds of reversal,
noting that we can be struck by new insights when we combine two familiar
phenomena, and when we combine real with fantastic phenomena. This intimates
at the opportunity to contemplate the universal through the combination of ‘what
is’ and ‘what might be’, or as Aristotle might have put it, history and poetry.
The idea of wonder arising from a combination of history and poetry provides
us with a way of making sense of the later books of al Tabari’s History of the Prophets
and Kings. His juxtaposition of verse and prose is striking, and perhaps he meant for
this approach to elicit a sense of wonder in his readers. So too, Aristotle’s careful
distinction between the form and the focus of history and poetry leaves open the
possibility that al Tabari, al Qazwini and al Tusi’s insistence on the contemplation
of God over the particulars of isnads—and Ibn Khaldun’s argument for history as
philosophy—make their works poetic. Here we see the wisdom of dividing history
from paradoxography or philosophy on the basis of its topoi questioned. A text
doesn’t have to look like a history in order to be a history: the status of a history
simply turns on whether it contemplates the world as it is, rather than as what it
might be. This provides a strong counterpoint to Polybius’ use of topoi to navigate
history away from some of the metaphysical problems he struck in considering
knowledge generated not in good faith.
More radically, the acknowledgement of poetic form as a trigger for an emo-
tional experience of wonder opens this text up to the idea of wonder without
metaphysics. We might not need Aristotle’s universals in things, or God, or an
angelic realm to achieve a level of comfort in seeking recourse to wonder. Wonder
can simply be a response to fine writing. As Lara Harb has observed, this
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complicates the conventional view of pre-modern Islamic thought as conservative.15
Lest we gallop away with this idea, though, we have to remember why poetry was
written in the pre-modern Islamic world. We may experience wonder at the beauty
of a verse, but we contemplate that verse in order to see the hand of God at work in
the world. Poetry may be beautiful, but it is a wonder of God’s creation, and ele-
vation of specific expression over universal contemplation may leave our knowledge
incomplete. As with medieval Christian historiography, Ibn Sina reminds us incom-
plete knowledge is sinful (The Metaphysics of Avicenna (Ibn Sina), 37).
Still, there is something tantalising at work in the idea of history transforming
into beautiful poetry, and of us acknowledging the emotional and physiological
impact of facing the beautiful and the horrifying. Ibn Khaldun’s prophetic discourse
with angels and al Tabari’s verse quotes beckon us to leave off with pinning history
down to its isnads and invite us to imagine the world as it might be, and not—as
scholars typically conclude about Islamic historiography—the world as it was or is.
And all of this we might credit to the failure to translate the first half of the first
book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the ‘translation’—as Ibn Rushd would describe
it—of Aristotle’s poetics via a Syriac intermediary, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd.
Entangled, retangled
It is tempting to think that Polybius and other ancient Greek historians established
a relationship between history and metaphysics in the manner of an unstoppable
billiard ball. The remainder of this book would therefore simply have charted the
course of that ball, diversions and wobbles included. But as I noted in the first
chapter, history rarely offers a straightforward story of heirs and successors. This is
because, firstly, the transmission of ideas is never perfect. Texts and ideas are lost,
translated in ways that are intelligible to their new readers, or even partly translated.
We have the pre-Islamic world to thank for the survival of much of Aristotle’s
writing. But as we noted in this chapter, the translation of his Metaphysics was
partial, and that provided an excellent opportunity to assess the translation, adop-
tion and adaptation of Aristotle’s metaphysics without wonder. We found evidence
of wonder reconnected to metaphysics, but via another of Aristotle’s texts, his
Poetics. The relationship between history and metaphysics was partially re-wrought
in ways that emphasised the importance of both the form and the content of his-
tories in making general sense of the world, and which liberated the historian from
writing to strict fidelity with the past. God still presided as judge on those efforts,
but it generated the firm possibility of creativity as a part of the historiographical
endeavour to make general sense of the world.
Notes
1 Chase Robinson, Islamic Historiography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002,
pp. 85–6.
2 Chase Robinson, Islamic Historiography, p. 96.
60 History in the Pre-modern Islamic world
3 Hans Daiber, Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures, Leiden: Brill, 2012, p. 60.
4 Amos Bertolacci, ‘The Arabic Translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy, 2005, vol. 15(2), pp. 241–75.
5 Ibn Rushd, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, trans. Charles E. Butter-
worth, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 12.
6 Zaid Ahmad, The Epistemology of Ibn Khaldun, London: Routledge, 2002.
7 Persis Berlekamp, Wonder, Image, and Cosmos in Medieval Islam, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2011, p. ix.
8 Travis Zadeh, ‘The Wiles of Creation: Philosophy, Fiction and the ‘Aja’ib Tradition’,
Middle Eastern Literatures, 2010, vol. 31(1), pp. 21–48.
9 Al Qazwini, Die Wünder des Himmels und der Erde, trans. A. Giese, Berlin: Goldmann,
1986, p. 26, translation is my own.
10 Travis Zadeh, ‘The Wiles of Creation’, p. 23.
11 As quoted in Travis Zadeh, ‘The Wiles of Creation’, p. 27.
12 References are to the Bekker pagination in Aristotle, Poetics, trans. M. Heath, Har-
mondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1996.
13 Translation as modified by Lara Harb, Poetic Marvels: Wonder and Aesthetic Experience in
Medieval Literary Theory, unpublished PhD thesis, New York University, 2013.
14 Khataba, as quoted in Lara Harb, Poetic Marvels, p. 48.
15 Lara Harb, Poetic Marvels, p. 1.
References
Al Qazwini, Die Wünder des Himmels und der Erde, trans. A. Giese, Berlin: Goldmann, 1986.
Al Tabari, The History of Al Tabari, 39 vols., various translators, New York, Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1989–1998.
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 3 vols., trans. F. Rosenthal, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1958.
Ibn Rushd, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, trans Charles E., Butterworth,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Ibn Sina, The Metaphysics of Avicenna (Ibn Sina), trans. P. Morewedge, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1973.
Ibn Sina, Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle, trans. I. M. Dahiyat, Leiden: Brill,
1974.
Ibn Sina, Remarks and Admonitions, trans. S. C. Inati, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, 1984.
History in the Pre-modern Islamic world 61
4
WONDER AGAINST RITUAL: STRANGE
CHINESE HISTORIES
Sima Qian | Confucius | Duan Chengshi |
Pu Songling | Yuan Mei | Ji Yun
I noticed the dragons on my fourth reading of Sima Qian’s (145–86 BCE) Shiji.
Previous readings had seen me acknowledge the ambitious scope of the work, and
Sima Qian’s clever use of a thematic structure to revisit and render ambiguous the
achievements of prominent figures from the Qin (221–206 BCE) and the Han
(206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties. In all honesty, I did not expect the Shiji to canvas
the strange and the wonderful. Sima Qian, in my mind, was set to play the role of
the ‘serious’ historian in this chapter on Chinese strange histories. Yet there are
dragons in the Shiji (Han 1:10, p. 303; 6, p. 59; Han 2:28, pp. 5, 22, 37), along
with a man with the body of a swallow (Qin 5, p. 2); ‘weird beings’ (Han 1: 55,
p. 113); omens (Qin 6, pp. 36, 53; Han 2:28, p.5); and supernatural roosters
(Han 2: 28, p. 8).1 Consider, for example, this story of the son of Dame Liu:
Dame Liu was one day resting on the bank of a large pond when she dreamed
she encountered a god. At this time the sky grew dark and was filled with
thunder and lightning. When Gaozu’s father went to look for her, he saw a
scaly dragon over the place when she was lying. After this she became preg-
nant and gave birth to Gaozu. Gaozu had a prominent nose and a dragon-like
face, with beautiful whiskers on his chin and cheeks; on his left thigh he had
seventy-two black moles …. When he got drunk and lay down to sleep, the
old women, to their great wonder, would always see something like a dragon
over the place he was sleeping. Also, whenever he would drink and stay at the
shops, they would sell several times as much wine as usual. Because of these
strange happenings, when the head of the year came around the old women
would always destroy Gaozu’s credit slips and clear his account. (1:8, pp. 51–2)
Esther Klein has noted the respect with which modern scholars have treated the
structural and stylistic innovations at play in the Shiji. 2 A good example is Grant
Hardy’s appraisal of the work as an adept rendering of the ‘world in miniature’,
and of Sima Qian as holding ‘notions of accuracy, consistency, evidence and
rationality [that are] similar to ours’.3 Yet Klein has also noted that the structural
complexity of the Shiji and modes of transmission for the text after Sima Qian’s
death complicate any methodological celebration we wish to make of it. For every
instance in which we may see our own methodological likings at work in the Shiji,
there are others that appear to render Sima Qian strange. This situation is com-
pounded by the availability of only abridged and rearranged English translations.
Klein’s conclusion that Sima Qian seems to defeat us is nowhere more evident
than in her silence about wonder in the Shiji. ‘For modern readers’, she tells us,
phenomena like the swallow man Qi ‘are easily understood by reference to the
features of comparative mythology, such as the miraculous births of heroes, and so
forth’. Qi’s birth, Sima Qian tells us, is connected with his mother ingesting a
swallow’s egg:
Qi of Yin’s mother was Jian Di, who was one of the daughters of Yousong
and the secondary wife of Emperor Ku. She was going with her two sisters
to bathe, when she saw a dark bird drop its egg. Jian Di picked it up, and
swallowed it, and thus being with child gave birth to Qi (Qin 5).
The important question, Klein notes, is what Sima Qian made of Qi. Klein
answers by noting simply that Sima Qian remained silent on the matter.4
Silence is the focus of this chapter. It purportedly explains why, as Xupeng
Zhang has argued, Chinese historiography is generally passed over in histories of
history. As he argues, and it is worth quoting at some length:
Theory seems never to have been prominent in Chinese historiographical
traditions. Sima Qian (c. 145–85 BCE), the father of Chinese historiography,
voiced the foundational claim that history serves as a human effort “to explore
the relationship between Heaven and humanity and to comprehend the
changes of past and present.” This could be taken as meaning that he insisted
on a comprehensive view of history and its laws, yet in actual practice he did
nothing more than intersperse his chronologically ordered stories with a few
comments, intending the latter to pinpoint his understanding of particular
historical personages and events. Likewise, generations of Chinese historians
after him have stuck to the historiographical position of “never ever talking of
principles separately from affairs,” that is, they don’t fashion general concepts
or universal laws from specific cases. Thus, in spite of their strong historical
consciousness, Chinese historians have never been keen on viewing history
from a purely theoretical perspective.5
Not speaking can be interpreted as not theorising. Ruth Wajnryb reminds us,
however, that sometimes when we remain silent, we speak volumes. She noticed
how things left unsaid can have a powerful impact on the lives of the descendants
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of Holocaust survivors.6 Moreover, it is not clear that understandings of silence are
stable and agreed over time. Silence is significant in Chinese historiography, as we
shall discover in this chapter. In order to grant that point, we have to become
acquainted with Chinese metaphysics because it plays a critical role in explaining
why Sima Qian did not speak out, and why—as we shall discover later in this
chapter—so many writers have produced what are called ‘strange histories’. Poli-
tical carefulness certainly plays a role, but making general sense of things by being
in harmony matters even more. This chapter will highlight the interest of Chinese
historians in being in harmony with an immanent world, and of growing into an
understanding of that world by speaking, but more importantly, by being silent and
therefore being open to and a part of it. Conversely, we will also see historians
speak out when harmony ossifies into social and political practices that suggest close
mindedness to the immanent world. We will see them speak out obliquely, as Sima
Qian did, and we will see them speak out through wonders, as the thousands of
authors of ‘strange histories’ did. Therefore, we will see a historiographical tradition
that is interested in the immanent, which expresses views on how to discern the
immanent, and which assumes it has a role in opening peoples’ minds to an
appreciation of the general sense of things.
We begin this chapter by needing to become reacquainted with metaphysics.
This is not metaphysical reacquaintance of the kind we experienced in the last
chapter, where the pre-modern European and Islamic worlds shared an engage-
ment with the ideas of Aristotle. This is something altogether different, but not so
different that we do not see historians trying to make general sense of things. If
anything, this chapter is an important reiteration of a point I made in the last
chapter: the history of the entanglement of history and metaphysics is not an
Aristotelian ball set rolling throughout world history. It is, however, a reiteration of
my overall argument that the history of history bears the imprint of a persistent
engagement with metaphysical questions. Importantly, this reacquaintance needs to
happen early in this chapter lest we all read Chinese histories with a Western
metaphysical frame of mind, and assume that historiography will only take flight
when the West gifts its texts and metaphysical traditions.
Chinese ‘metaphysics’: immanence, harmony, silence
While Chinese philosophers have long worked on questions designed to make
general sense of things, there is no label equivalent to ‘metaphysics’ that sits com-
fortably over their efforts. A key tenet of Confucian (551–479 BCE) thought is
that the universal is immanent, but this is not immanence in the Aristotelian sense.
This is because this immanent sense of things is generative and without tense: we
contemplate an approach to the natural order of things (dao) in the manner of
being on a path or being on a way. And dao is in everything, including ourselves.
When we look to make general sense of things, we must also look to ourselves and
understand that we too are on a path to understanding the natural order of things.
It is a dynamic inclination within us which we can embrace through the removal
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of obstacles, giving up striving or lack of action or fasting of the heart or mind.7
This includes learning to refrain from speech and to embrace silence. So far from
being an absence of speech, silence is the decision not to speak.
Confucius was reluctant to speak, as we learn in Analects 17.19:
The Master said, ‘I am thinking of giving up speech.’ Zigong said ‘If you did not
speak, what would there be for us, your disciples to transmit?’ The Master said,
‘What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are four seasons going round and there are
the hundred things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?’
Not speaking is an important idea in Confucian thought, and not simply because
silence might appeal to our notions of self-restraint. It is also the case that we do not
need to speak to discern the seasons going round; in the harmony of nature Heaven
shows us much about how to live and to act. Katrin Froese’s characterisation of
speaking as a kind of marking aside or separateness of the self that displaces the
showing of heaven helps us here. Speaking is not needed because being open to
heaven showing us is the way to learn (Analects 7.2).8 Speaking interrupts that
showing, and if not checked, there is the risk that our speaking becomes habitual,
obsessive, and empty. This is in line with a view of ethics in which we learn to be
moral in acts of harmonisation that draw upon the immanent potential of nature.
The ethical is in us and our world. There are no separate, abstract universals, but
our experiences are not entirely subjective either. We find harmony in the natural
order of the world and in social order or harmony. Hence Confucius’ suggestion in
Analects 4.10 that ‘Exemplary persons in making their way in the world are neither
bent on nor against anything; rather they go with what is appropriate.’.
Confucius did not just offer advice on universal silence. He also offered advice
on not speaking about particular things. Of most relevance for this chapter are the
ideas in Analects 7.21: ‘Subjects the Master did not discuss: strange occurrences,
feats of strength, rebellion, the spirits’. In explaining this passage, Michael Puett,
David Hall and Roger Ames and Erin Cline hone in on the final item in Con-
fucius’ list: spirits. Puett’s sense is that spirits are powerful and that we should focus
on our own ethical journey rather than trying to influence them, whereas Hall and
Ames read it as a call for respectful detachment by an a-theist. Cline disagrees with
this interpretation, opting to align with Puett’s notion of neither rejecting nor
accepting practices concerning spirits in Confucian thought.9 Yet none of these
interpretations acknowledge the range of phenomena covered in the clause, which
looks like a summary of the items you might expect to find in a paradoxology or
a history.
We have no grounds to believe that Confucius’ misgivings stem primarily from
critical judgement of those who are enamoured by telling entertaining tales. We
should therefore be careful about reading his thoughts as akin to those of Polybius.
We do, however, get the sense that the eloquent speaker is not necessarily a good
speaker. This is seen in Analects 5.5, in which it is claimed that ‘an agile speaker
creates many enemies’. Something more of a hint at Confucius’ ethical view is seen
in 1.3, in which we hear that ‘clever talk and affected manners are seldom signs of
goodness’. At work in this saying is the suggestion that mannered talk is empty
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talk: there can be an assumption that form delivers the good, which may lead us
only to empty agreement and empty action. Again, it is useful to be reminded of
speech as separation or abstraction out, and the more eloquent, the more we lose
our sense of the way. This returns us to the fundamental idea of harmony, and also
takes in the idea of ritual. Action that ossifies and thus separates from the harmony
of the world cannot lead us to rightful action. Rather, rightful action flows from
‘constant perseverance and application’, as we are reminded in the opening of the
Analects (1.1).
We do not speak of the strange, the strong, the rebellious and the spirits because
doing so sets them apart from the order of nature. They, like the normal, are part
of nature. It makes no sense to separate the strange from the normal in speaking,
because nothing is purely transcendentally strange. The strange is immanent in the
world, and has to be appreciated as entangled in the order of nature along with us
and all other manner of phenomena. And so it is also that nothing is purely trans-
cendentally normal, strong, rebellious, or even historical. The history that we write
or read ritually, without perseverance and application, risks separating us from
appreciating the order of the world that heaven shows us in a variety of phenom-
ena. Silence, speaking, separation and ritual, as we shall see, were the key drivers
behind both Sima Qian’s silence and the profusion of speaking in what are called
strange Chinese histories.
Sima Qian having nothing to say about Qi the swallow man locates him in a
Confucian world in which not speaking about ‘strange happenings’ (Analects 7:21)
is part of living a harmonious ethical life. Paradoxically, the ideas of harmony and
community are also needed to make sense of a body of over 4000 strange histories
that Robert Campany estimates were written in China between 206 BCE and 618
CE, and a further two thousand stories that Sing-Chen Francis notes as having
been added in a Qing dynasty revival between the seventeenth and early nine-
teenth centuries.10 Chinese historiography abounds with tales of fox spirits, reve-
nants, strange births, gender shifts, and the consequences of human shortcomings.
My first step in making sense of this silence-breaking will be to note that Chinese
paradoxography is presented as transmission rather than as creation, written in the
past tense, and supported by a range of topoi in common with history such as ‘x
told me’ and ‘I learned when travelling’. Moreover, I will observe that the
comingling of history and paradoxography in Chinese strange histories was not
seen as a problematic union in need of reversal, but as a necessary ethical demand.
In distinction from Francis, though, I will not advance the argument that strange
histories arose simply as a ‘safety zone within which… dominant [Qing] cultural
values might be toyed with, temporarily suspended, or even subverted’.11 Strange
histories are a persistent feature of Chinese historiography, even though the volume
produced during the reign of the Qing is notable. Nor will this chapter provide a
simple affirmation of Rania Huntington’s argument that ‘[b]y imagining the alien,
we establish the boundaries of the human’.12 Confucian China is not one in which
our ethical abstractions and notions of self and other play out neatly, and we should
not expect that in experiencing the strange that we can abstract the normal via
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logical inversion. There are no dipoles of normal/abnormal, man/woman, alien/
human, for example, for distinguishing and setting opposites are acts of separating out.
The recognition of ethics at play in our daily interactions means refraining from
separating out and establishing those dipoles. As the histories of Duan Chengshi (ca.
800–63 CE), Pu Songling (1640–1715), Yuan Mei (1716–97) and Ji Yun (1724–1805)
show us, the wonderful is the ordinary and the human the alien. Theirs are stories in
which people and spirits transition from one form to another, seamlessly, in ways that
cast a stern light on habitual forms of moral judgement. Moreover, they point to and
even mock the ways in which state-sponsored authors work to split out history from
other kinds of writing. What these texts invite us to consider is our potential to
mistake habitual approaches to the writing of history as an expression of harmony.
Official, state-sponsored histories were, in their eyes, expressions of hollow ritual
that formed obstacles to harmony, and the strange was needed to remove them.
In summary, we will find in Chinese historiography an interest in immanence.
This will provide us with another instance of the interrelation of history and
metaphysics in this book. As we will also discover, though, the discernment of the
immanent, and the treatment of the knowable and the unknowable, will play out
in a manner quite unlike views we have previously considered. This will not be
another rehearsal of sense making that enshrines active, critical perception, thought
and feeling. Rather, restraint, silence and being open will be seen as critical to
making general sense of things.
History as saying many different things, and then holding silence
The arresting structure of Sima Qian’s Shiji makes it easy for readers to miss the
dragons. It is not so much a history as at least five different kinds of history: basic
annals (benji, 12 chapters), chronological tables (biao, 10 chapters), treatises (shu, 8
chapters), hereditary houses (shijia, 30 chapters) and memoirs (liezhuan, 70 chap-
ters). The basic annals outline the history of dynastic houses and emperors. These
are followed by the chronological tables, which present events in the form of lists.
Next come treatises on a range of topics of contemporary and historical interest,
from economics to music and religious affairs. Following the treatises are the her-
editary houses, which identify prominent hereditary office-holding families. The
final section, the biographies, is dedicated to the lives of individuals, foreign peo-
ples and peoples of similar disposition, social status or profession such as assassins,
harsh officials, jesters, diviners and tycoons.
Within each of these sections, the chapters are arranged hierarchically or
chronologically. This combination of thematic, hierarchical and chronological
approaches allowed Sima Qian to describe the same individual or event multiple
times. As commentators such as Hardy have noted, this provided Sima Qian with the
means to describe the achievements of individuals and groups in slightly different
ways, and thus to provide an oblique criticism of influential figures.13
One of Sima Qian’s stated reasons for writing the Shiji was to provide a com-
prehensive and true record (shilu) of past events. This purpose is not only
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articulated in the last Shiji—130—but also throughout the work. Sima Qian tells us
about major sources that he used such as the Zuozhan, the Guoyu or Discourses of the
States and the Zhan Guo Ce or Intrigues of the Warring States (Han 2:123); visits to
historical sites (Han 1:92, Han 2:29); meetings with key individuals or their des-
cendants (Han 1:102, 104; Han 2:108, 109, 124); and his own participation in
events (Han 2:28). These declarations are in keeping with Sima Qian’s official role
as historian of the court of Wu-di, a position that he inherited from his father,
Sima Tan. On the evidence of Shiji 130, Sima Tan determined to bring together
records of the various rulers, officials and events of the known Chinese world
together in a single history and Sima Qian completed the work out of filial piety.
In this way, Sima Qian exemplifies wider Confucian belief in the importance of
historiographical harmony, as Roger Ames explains:
In this traditional paradigm, a figure achieves prominence not from standing
out in contrast to his historical inheritance but rather from the degree to
which he embodies, expresses, and amplifies his tradition. It is for this reason
that from the earliest times there has been such an extraordinary emphasis on
historical records in China. The records represent a repository of the past cultural
tradition out of which the new can emerge.14
While we have already observed the conjoining of history and harmony in Con-
fucianism, it is important to note for the present that Sima Qian’s deference
towards family tradition did not prevent him from achieving innovations in the
scope and structure of his history.
The scale and textual variety of the Shiji was novel. So too was the extent of
Sima Qian’s critical stance towards earlier attempts at history making. He did not
assume that historians had to accept their sources. This scepticism stemmed from
his recognition—much like that of Polybius—that texts reflect a variety of motives
and levels of understanding. Nowhere is this view clearer than in his comments on
the source ‘Basic Annals of the Five Emperors’ in Shiji 1, which is worth quoting
at length:
Scholars have often referred to the great antiquity of the Five Emperors.
However, the Book of Documents begins only with Emperor Yao. As for the
hundred schools that speak about the Yellow Emperor, their accounts are
implausible and extravagant, and it is difficult for a person of refinement and
learning to speak about them. What Confucius is supposed to have passed
on—the questions of Zai Yu on ‘The Virtues of the Five Emperors’ and the
‘Genealogies of Emperors’—are sometimes rejected (as spurious) even by
Confucian scholars. I have traveled west to Kong Tong, north past Chou-lu,
east almost to the ocean, south along the Jiang and Huai Rivers. Where I
went, the elders without exception referred to the places associated with [the
names of] the Yellow Emperor, Emperors Yao and Shun: the customs and
ethos of those places are actually different. In sum, that which does not depart
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from the canonical writings in ancient script is close to the truth. I have
examined the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Discourses of the States,
which elaborate (ideas from) the Virtues of the Five Emperors and the Gen-
ealogies of Emperors, yet people do not pay [this derivation] much attention.
Only love of learning and sustained reflection can bring intuitive under-
standing: this is difficult to explain to those of shallow perception and scanty
knowledge. I thus sort out the sources, and choose the most plausible and
responsible accounts to place at the beginning of the ‘Basic Annals’.15
Here we see Sima Qian reject speaking of the extravagant, irresponsible and
implausible in favour of the intrinsic pursuit of ‘sustained reflection’ and ‘intuitive
understanding’. This stance, he explains, arises from checking sites and sources for
inconsistencies against canonical writings and ‘implausible’ claims. Sima Qian’s
historian does not follow the extrinsic desire of wishing to please others; rather,
they hold back and contemplate, thinking about whether the sources justify
speech. This would seem to accord neatly with the sense making view of history
promoted by Polybius in chapter one, but as we noted earlier, Confucius was also
circumspect about speaking at all. Importantly, the extract suggests a further
meaning for ‘intuitive’, which is hinted at in his claim in Shiji 28 that he will
present the ‘inside and outside’ of phenomena (Han 2:28).16 Here, Sima Qian
points to a desire to help others to understand Confucian thought, as he explains
more explicitly in Shiji 130: ‘I wanted to convey Confucius’ concerns through
abstract, conceptual language, but it would not be as profound, compelling, and
clear as embodied and seen through past events and actions’.17 History reveals the
universal in the context of the particular; or to put it another way, the ‘inside’
through the ‘outside’. Philosophy is immanent in the concrete particulars of his-
tory, and not the other way around. This is an important observation to make at
this stage of the book, and indicates that wonder at the past might not be a
rationally or morally deficient activity. If it entails awe or speechlessness, it may
even support our journey on the way.
Whether Sima Qian himself achieved an understanding of the immanence he
described has long been a matter of dispute. One of the most interesting complaints
about his work can be found in the Yangzi Fayan of the Han scholar Yang Xiong.
To Yang Xiong’s mind, Sima Qian fell prey to his own charge of shallow perception
due to an unseemly interest in guai (the strange):
Having many interests and not content to leave out anything—that was Sima
Qian. Confucius had many interests, but his interests all revolved around yi
[the different]. Sima Qian had many interests, but he was interested in guai
[the strange].18
How yi differs from guai is something we will explain when we look to the wider
tradition of strange histories in the next section of this chapter. What is apparent to
us at this stage is that Yang Xiong’s complaint suggests an imbalance in writing in
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favour of the particular over the universal. This seems to arise not simply from the
historian’s desire to entertain others—as Sima Qian suggested—but also from the
historian’s own captivation by the entertaining. The song writer Ouyang Xiu also
presents Sima Qian as being overly interested in the strange, but his explanation
for that interest focuses not on the desire to entertain but on an inability or
unwillingness to judge. He writes:
As for curiosity-loving gentlemen of broad learning, they set to work on the
abundant hearsay and so thought themselves the most accomplished. Thus did
they exhaustively compile all kinds of discourse, but from the very start, they
did not discriminate in what they selected, and only feared leaving things
out—such a work was Sima Qian’s Records of the Historian.19
What Sima Qian’s critics highlight for us is a distinction between wonder at the
world, and writing about wonder at the world. There is nothing to indicate that
the former is problematic; rather, it is the precarious activity of achieving harmony
in writing that we have to be wary about. Too much interest or too little judg-
ment are likely to land us with a text that Sima Qian’s person of refinement would
have trouble speaking about. To adapt Confucius’ thought: a person’s writing, is
‘neither bent on nor against anything; rather [it goes] with what is appropriate’
(Analects 4.10).
These judgements appear to be out of keeping with the Sima Qian we know in
translation. Burton Watson’s English translation of the Shiji suggests that Sima Qian
was not much interested in the strange, and there are fewer than a dozen mentions
of wonder across the three volumes, including the examples in the opening of this
chapter. This makes us realise, however, how susceptible we might be to the
translator’s vision and understanding of Sima Qian. Even noting this point, though,
the small number of mentions of wonder and the strange in the Shiji cannot be
explained away, even if we believe William Nienhauser’s portrait of Sima Qian as a
time poor bureaucrat who became overwhelmed by his work.20 Nor are we
helped by Sima Qian’s paradoxical handling of not mentioning strange phenomena
by mentioning them, as seen in his appraisal of the Shanhaijing (Classic of Mountains
and Seas) and Yu Benji (Annals of Yu):
As for anomalous creatures (guaiwu) found in the Yu Benji and Shanhaijing, I
dare not even mention them (Han 2: 123).21
Not mentioning something can mean that it is beneath contempt. On this reading,
the Yu Benji and Shanhaijing are simply bad histories. It is important to note,
though, that Qian’s conclusion stems from his prefatory statement about there
being ‘anomalous creatures’ in the two texts. It is not so much the texts that should
not be mentioned, but the anomalous within them. If anomalous creatures are the
focus of Qian’s criticism, though, what are we to make of anomalous in the Shiji?
Our analysis of Confucian thought earlier in the chapter highlights the parallels
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between Sima Qian’s claim and Confucius’ avowal to remain silent on the strange,
but it would have been logical on that account not to have mentioned them at
all. Some other dynamic is at play, and that, as we shall see in the next section,
concerns the need to speak out against ritualistic historiography.
Strange history and ritualistic histography
Understanding the anomalous in the Shiji begins with a return to Ames’ idea of
historiographical harmony, and with the appreciation that harmony suggests align-
ment with both successors and predecessors. Sima Qian’s Shiji was a continuation
of the work commenced by his father Sima Tan, and purportedly a true record
(shilu) of past events. It was also the progenitor for the 24 standard or official his-
tories (Zhengshi), which ranged over the period from 3000 BCE to the Ming
dynasty (1368–1644) and comprised around 40 million words. These reflected the
output of the bureau of historiography, which located historians in the imperial
court. These historians were positioned to record events with absolute fidelity,
serving not only to memorialise but also to make rulers think twice about their
actions, as the later Han historian Ban Gu (32–92 CE) explains in his official
Han shu (History of the Han Dynasty):
Kings of ancient times, in generation after generation, had scribal officials. The
sovereign’s every act had to be written down. This was the reason why he was
cautious in word and deed and clarified his rule and model. The scribe of the
left recorded words; the scribe of the right recorded events. Events were [the
basis of] the Springs and Autumns; words were [the basis of] the Esteemed
Documents [Shang shu]. Of rulers and kings, there were none who did not act
in the same way.22
This account positions the historian at a triple intersection of restraint. First, the
historian as observer encourages self-control on the part of the sovereign. On this
logic, the knowledge that I am being observed encourages me to be ‘cautious in
word and deed’. Second, the historian’s record of the court is assumed to reveal
ethical principles that might shape the nature and limits of a good life for the wider
community. In this case, the behaviour—and restraint—of the emperor is taken to
be a model for community restraint. Here we see the contribution of history to
making general sense of things. Third, the historian records only phenomena con-
nected to the imperial court and refrains from distraction by a wider field of phe-
nomena. Importantly, too this practice is seen as maintaining a harmony of
approach, as seen in the phrase ‘there were none who did not act in the same
way’. This phrase not only applies to rulers, but also to the historians who record
their actions.
These assumptions appear to present a very tightly-bound role for historians,
including the range of sources that they might use. In a way, they work at the
extreme end of Polybius’ idea of history as only recording that which the author
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saw. Yet Ban Gu did not want to see the anecdotes and accounts of ‘woodcutters and
madmen’ passed over. While he noted Confucius’ advice that too much of an interest
in the ‘hearing from the highroad and retelling in the lane’ proved a hindrance to
reason, he also conceded that as they might contain even one expression of wisdom
they ought to be preserved.23 This is, fundamentally, a recognition of ethics as imma-
nence: any description of the world that falls short generates the risk of an incomplete,
abstracted or even distorted account of the virtues in action. Moreover, we cannot be
sure that accounts of imperial events are certain, as he concedes in his Jinshu:
Although we can examine what was formerly set down in records and collect
excluded fragments that have come down to the present, I suppose these are
not matters which were heard and seen with one person’s own eyes and ears .
… As for what I have herewith collected, when it sets forth what has been
received from earlier accounts, any fault that might be found is not my own; if
there are vacuous or erroneous places in what has been garnered from inqui-
ries into more recent events, then I wish to share the ridicule and criticism
with former worthies and scholars.24
Ban Gu’s comments acknowledge a world in which wonder as the experience of
the strange and ethics were never apart. Moreover, they indicate the struggle of
knowing what to record and whether other peoples’ records can be trusted.
Restraint only works, it seems, when you know where and when the ethical is at
work. The particular challenge of Confucian ethics is the assumption that it is at
work in daily phenomena, rather than in the crystallisation of abstract concepts.
This may be seen as predisposing the historian towards the recording of more
phenomena rather than fewer, and thus as being susceptible to Ouyang Xiu’s
complaint about the absence of historiographical judgement.
This opens the way for histories of the strange, which number in the thousands
in China, and which pre- and post-date the Shiji. Helpful explanations of the
nature and purpose of these texts can be found in the works of writers like Robert
Campany, Judith Zeitlin, Sing-chen Lydia Francis and Rania Huntington. Cam-
pany designates these texts as histories on the grounds that they share three key
features with Zhengshi. First, both sets of authors position themselves as harmonious
transmitters rather than as creators; second, both present descriptions in the past
tense; and third, both are underpinned by the same kinds of topoi or methods for
making and sustaining an argument such as eyewitness rhetorical devices like ‘I
heard’ and ‘I saw in my travels’.25 Looking in more detail at a smaller range of
texts, Zeitlin reminds us that strange histories are not a homogenous text type: she
suggests a threefold subdivision into literature that focuses on yi (the different,
departure from the norm); the guai (the anomalous, the weird, freakish or unfa-
thomable as distinct from the normative); and the qi (the marvellous, the rare, the
wonderful as distinct from the canonical).26 Of these, qi is the most common focus
of strange histories, and guai the least common focus. So too, she highlights how
these three terms might be conjoined with their opposites—different with same;
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aberrant with normative; exceptional with canonical—in stories that emphasise the
crossing of various social boundaries. In crossing the boundary between male and
female, or being awake or dreaming, she suggests, we see in play the social mores
that set the boundaries and paths of our lived order of the world. Zeitlin thus asks
us to pause in assigning positive value to the demarcation of history and para-
doxology. It is in the ambiguous boundary between history and fiction, sense and
nonsense that the virtues dwelling in our world are thrown into sharp focus. This
idea is extended by Francis, who suggests a role for strange histories in providing a
‘safety zone within which … dominant [Qing] cultural values might be toyed
with, temporarily suspended, or even subverted’, and by Huntington’s idea of
extrapolating the human through inversion of the alien.27
As appealing as these ideas might be to our notions of self and other, and con-
temporary western ethics, they ignore an important feature of their Confucian
context, as expressed by the Eastern Jin author Guo Pu (276–324 CE) in his
commentary on the Shanhaijing:
What the world calls ‘anomalous’ it does not know by virtue of what it is
anomalous; what the world calls ‘non-anomalous’ it does not know by virtue of
what it is non-anomalous. How is this so? Things are not intrinsically anom-
alous; they wait upon a self and only then are ‘anomalous’. ‘Anomalousness’ is
therefore located in a self; it is not things in themselves that are anomalous.
(Campany, Shanhaijing, 274).
Guo Pu’s simple yet powerful point is that there are no fixed, transcendent poles
of anomalous and non-anomalous. They are concepts that we come to know
through the concrete and particular features of the world and via understanding
ourselves. Inversion from the anomalous to the non-anomalous is therefore not a
straightforward matter of abstraction. The very act of abstracting may distract us
from seeing how much of the alien is at work in the ordinary—including in
ourselves—and the other way around.
The co-presence of the strange and the normal is a feature of the 500 stories in
the Qing text, Strange Tales from a Classical Studio, which was the work of the self-
titled ‘historian of the strange’, Pu Songling. The Strange Tales range the boundaries
between the dead and the living, spirits and humans, dreams and consciousness,
animals and humans and male and female. These boundary crossings are lively and
detailed, with fox spirits conjuring up mansions for humans who cannot dis-
criminate between dreaming and consciousness (‘The Marriage of the Fox’s
Daughter’, 39–42); a man’s soul taking rest in a parrot’s body (‘Miss Abao, or
Perseverance Rewarded’, p. 124); and a terrestrial man falling for a beautiful sea
woman in a tale not unlike Guillermo del Toro’s film The Shape of Water (‘The
Luocha Country and the Sea Market’, 245–54). On Campany’s view, these stories
should be designated as histories because they are cast in the past tense and are
preceded or closed by the use of eyewitness or secondary source topoi such as ‘The
story was fully related to me…’ (‘Mr Zhu, the Considerate Husband’, p. 107); ‘I
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learned the above when travelling…’ (‘Miss Lianxiang, the Fox Girl’, p. 120); and
x ‘told me’ (‘The Singing Frogs’, p. 136; and ‘The Performing Mice’, p. 137).
Moreover, there are instances where—as we discovered in chapter one—the use of
ambiguous topoi might suggest the attempt of authors to distance themselves from
the claims reported. Take for example Pu Songling’s closing thoughts for ‘The
Man who Changed into a Crow’:
The person who told me this story did not recollect from what department or
district he came. (p. 171)
This claim might function as an empty marker: a necessity to make the claims in
the story ‘historical’ in the style promoted by Sima Qian. It is also worth con-
sidering whether the claim is not so much inadequate as ambiguous and therefore a
parodic or even mocking comment on the veracity of the story or even our belief
in the authority of historical accounts.
In this way, the Strange Tales may be an exposé of our trust in histories. As you
may recall from the account of Lucian of Samosata’s ‘True History’ in chapter one,
paradoxographical works can function to highlight scholastic practices that are
seemingly hollow. On this account, wonder works are not poor histories but
indictments against blind historiographical trust. In Pu Songling’s world, the doubt
generated is significant because it might be seen as undercutting the authority of
the functions and activities of the imperial court and the assumption that history is
the way to discern the lived order of the world.
This tantalising glimpse of strange histories as a destabilising force is not isolated,
for the preface to Strange Tales establishes an inversion of the historian traveller model
employed in Sima Qian’s Shiji and Polybius’ Histories. Those from the margins of the
known world came to Pu Songling to recount wonders, not the other way around:
What I have heard, I committed to paper, and so this collection came about.
After some time, like-minded men from the four directions dispatched stories
to me by post, and because ‘things accrue to those who love them’, what I
have amassed became even more plentiful. (preface).
In this way, Pu Songling tells us that the wonderful and the strange are not only
found in distant places, but also with us. The profound point at work here is that
the strange is not something that we seek out in distant parts of the world: it comes
to us, and it is a part of us. Knowledge is not ‘out there’ separate or abstracted from
our experiences: it is accrued to and in us. This is the immanence of the strange.
The authority of the Strange Tales will rest upon sources that would have trou-
bled Polybius mightily—things that Pu Songling has not seen, things recounted
without sources, stories that have passed through many hands—and Pu Songling is
in no way troubled by this. As if to sharpen the point against discriminating fide-
lity, Pu Songling also positions himself as an indiscriminate, obsessive collector. In
this way, the historian is part of the Strange Tales of individuals who succumb to
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gambling, book collecting, pigeon chasing, the love of rocks and the excessive
consumption of alcohol. Yet this form of obsession is not necessarily a bad thing,
because absorption is seen as necessary for the development of expert knowledge.
As he explains:
If one’s nature is ‘foolish’, then one’s resolve will be firm: thus those who are
foolish in their love of books are sure to excel in composition, and those who
are foolishly devoted to the arts are bound to have excellent technique,
whereas those people who make no progress and achieve nothing are always
those who claim that they are not foolish (2.239).
Obsession entails commitment, and commitment is necessary to develop expertise.
On this count, the historian is a fool, and the writing of history is a foolish pursuit.
This runs against the advice on avoiding curiosity laid out in our chapter on
medieval European histories. But it also highlights the difference between initial
commitment and detainment of interest, as explained well by the song writer Su
Shi (1037–1101) in ‘On Wang Shen’s Hall of Precious Paintings’:
A gentleman may temporarily ‘lodge’ his interest in things, but he must not
‘detain’ his interest in things. For if he lodges his interest in things, then even
trivial objects will suffice to give him joy and even ‘things of unearthly beauty’
will not suffice to induce mania in him. If he detains his interest in things, then
even trivial objects will suffice to induce mania in him, and even things of
unearthly beauty will not suffice to give him joy.28
In this account, detained interest is a form of mania, even a pathology. The
emerging sense of mental activity we have here is that captivation is good, but that
persistent pursuit means a susceptibility to forgetting other possibilities and to a
habitual going through the motions. We may be so fervently devoted to the
writing of history that we cannot remember why we do it and lose joy in the
experience. This is no better than gambling, excessive drinking or hoarding. It does
not take much interpretation to see, for example, how Pu Songling’s description of
money hoarding—‘money is properly a circulating medium, and is not intended
for a man to lie upon and keep all to himself’ (‘The Stream of Cash’, 300)—might
be translated into the ossified obsessions of official historians. Historical expertise
might be necessary in imperial China, but our habitual dependency on it is also
potentially a problem.
Sima Qian might have positioned history as a ‘profound, compelling and clear’
vehicle for understanding Confucian thought (Shiji,130), but any investment of
belief in it as a reliable and stable foundation for knowledge sees us forego the
persistent struggle for ethical enlightenment. That investment is fair game to Duan
Chengshi, a financially independent imperial official whose Chinese Chronicles of the
Strange appear to be far from the idea of historiographical harmony in the Tang
world. Sparrows perform good deeds and are promoted to higher ranks (1.14.534);
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a silkworm as big as a cow is reported (Xuji, 2.1: 1); a man exorcises himself
(2.1.10); a baby drops from the sky and then turns into a broom (2.2.35); a man
eats a supernatural fish and turns into a shapeshifter (2.2.40); and perhaps most
intriguingly of all, a spirit morphs from a walnut to wasps, leaving the author to
conclude ‘There is no telling what strange thing it was’ (1.14.560; see also
1.15.597). Yet all of these stories are written in the past tense, and nearly all end in
the manner of the Shiji, with the author summarising the point of the tale and its
source. All of them make sense in historiographical form, and because of that,
we grasp at straws to reject accounts like his imperial record of giant singing
earthworms:
In the upper capital … grew a small cassia tree in which there is a hole the size
of a coin. Every night, after the clouds had passed from the face of the moon,
(on this tree) there would appear an earthworm like a giant arm, more than
two feet long, with white neck and red spots. This earthworm would go in
advance of several hundred earthworms that looked like ropes encircling the
branches and twigs of the tree. In the morning they would all cry out, and the
sound was always melodious. According to the student Zhang Cheng, when
Hun Jian was Secretariat Director, in front of the hall a tree suddenly sprang
up from the ground, and it was covered with earthworms hanging on its
branches. There was a source for this information, but he said he had forgotten
the name of the book. (2.18)
As with Pu Songling’s tale of a man who changed into a crow, the account is
simultaneously detailed and historiographically ambiguous. It emanates from the
imperial court, but the name of the book is forgotten. Duan Chengshi hereby
mocks our obsession with knowing precisely where historical stories come from. If,
he teases us, we can accept the accounts of emperors based on less than certain
sources, why not accept an account of earthworms based upon a forgotten book?
Even more pointed is Yuan Mei’s Censored by Confucius (1788), which includes
just under 750 tales of revenants, 10-foot high hairy giants from the hills, gender
shifts, sightings of reincarnation and an old man who resembles a prawn (36). Yuan
Mei’s financial independence provided an opportunity not only to contribute to a
critical picture of history but also to comment on the Chinese judicial system and
behavioural norms. Justice is frequently served in the firm but fair courts of the
underworld but found wanting on earth; just as the behaviour of fox spirits highlights
the shortcomings of humans (e.g. Zhang Guangxiong, 100–3).
That we might read Duan Chengshi and Yuan Mei’s texts as an oblique attack
on both the imperial court, and more specifically the historiographical function
within that court, comes from our interpretation of particular stories. This leaves us
open to the charge of seeking out the kinds of historiographical scepticism which
feature in our times, akin to some criticisms of Hardy’s reading of Sima Qian. Yet
these texts are challenging to our views because they do not square evenly with
our attempts to split out the form and content of history, or the strange and the
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normal. History and paradoxography are entangled, and explicitly so, as Ji Yun tells
us in his Shadows in a Chinese Landscape. The 1200 stories of the Shadows are pre-
sented in the order recalled by Ji Yun (1789 preface, 149) and are far from a certain
corpus of knowledge, as he explains in the preface:
When others include stories about my family, I can know when they diverge
from the truth. Others cannot know this. Similarly, when I include stories about
other people’s families, I based them on what I have heard and produce narratives
right away. Sometimes they might be false; sometimes they might be true;
sometimes they might be incomplete. The others will know which it is, but there
is no way for me to know .… My writings have always been true and tolerant.
They encourage what is good and discourage what is bad.’ (‘Corrections’, p. 24)
His writings are ‘true and tolerant’ despite some of them being based on sources
that might be false. They are also able to ‘encourage what is good’ despite such
uncertainty. This is not Ames’ idea of historiographical harmony played out in the
passive acceptance of sources that might be false. This is because Ji Yun echoes Pu
Songling’s connection of histories and history makers with a foolish obsession:
Those mired in the past are fools …a former teacher of mine, once said to me:
‘When your guts are filled with nothing but books it can be dangerous—just
as dangerous as if your guts are filled with nothing.’ The most skilful chess
players in the empire do not discard the ancient treatises, nor do they adhere
to them blindly. The most skilful physicians in the empire are not stuck in the
methods of ancient times, nor do they abandon them. (‘By the Book’, p. 31).
Ji Yun’s call is for wariness about any one source of knowledge, which would
include histories. He also warns us about the difference between consuming books
and understanding them, as highlighted in a tale in which a servant seeks to study
the ideas of Confucius:
That servants read books is arguably a good thing. Nevertheless, one reads books
to grasp principles. And one grasps principles in order to apply them in actual
situations. Consuming knowledge without digesting it may lead to confusion
and stupidity, causing endless pain. (‘The Neo-Confucian Conscience’, p. 123).
Similarly, a fox spirit fails to grasp the principles of Confucius because he confuses
fervent reading over careful deliberation (‘A Fox on Sagehood’, p. 50).
Never apart: immanence
Like Ban Gu, Ji Yun held that ‘the anecdotes and opinions of the alleyways may …
be useful in encouraging good and discouraging evil’ (p. 149). On the reading of
Francis and Huntington, this is an invitation to consider not only how the strange
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shapes the normal, but also how the anomalous may highlight the shortcomings of
the normal. This is a reasonable interpretation when we see tale after tale in which
fox spirits lay bare human shortcomings such as greed, intemperance and resort to
violence. The subjects of strange histories impugn us, reminding us of the need to
restrain our impulses.
Yet such is the historical spread of strange histories in China that Francis’ char-
acterisation of them as a safety zone for exploring the social mores of the Qing is not
right, or at least an incomplete idea. Strange histories are a far more persistent feature
of Chinese historiography. This is, however, not my only departure from prevailing
explanations of strange histories. In the above section, I have suggested that the ethical
indictment of authors like Ji Yun and Pu Songling is even deeper, with them both
providing pointed reminders of the risk of a detained belief in the certainty of histories
as a source of knowledge, including ethical knowledge. History, we learned, can be
the obsession of the foolish. Characterising history as the obsession of the foolish might
be seen as politically destabilising given the formal function of historiography in the
imperial court. Going through the motions in historiography—either as a writer or a
reader—means that you cannot spot your emperor for your earthworms. As I also
pointed out, however, it also destabilises the assumption set out by Sima Qian in Shiji
130 that history provides a clear vehicle for conveying Confucius’ teachings.
Reading Pu Songling, Duan Chengshi, Yuan Mei and Ji Yun requires perse-
rverance and application: it is all too easy to dismiss the false, the ambiguous, the
tale collected when the margins of the world come to the writer. Their historian
also shifts from being a senior official in the imperial court to an obsessive fool,
providing us with the suggestion that histories, like money, are ‘a circulating
medium, and … [are] not intended for a man to lie upon and keep all to himself’.
In this shift, we are delivered a blunt reminder not to mistake harmony for agree-
ment, and not to delude ourselves that in fixing on activities that we believe to be
right, we are delivered from the struggle of finding our own way.
This leaves us wondering about Sima Qian’s dragons. The volume of the strange
in English translations of the Shiji is slight, making it easy for us to conclude that
this work is squarely the progenitor of the official line of histories that writers like
Pu Songling question. Hardy suggests otherwise, noting that the use of multiple,
conflicting accounts of the same individual may function as a form of oblique cri-
ticism. Hardy’s idea can be further extended to encompass both Sima Qian’s use of
topoi and juxtaposition of the strange and apparently normal. The occasional
appearance of a dragon is not simply due to lack of judgement in selecting mate-
rials, as Ouyang Xiu suggests. It can reflect both a dedication to ethics as imma-
nence, requiring consideration of all manner of phenomena, and a critical stance on
the nature and purpose of the activity of history making itself. Content, form and
arrangement of materials may point to the shortcomings of individuals, but they
can also point to shortcomings in the very activities that record the activities of
those individuals for our consideration.
To be clear, though, there is no explicit diagnosis of the historian fool in the
Shiji or inversion of the eyewitness model used by the historian to claim certainty.
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The Shiji is not positioned explicitly as a set of strange tales, or even as a collection of
things that Confucius would not speak about. Our search for a definitive ruling on
whether Sima Qian sought to undercut the historiographical form is met only with
silence. Understanding the Shiji clearly requires a measure of Confucian perseverance.
In sum, Chinese historiography points to, wrestles with and impugns our lack of
respect for radical immanence, as against transcendence. It is radical because it
shows us that making general sense of things through the assumption of universals
does not necessarily imply boundaries and divisions. There is no making sense of
what is outside or inside us, self or other, beyond and near, past, present or future.
It unsettles any obsession we might develop in dividing out what is accessible to us
through experience and what is inaccessible to us through experience. It confounds
the idea of a boundary between the knowable and the unknowable, abstract and
particular. And wonder is its diagnostic. Not speaking of it implies harmony in
living with that radical immanence, but speaking of it means that our world is at
odds. This is a world in which not writing history might be seen as good, but also
in which writing and even mocking history might be necessary to help us to find
our way. Arguably, Chinese history and metaphysics never needed to come together
for historians to make sense of the world, because they were never apart.
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5
HISTORICAL CABINETS OF CURIOSITY
IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
Jean Bodin | Francis Bacon | Walter Ralegh |
Nathaniel Wanley | René Descartes |
Thomas Hobbes
No one likes dining at a banquet when the order of the courses or the seasonings
are haphazardly arranged. So too, the lawyer, historian and philosopher Jean Bodin
(1529/30–1596 CE) argued, all historical phenomena ‘are nicely adjusted to each
other and cemented into one body … by the great industry of scholars; but by
some people they are unskilfully separated’ (Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitio-
nem [Method for the Easy Comprehension of History], 1565, hereafter Method, p. 20).
Jean Bodin’s Method is as much about the unskilfully made history as it is about the
properly universal one. The unskilful historian, we learn first in the book’s ded-
ication, falls short in the ability to discover and collect materials; to arrange them in
the ‘correct order’; and to eliminate errors in earlier histories (pp. 1–2). By the time
we reach chapters four and five—on the choice and evaluation of historians—
Bodin’s analysis of the historiographically inept peaks at the suggestion that the
‘evil’ writer is captive to delights, superstition, enthusiasm, zeal and a desire to
entertain or to achieve fame (pp. 41, 43, 46, 57, 85).
History making was for Bodin, as it was for Polybius, a sense making activity.
Diligent observation and ‘taking a modest part in practical affairs’ provide us with
the ‘most valuable fruits from history’ (pp. 24–5). Moreover, that observation must
have as its end the discernment of universals in a cohesive account of the past, for a
history without universals Bodin tells us—using the same analogy as Polybius—is
like a body without eyes (p. 61). So too, Bodin’s critical choice and evaluation of
historians throughout Method suggests a Polybian approach in which history is
defined in the process of writing history itself. Yet Method is not simply a slavish
reinscription of the ancient Histories. Bodin’s thought represents a wider revisitation
of ancient thought for moral and civil ends that is first hinted at in this extract:
In this exercise, truly, I have appreciated the saying of Plato—nothing is more
difficult or more nearly divine than to separate accurately. (p. 3)
Bodin credits Plato with the insight that separation is difficult. Plato, we recall from
chapter one, argued that we make sense of particular things in the world, not
abstractions: we may witness, for example, a particular act of kindness, then
another particular act of kindness on a different day in a different place. He was
interested in the idea that if many different acts are understood by us to be kind,
then there must be something that they share in common which is ‘kindness’, and
that this ‘kindness’ must exist even though we might not experience it directly
through our senses. This formed the basis of his proposition that there are ‘forms’
or ideas, and that these forms were not only distinct from our sensory experiences
of particular things, they were distinct from one another (Phaedo, 78b–84b). The
key problems with forms, Plato intimates in the later dialogue Parmenides, is that
we need to be able to explain how they are present in particular things, even
though they are distinct from one another. Moreover, as we cannot access forms
directly, it becomes a challenge to know how many forms there might possibly be
(Parmenides, 142B5–C2). Is there, for example, a form of history, as distinct from a
form of philosophy?
It is well known that Aristotle’s Metaphysics presents an extended critique of
Plato’s theory of forms. Aristotle, we recall, was not at all convinced that forms
exist independently of the sensible objects that are meant to be their instantiation.
Yet Aristotle was not averse to the idea of providing a systematic categorisation of
the most general, distinct kinds of things that are and which help us to make sense
of how the world hangs together. The very point of the Metaphysics is to help us to
understand being, and this work is not unusual in the Aristotelian corpus for that
interest. In looking for the practical result of Aristotle’s interest in the separation,
uniqueness and distinction of different kinds of being, it is the early work, Cate-
gories that catches our eye. Categories provides a departure point for this chapter in
two important ways. First, Aristotle goes one step further than Plato, specifying a
list of the ten kinds of being that cannot be further reduced, including quantity,
place, date, action and emotion (Categories, 1b25–2a1). That is, he tells us what the
most basic kinds of things are, rather than just suggesting that there are basic kinds
of things. This initiated a practical and philosophical interest in distinction, differ-
entiation and classification that remains with us today, with writers articulating
various reasons for the activity of categorisation. It is a tradition that is far removed
from the themes of harmony and radical immanence we explored in the last
chapter. Second, while Aristotle specified emotion as a kind of being, Categories
breaks off unfinished after the brief observation that emotions can be experienced
in varying degrees (11b1–5). This leaves us with less of an idea of how to make
sense of the nature and purpose of the emotions than the other nine categories.
The incomplete state of Aristotle’s thoughts on emotion as a category of being
turns out to be quite important, because it provided much later writers such as
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and René Descartes (1596–1650) with an opportu-
nity to flesh out theories of the emotion and affective states, which for them
included wonder. This designation of wonder does not sit squarely with current
theories of the emotions, because early modern European writers followed
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Aristotle in treating the passions as embodied responses to the world, much like
perceptions. It was their status as sensory responses that piqued Aristotle’s interest in
the extent to which we can control them, or whether we can control them at all.
Aristotle’s later work Nicomachean Ethics looks to the role of the passions in stimu-
lating actions in accordance with our habits and desires as moderated by reason
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b26). They are like an inhibitor that prevents our com-
pletion of an action, whether the action is good or bad. This, we recall from
chapter two, is seen in the akratic weakness of will that lets curiosity drive indivi-
duals to sin. Importantly, Aristotle saw the taxonomic ordering of the emotions as
an important means for understanding and controlling them (Rhetoric, book II).
Descartes and Hobbes shared the Aristotelian view that categorising the emo-
tions helps us to understand and to control them. In their hands, Aristotle’s basic
insights provided a platform to further distinguish different kinds of emotions,
including in Descartes’ case some diagrams of the physiological aspects of particular
emotional expressions. More significantly, though, Hobbes’ identification of some
emotions as concerned with future rather than present objects and Descartes’
positioning of wonder as the ‘first of all passions’ and as prior to judgement led
them to be able to extend the connection drawn by Aristotle between categorisa-
tion and rightful action. Whereas Descartes saw wonder as facilitating individual,
ethical judgements, Hobbes located that rightful action in a civil society in which
individuals needed to be in possession of their mental activities in order to support
government. The inversion of this state is seen in the addictive tendencies of a
gamester, whose addiction to hope leads them to disengage from the necessary
task of being a member of civil society in the present. Wonder facilitates self-
understanding and control and good government; curiosity signals a loss of
self-control and that signals the end of society.
The above connection of wonder with self and social order accords with
Michael Deckard’s analysis of Descartes’ and Hobbes’ contributions to our under-
standing of wonder. This chapter extends his argument, though, by highlighting
the role that rightful functioning of mind by historians plays in a rightfully func-
tioning state.1 An historical engagement with wonder, it turns out, is a pivot in the
struggle for self-possession over possession by others. This highlights the limitations
in the predominantly materialist and imperialist interpretations of European history
and histories that loom large in contemporary historiography. Early modern his-
torians were not bent solely on possessing others; they drew upon categorisation
and wonder to ensure that they were not possessed by the limitations of ancient
thought that might prevent them from thinking and acting rightfully.
Early modern European histories were far more than expressions of the rise of
global mercantilism. Yet there is something beguiling about Lisa Jardine’s argument
in Worldly Goods that the dual drivers of international trade and domestic economic
development birthed a consumerism in which history writing was entangled.2 This
consumerism, Stephen Greenblatt explains in Marvellous Possessions, connotes com-
plex encounters of possession and rejection for which ‘wonderful’ first encounters
provide the starting point. This locates wonder, he proposes, as:
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A central feature … in the whole complex system of representation, verbal and
visual, philosophical and aesthetic, intellectual and emotional, through which
people in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance apprehended, and thence
possessed or discarded, the unfamiliar, the alien, the terrible, the desirable, and
the hateful.3
James Bester makes a similar point when he notes that ‘[w]onder was recognised
as overpowering when imposed from without, but empowering when pos-
sessed.’4 Wonder is the tool of the possessor over the dispossessed. From this
position it is not difficult to extend arguments about wonder and possession in
the direction of James Gregory’s observation that wonder works—including his-
tories—suggest a normative expression of the normal, Lorraine Daston and
Katharine Park’s separation of the discriminating and refined wonder of the
connoisseur and the effusive wonder of the ‘vulgar stay at home’ and Michel
Foucault’s now famous reminder in The Order of Things that categorisation is a
cultural act designed to include and exclude:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shat-
tered … all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the thought
that bears the stamp of our age and geography—breaking up all the ordered
surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild
profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and
threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the
Other. This passage quotes a “certain Chinese encyclopedia” in which it is
written that “animals are divided into (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b)
embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h)
included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn
with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water
pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies”. In the wonderment of
this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by
means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of
thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. 5
The lengthy, comprehensive and apparently eccentric contributions of early
modern European historians make them an easy target for our laughter at the ‘stark
impossibility of thinking that’, and our sense that they are easily unmasked as
European imperialist acts of exclusion. This account of early modern European
histories, however, underestimates the extent to which their authors worried about
their European contemporaries not being in possession of their thought and
actions. There is no doubt that Bodin wrote in an age of exploration, possession
and consumerism, but his interest in order signals a need for Europeans to engage
in rightful thought and action, and that stemmed from making general sense of the
world. His oblique connection between order, ethics and civil society becomes an
explicit remonstration in the writings of Francis Bacon (1561–1626), who positioned
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an openness to wonders and thus the activity of wonder as a necessary remedy to the
foreclosure of categories of thought and action by ancient atheist writers. Compre-
hensive historical documentation and analysis drives our visitation and revisitation of
the most basic, distinct kinds of being, and these in turn, set down the ‘rules’ for our
individual and society actions. These themes are echoed in more empirically oriented
works such as Walter Ralegh’s (c. 1552–1618) History of the World, including a
warning about the overambition and vanity at work in a mind that endlessly pursues
curiosities. That warning would seem to apply to prodigiously ‘eccentric’ works like
Nathaniel Wanley’s (1638–80) The Wonders of the Little World (1678), 6 but in it
too we will find recourse to Descartes’ taxonomy of the passions and its primary
positioning of wonder as prior to judgement.
The simple point here is that early modern European historians were not driven
by a common imperialist or consumerist agenda; rather, they reflected variations on
the Aristotelian theme that categorisation of the most distinct kinds of being is
necessary if we are to understand and regulate our actions as individuals and as
participants of civil society. In short, this chapter marks the start of an unravelling
of the uncomplicated equation of early modern European wonder with the pos-
session of others. Possession of self in society is also a key theme, and wonder plays
a role in triggering openness to different ways of encountering the world, and thus
agency. Moreover, as a secondary point, it complicates any argument we might
wish to make about the emergence of history as a distinct discipline over time. In
this period, as with earlier ones, the boundaries between history, philosophy and
wonder writing or paradoxology are blurred. This is not by accident. While
ancient writers like Polybius wanted history to part ways with paradoxology, the
association of wonder with openness in early modern Europe and the need to lay
bare the categories that such openness reveals meant that all three were seen as
necessary for making sense of the world.
In summary, early-modern historiography continued ancient Greek traditions
of looking to the past to discern universals and doing so through rigorous sense
perception. But they also enhanced those earlier conjunctions of history and
metaphysics by insisting upon the exhaustive categorisation of the most basic
kinds of things in our world, including emotions. Moreover, they did so not
just for the sake of describing what they took to be the actual structure of the
world, but because they saw categorisation through history as necessarily for
the rightful operation of mind, the self, and society. This, as I will come to
describe it in this chapter, suggested a triple skip from metaphysics to episte-
mology to ethics via history.
Orderly historical comprehension
A relatively small body of research on Jean Bodin’s views on history celebrates
what Peter Gay describes as his ‘critical rationalism’. By this, Gay—as well as other
writers such as Jacob Soll and Nicholas Popper—mean a rigorous disposition
towards the analysis of primary sources and other histories.7 Soll captures this
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rationalist Bodin well in a quote from the fourth chapter of Method, on the choice
of historians:
Rather stupid are those readers who admire nothing in history but eloquence
or invented speeches or pleasing digression. I have made up my mind that it is
practically an impossibility for the man who writes to give pleasure, to impart
the truth of the matter also—a thing which Thucydides, Plutarch, and Dio-
dorus criticised in Herodotus. (p. 55)
The best historian is one who, like Tacitus and Polybius, presents the truth in an
unpolished manner, rids themself of emotions and who works assiduously to find
firsthand documents and to critique them via comparison with one another
(pp. 43, 47, 52, 70). Method is an empirically thorough work. Five chapters on the
categories, order, reading, selection and evaluation of histories precede applications
of this thought in a consideration of government types, regal histories, time and
chronology, the origins of peoples and an appraisal of the best historians and the
order in which to read them. In so doing, Bodin demonstrates an admirable grasp
of both the principles and the publications that were associated with the idea of
history in his day.
Moreover, Method is a very appealing work to us by dint of the proximity of
Bodin’s views to the work practises of many present-day historians. But as Soll
intimates, Bodin’s views are part of a wider project to glean the universal. This is
the Bodin seen in the dedication and first three chapters of Method, encapsulated in
this passage from the dedication which Soll quotes at length:
At the beginning I outlined in a table a form of universal law, which I have
shown you, so that from the very sources we may trace the main types and
divisions of types down to the lowest, yet in such a way that all members fit
together. In this exercise, truly, I have appreciated the saying of Plato—noth-
ing is more difficult or more nearly divine than to separate accurately. Next, I
have established postulates, on which the entire system rests as the firmest
foundation. Then I have added definitions. Afterward I have laid down as
briefly as possible precepts called ‘rules’ according to the proposed form, as if
to a norm. At one side I added, in brief notes, the interpreters of Roman law,
so that from the same sources whence I have drawn, each man can take his
satisfaction. (pp. 2–3)
The important thing to note about this excerpt is that Bodin does not equate the
term ‘universal’ with the encapsulation of all phenomena and events in a written
work. Rather, as with ancient historians such as Polybius, it means setting out the
divisions, postulates, definitions and rules that give meaning to all past phenomena
and events. Universal in this case means setting out the definitions, rules and
principles that allow us to order and to understand the vast particulars of the past
and to present them as history.
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For Bodin as for Polybius, history without universal truths is like a body
without eyes (pp. 20; 61). History is a form of sense making that helps us to see
beyond the particulars of the world to the rules that drive it. Yet in distinction
from Polybius, Bodin does not see the achievement of universal history as one
historian’s project. Polybius argued that the unity of one mind and the assiduous
use of certain claims about the past—those things seen by the historian—were the
key to apprehending the universal. In practical terms, this resulted in Polybius
offering a largely contemporary account of things that he had experienced. He
worked to shut down uncertainty by shutting out all the claims that he could not
trust. Consequentially, as noted in chapter one, readers are reliant on Polybius
understanding—and wanting to understand—past phenomena. The problem with
this view was not simply that it was idealised—as Polybius himself noted—but it
also presumed that the one historian’s views are more certain than all others.
Polybius might have succeeded in uncovering some aspects of the universal in the
past but not others, or no aspects at all.
Bodin was confident that many historians could contribute to the revelation of
the universal in an orderly and comprehensive way, and that their efforts could
make sense to readers. This confidence turns on two principles that underpin
Method more or less explicitly: first, that there are universal rules that shape the
activities of historians; and second, that these rules are seen at work in the rightful
operation of mind. The first principle is signalled in the title of the first chapter of
Method, ‘categories’. There are three historical categories, Bodin asserts with con-
fidence: the human, the natural and the divine (p. 15). We might assume that these
are Bodin’s assertion of the most basic, irreducible, kinds of history there are, and
that they consequently do not overlap. But there is more in store for us in the
second and third chapters of Method, which explain how the different kinds of
history can form a comprehensible universal. This order, we are told, arises from
two basic rules in history making: the presentation of events in chronological order,
and in order from the general to the specific.
Bodin’s suggestion that chronology is basic to the idea of history seems intui-
tively right. While there may be thematic works on offer, it is hard to think of
history as making sense without chronology. His point about proceeding from
the general to the particular is far more contestable given the predominant
interest of present day historians in phenomena that are sub global. The impor-
tant point about both of these claims is that neither is derived logically in Method.
Bodin is no Plato or Aristotle. Yet they are not simply bald, untested metaphy-
sical assertions. Rather—and this brings us to see the second reason for Bodin’s
confidence—they are seen in all good histories. Setting the circularity of this
argument aside, his point is that a history without chronology or with no sense of
movement from the general to the specific is akin to dining at a banquet when all
the courses and seasonings are out of place. It is what we want, and not just
because a properly ordered banquet is agreeable. Bodin has a more fundamental
point to make: that we cannot function mentally or in our actions unless things
are in the right order.
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This is seen somewhat obliquely in his suggestion that developing memory as a
‘treasure chest’ of sayings and deeds is needed as a guide for rightful actions (pp.
27–8). This triple skip from metaphysics to epistemology to ethics is easy for our
eyes to miss because of his use of the phrase ‘treasure chest’. By treasure chest, we
might appraise him as suggesting the establishment of a stuffed cabinet of curiosities,
and back that claim up by conjuring up Francis Bacon’s contemporary definition of
such a cabinet as containing:
whatever the hand of man by exquisite art or engine has made rare in stuff,
form or motion; whatsoever singularity, chance, and the shuffle of things hath
produced; whatsoever Nature has wrought in things that want life and may be
kept. (Gesta Grayorum, in The Oxford Francis Bacon, hereafter OFB, vol. 8: 335)
But this idea of a hodgepodge repository of curious or wonderful acquisitions is not
what Bodin has in mind, and as we shall see below, it does not capture Bacon’s
complex views on mind well either. Bodin’s Method sounds a strong argument in
favour of order because disorder and the ill-disciplined collection of novelties are
the marks of a superficial or insane mind and the immorality that such states imply
(pp. 14, 21–9, 71).
The problem is that Bodin does not tell us directly that order is necessary for
reason and moral action. We have only a route via negativa, the chaotic, superficial,
curiosity chasing activities of the insane immoral are not what we want. We have to
join the dots between Bodin’s rules and good histories and say that orderly histories
reflect and reinforce reasoned, ethical action. A good historical ‘banquet’ goes
without saying, even if it leaves us puzzled about where that might leave wonder
in the writing of history.
Overcoming the retrenchment of mind
Bodin might be forgiven for providing more of a practical primer for historians
than a theoretical reflection on how the rules of history are known, make sense,
and take shape in or shape activities of mind. He was not an Aristotelian logician.
Nor could we fault him for echoing the medieval association of unbounded curi-
osity with the disordered mind and the immorality that it was assumed to generate.
But it still stands that he was interested in the intersection of history and philoso-
phy in seeking to understand categories, mind and social ethics. His writings reflect
lines of thought set down by ancient and medieval approaches to metaphysics,
even if he was not a metaphysician. He was not alone in these interests. Daston and
Park draw our attention in Wonders and the Order of Nature to the contribution of
writers like Walter Ralegh and Francis Bacon to late-sixteenth and early seven-
teenth-century challenges to ancient and medieval philosophy.8 Theirs is a
refreshing expansion of analyses that typically emphasise the increasing autonomy
of the discipline of history and the role of the historian as the critical arbiter of
historical evidence or, as Beverley Southgate puts it, as ‘political manqués—people
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who would have liked to be politicians and who resorted to history as a substitute
for more active and direct political involvement’.9
Yet Daston and Park’s analysis also falls back to conventional thought in one key
way. This is hinted at in the disproportionate attention given to Bacon as against
Ralegh, and is more explicitly seen in their celebration of Bacon as a radical who
used wonder to challenge customary lines of categorisation, and of Ralegh as pro-
viding an empirical correction to John Mandeville’s account of the headless blem-
myes in Guyana.10 Put bluntly, Bacon opens up thought using wonder; Ralegh
corrects accounts of wonders. But the distinction is not so clean, because Bacon’s
ideas provide a significant source of orientation in Ralegh’s multi volume History of
the World (1618), and thus Ralegh is a theorist as well as a practitioner. This
encourages revisitation of other works of history, including those which have been
passed over in histories of history-making. Nathaniel Wanley’s The Wonders of the
Little World is a strong case in point. While an examination of this work is not
meant to provide an exhaustive analysis of early modern histories, a revisition of its
‘eccentric’ pages shows a similar tendency towards categorisation and the triple skip
from metaphysics to epistemology and ethics. Where it differs from the works of
Bodin and Ralegh is in the use of later currents of thought to make these arguments,
namely the philosophies of Descartes and Hobbes.
Wonders, Bacon argued in Novum Organum (1620) and De dignitate et augmentis sci-
entiarum (1623), provide a corrective to principles derived solely from non-wonderful
phenomena and a panacea to the human tendency to make the metaphysical leap
from a tiny number of particular phenomena to abstract generalisations about
them (De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, hereafter De augmentis scientiarum, OFB,
vol. 6, 2.2; Novum Organum, OFB, vol. 11, 1.19–1.22; 1.26–8). In this expansive
view of knowledge, history functions as a ‘warehouse’ that we can draw upon to
move backwards and forwards between the universal and the particular. History,
and this constant motion of mind, are needed to reveal the order of nature
(Novum organum, OFB vol. 11, 1.18).
History in the Advancement of Learning is divided fourfold, into natural, civil,
ecclesiastic and literary categories. Those categories are collapsed further in De
augmentis scientiarum, with ecclesiastic and literary history rolled into civil his-
tory—concerned with the activities of people—and distinguished only from nat-
ural history, which is concerned with acts of nature (Advancement of Learning,
OFB, vol. 4, 2.1.2; De augmentis scientiarum, OFB, vol. 6, 2.2). Both categories of
history result from acts of sense making, in which our perceptions are brought to
memory and classified—ordered—and recalled by reason. The role of reason is
important, for the simple capture by memory misses the engagement of the
intellect, as Bacon explains in an account of the power of mental images in De
augmentis scientiarum:
… even brutes have their memory excited by sensible impressions, never by
intellectual ones. And therefore you will more easily remember the image of a
hunter pursuing a hare, of an apothecary arranging his boxes, of a pedant
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making a speech, of a boy repeating passages from memory, or a player acting
on the stage, than the mere notions of invention, disposition, elocution,
memory, and action. (De augmentis scientiarum, OFB, vol.6, 2.5)
Thinking back to chapter two, this quote suggests a role for mental images akin to
that of curiosity in Augustine’s writing. They are an active expression of memory,
but the ease with which they can be recalled means that they can prevent us from
engaging in the more taxing tasks of combining images or of considering and
classifying non-visual ideas. We need reasoning and judgement to make prudent
decisions about good and bad courses of action.
So too, wonder is both the ‘seed of knowledge’ and ‘broken’, he tells us, and a
part of a world in which knowledge is ‘confined and circumscribed’:
… all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an impres-
sion of pleasure in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their
knowledge… and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires,
there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind…. for the contemplation
of God’s creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and
creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God, no perfect
knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge (Advancement of Knowledge,
OFB, vol. 4, 1.3).
The limits of our knowledge are both internal and external: internal in the sense
that the limits of our will and self-control see us fall prey to fears and vanities, and
external in the sense that we cannot know God directly. Thus wonder—positioned
at the start of our mental activities—can generate only a ‘broken’ knowledge of
God. We need to exercise reason to strengthen our will and to remind us not to
overreach in our claims to know the universal. In this process, wonder acts as a
stimulant to new knowledge in the ways suggested by Plato and Aristotle, but as
we shall see below, it is also taken as the mechanism by which we open up ways of
thinking and acting that go without saying.
Bacon expects us to labour at knowledge, moving constantly from memory to
knowledge and back again and from the particular to the universal and back again.
This means that the historian must ‘examine things to the bottom; and not to
receive upon credit, or reject upon improbabilities, until there hath passed a due
examination’ to do more to establish which accounts of phenomena are certain,
dubious, and to be condemned.11 The problem with this approach, as Bacon
acknowledges, is that when we go beyond accounts derived from our own
first-hand experiences, we are reliant upon the mental efforts of others (Novum
Organum, OFB, vol. 11, 176–77). This is a familiar complaint in this book: the
treatment of history as a sense making activity sees certainty connected with
individual sense-making. A boundary is established between what is certain
knowledge and what is not certain knowledge, with our involvement in the
former as the critical discriminator between the two. This opens the way for
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scepticism about the sense-making of others. Bacon has two remedies for this
scepticism. The first sees him employ topoi or textual conventions to signal not
the veracity, but the dubiousness of others’ claims. The second sees him remind
us that wonder was not just important at the start of philosophy, but that it is
constantly needed to protect us from the ossification of thought.
Phrases such as ‘I heard from X’ or ‘I read in an account by Y’ signal doubt.
Certain claims, on the other hand, come with none of these riders (Historia naturalis
et experimentalis, OFB, vol. 12, 12–17). Bacon’s arguments on source claim topoi
suggest a significant departure from some of the other approaches outlined in this
book. Islamic writers, we recall for instance, see the statement of lines of source
transmission—who handed a description of a phenomenon down to whom—as an
important part of splitting out dubious claims from those to be trusted. As we have
also noted, though, wonder writers also used source claim topoi either to signal the
veracity of their accounts of wonders, or to criticise the approaches of historians
who held state-supported positions. The strange tales we examined in the previous
chapter, for example, provided oblique and even direct criticisms of the efforts of
official historians. If we were to apply Bacon’s view to histories generated in our
own time, footnoting would be taken as a signal not of certainty but of uncer-
tainty. The more references in a work, the more dubious its claims.
In Bacon’s view, the more we say about the sources of an individual sense-making
claim, the more doubt we signal about it. He also appreciated, however, that a lot of
sense making activities can go without saying. In simple terms, what we take for
granted as being certain can also be uncertain or even dubious. Here we might assume
that Bacon got stuck in the same way as Polybius, not being able to provide us with a
guide on what to trust and what not to trust. Polybius tried to resolve the problem by
relying on only his own knowledge claims. Bacon, on the other hand, recalls that
wonder is always available to us to ensure that we think things through and not simply
rely upon the thoughts of others. Bacon’s account of history thus takes aim at others’
decisions of inclusion and exclusion, suggesting that we open up consideration of both
the ordinary and the irregular (history of wonders) in our consideration of phenomena
(Advancement of Knowledge, OFB, vol. 4, 4.67). In this way, he sees us as being able to
address the blind spots of earlier thinkers, and to ensure possession of our own minds
by constantly renewing our understanding of the world.
Nothing less than the regeneration of thought via history was what Bacon
sought. This is because he saw the ancient foundations of the thought of his day as
having become unquestioned. The inclusion of wonders and the experience of
wonder signalled the need to re-do the work of deriving categories and descrip-
tions of the most basic kinds of being by induction through propositions seen at
work in particular phenomena. That is, he argued for us to be open to the possi-
bility that past descriptions of the most basic categories of being are unduly limited.
Bacon spent more time elaborating on this task of shifting between the particular
and the universal in his various writings on natural history, but Novum Organum
makes it clear that the inductive method is appropriate for all endeavours of mind,
including human history. We need, he tells us:
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histories and tables of discovery concerning anger, fear, shame and so on, and
also ones to do with examples of civil business; no less than to do with the
mental motions of memory, composition and division, judgment and the rest,
just as much as I would of hot and cold (Novum Organum, OFB 11.191).
These would provide the foundations needed to assist us in making judgements
about particular courses of action, as Aristotle believed was the case with the study
of the affections. Moreover, the acts of the individual who uses will to make good
judgement contribute to good government (Advancement, 4.135) and to an under-
standing of ‘pertubations and distempers of the affections’ needed to treat others
suffering from weakness of will or even insanity (Advancement, OFB, vol. 4, 4.149–
50; De augmentis scientiarum 1: 735, 737).
Bacon saw the ancient Roman historians Tacitus and Livy as providing some of
the descriptions of phenomena upon which universal categories of the most basic
kinds of being could be derived. But the work of the historian in his day was not
done. Far-ranging and comprehensive accounts of past phenomena were needed to
build an understanding of the universals that shape individual and social action.
Exhaustiveness was thus not a sign of methodological weakness; rather, it reflected
a willingness to be critical about past assumptions in order to derive a fuller, and
better, account of the categories of being that shape our lives. As we recall from
the past chapter, some of the same intent was at play in the critical stance strange
historians took against the Chinese official histories.
Strange historians, though, needed to question official histories through a sepa-
rate, unendorsed, even guerrilla approach to history making. Bacon’s stance, on the
other hand, signalled an invitation for the wondrous and the wonderer to be part
of history as it was recognised by the state and by those who wrote other histories
and who might have also called themselves historians. Combined with liberal
notions of textual ownership and copyright, there was only one direction for the
word totals of histories to go: up. Volumes heaped upon volumes, with a variety of
authors of both genders seeking to explain the universal through the careful cata-
loguing and classification of what Foucault would have called ‘the wild profusion
of existing things’. This age also continued the tradition of the commonplace book,
where authors created meta distillations of the things that students and those who
wished to transact well in society ought to know.12
Walter Ralegh’s crystallisation—while imprisoned in the Tower of London—
of around five hundred texts into the five books of History of the World is a
much noted example. This is not simply because, as Daston and Park have
noted in a passing remark, Ralegh gave his readers cause to think critically
about wonder claims of the travel writer John Mandeville.13 Further, while he
did as Nicholas Popper suggests, labour to illuminate the hand of providence,
his was not a work simply of categorical description.14 He, like Bacon, saw a
need to be exhaustive in order to illuminate universals kept from our view by
the tyranny of ‘sloth and dullness’ at work in philosophy. As he explains, in a
fashion much like Bacon:
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… [philosophers] have so retrenched their minds from the following and
overtaking of truth, and so absolutely subjected themselves to the law of those
philosophical principles; as all contrary teaching, in the search of causes, they
have condemned either for fantastical or curious… that where natural reason
hath built any thing so strong against itself, as the same reason can hardly assail
it, much less batter it down… (History of the World, I:xliv).
Here we see the traditional lines of philosophical thought coming up short in the
explanation of the ‘fantastical’ or the ‘curious’, which as he explains further on,
may reflect the work of God. By necessity, historical research has to be opened up
so that we can gain ‘sense and feeling of corporeal things’ (History of the World, I:xl;
and xxxi). So too, we see in Ralegh’s use of the word ‘feeling’ that an exhaustive
account of phenomena embraces the affections in sense making.
The echo of Bacon is also seen, significantly, in Ralegh’s positing of a double
limit to wonder. That limit, we recall, is internal and external, reflecting the
overreach we experience due to weakness of will, and the fact that we cannot
apprehend God directly. Our knowledge can only be of God’s works in the world.
So while Bacon and Ralegh saw wonder as a necessity in reopening lines of
enquiry closed down by ancient—indeed ‘secular’ or ‘atheist’—philosophers, they
made it clear that it could not be relied upon solely because it spurs endless
recourse to curiosity. Here we see Ralegh echo the medieval idea that a little wonder
is a good thing, but a lot of curiosity is a bad thing. Bacon describes this stretch using
the rich analogy of ‘flying up to the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses’
(Advancement of Learning, OFB, vol. 4, 1.3). Ralegh opts for his own analogy, which
sees us focus on the overambition of those who attempt to cross a powerful river:
… who, not contented with a known and safe ford, will presume to pass
over the greatest river in all parts, where he is ignorant of their depths: for so
doth the one lose his life, and the other his understanding (History of the
World, I:i.xii).
Why someone switches from wonder to curiosity is not explained by Bacon and
Ralegh in terms of specific mental activities. Rather, they see the switch from one
to the other as reflecting both the fact that human reason is limited, as distinct from
God’s powers, and because the Devil ‘seemeth to work his wonders by moving the
cogitations and affections of men’ (History of the World, I:ix.399). Protection comes
from the humility of knowing that human knowledge is limited, and therefore that
the historian must employ a critical attitude towards sources. That aim, however,
runs up against the counter tendency of dismissing sources on the grounds that
they suggest phenomena too remarkable to be explained by known methods of
explanation.
Where Popper saw in Ralegh’s History of the World a deliberate opting for a
more extensive account of phenomena than might be trusted by rigorous source
analysis, any notion of deliberation seems to fly out the window in works such as
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Nathaniel Wanley’s The Wonders of the Little World (1678).15 What few apprai-
sals of Wanley’s Wonders we have seen him described as a source for ‘eccentric’
and ‘abnormal’ biographies. A surface glance at Wonders seems to underscore
the soundness of these judgements, and Foucault’s idea of us arriving at
the stark impossibility of Wanley thinking such things. Six books of lives which
are organised by chapter heads such as ‘Of the Different and Unusual Ways by
which Some Men have Come to their Deaths’ (I:28); ‘Of Such as Having Been
Wild, Prodigal, or Debauched in their Youth, Have Afterwards Proved Excel-
lent Persons’ (III: 2); and ‘Of the Signal Deformity, and Very Mean Appear-
ance, of Some Great Persons, and Others’ (I: 13). It is a great read, but read in
one sitting, the detail is overwhelming, and suggests that Wanley was correct to
appraise himself as a reciter and a collector, rather than an inventor or framer
(Preface: vi).
Wanley saw himself as a cipher in order to position the reader as judge of the
phenomena described. As he admits in the preface to Wonders, though, the work
includes citations, and multiple citations are used to build up an account of the
same phenomenon in order to fill in gaps (Wonders, Preface:vi). Yet Wonders is not
without stance, as the highly critical comments on the materialism of Catholic
clergy in the chapter on different and unusual deaths show (Wonders, I:28). More
importantly, Wonders is not without order. Books two and three provide the most
apparent evidence of this, with Wanley setting out a detailed account of all known
human virtues, affections and sense making abilities through a prodigious collection
of examples. Wonders is a catalogue of human appearances, sense making abilities
and types of reason and affection.
A deeper dive rewards us with a sense of the primacy of some human virtues,
forms of reason, and affection over others. Wanley’s ordering of the affections is
particularly striking, because of how it positions admiration, which is a cognate
term for wonder. As he explains:
… admiration, the first of all the passions, rises in the soul before she hath
considered whether the thing represented to her be good, or convenient to
her, or not; so, after she has judged it to be good, there is raised in her the
most agreeable and complacent of passions, love; and when she hath con-
ceived the same to be evil, she is quickly moved to hatred, which is nothing
but the soul’s aversion to that which threatens pain or grief (Wonders of the
Little World, II.9.176).
There is something more to this than Bacon and Ralegh’s insistence that we need
wonder to open ourselves up to new lines of thought. Wanley takes great pains to
tell us that admiration is the first of all passions, and that it is prior to judgement.
This view is not incompatible with Bacon’s or Ralegh’s views, and it certainly
suggests a revisitation of the ideas of Thomas Aquinas. But the idiom of Wanley’s
description, and the sheer number of affections he catalogues suggests that their
lines of thought are insufficient for capturing the contours of his view.
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First of all the passions
Wanley did not arrive at these views of admiration on his own. As with Ralegh,
his history draws upon philosophy as the source for explanations of why we cate-
gorise in particular ways, and to what ends. In Wonders we see two other currents
of early modern European philosophy that postdate the ideas of Bodin, Bacon and
Ralegh: the writings of Descartes and Hobbes on the passions.
Hobbes and Descartes both classified wonder—Hobbes also used the term
admiration—as a passion or affection. This designation is not easily translated into
the term emotion as we understand it. Rather, they employed the term passion to
signal a reflection of Aristotle’s interest in receptive—even passive—states or states
of perception. They also followed Aristotle in providing an account of the most
basic, distinct kinds of passions, with Descartes identifying six in a detailed physio-
logical and philosophical taxonomy in The Passions of the Soul (1649) and Hobbes
proposing 25 to 30 across The Elements of Law Natural and Politic (c. 1640, in Human
Nature and De Corpore Politico, hereafter Elements of Law) and Leviathan (1651).
Where they parted company with Aristotle was in the placement of a particular
passion at the head of their taxonomies, and the choice of passion differed for the
two: glory for Hobbes, wonder for Descartes. This difference in choice is sig-
nificant, and stems back to differing views on social interaction and the power of
will. The latter, we will see, provides a strong rebuttal to the Aristotelian idea of
the passions as passive human states. Whereas Hobbesian glory is a sense of super-
iority that drives conflict between at least some individuals (Leviathan, I:13); Car-
tesian wonder is prior to judgements of good and bad, but the wonderer does
consider attentively and either bestow scorn or esteem depending on the smallness
or the greatness of the phenomenon respectively (Passions of the Soul, 2:70; 2.54).
The Hobbesian individual never attains what they desire, and consequently,
human action is future oriented (Leviathan, I:6). This spurs a diffidence or even lack
of trust in others, which can result in acts of harm (Leviathan, I:13). That distrust
can extend to the state or the ruler of a state, and be fuelled by admiration or
wonder at the distracting words of tricksters and false prophets (Leviathan, III:37).
The result is addictive hope akin to that of a gambler who focuses only on the
hope of bettering their own life circumstances. This analogy is seen at work in
Hobbes’ adaptation of Aristotle’s opening to the Metaphysics in Elements of Law:
And from this beginning is derived all philosophy: as astronomy from the
admiration of the course of heaven; natural philosophy from the strange effects
of the elements and other bodies. And from the degrees of curiosity proceed also
the degrees of knowledge among men; for to a man in the chase of riches or
authority (which in respect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversion of
little pleasure to consider, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth
that maketh the day, or to enter into other contemplation of any strange
accident, than whether it conduce or not to the end he pursueth. Because
curiosity is delight, therefore all novelty is so, but especially that novelty from
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which a man conceiveth an opinion true or false of bettering his own estate.
For in such a case they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have
while the cards are shuffling (Elements of Law, IX:18).
Philosophy begins with wonder, but without moderation, it transforms into a
curiosity that endlessly seeks out novelty. What is lost in the process is an awareness
of our need to submit to a powerful sovereign in a state if we are to be protected
from harm by others. We see only ourselves and the hope for something different,
even novel, in the future. Curiosity is thus, taken to extremes, a destabiliser of
individuals and states.
Hobbes’ remedy for curiosity is a shift from attraction to superficial consideration
of causes to the disciplined consideration of the basic categories of cause and effect
(Leviathan, I:11). That discipline comes from not treating books as the complete
source of reason; not accepting established definitions as going without saying; and
scrutinising the claims of historians against our own and others’ experiences
(Leviathan, I: 4; IV: 46; I:7;). In stressing the importance of not being beguiled by
speech or past definitions or categories, Hobbes combines the insights of Roger
and Francis Bacon, the former of which he knew by text and the latter of which
he knew by a series of conversations.
Descartes also held to the importance of regulation of the passions by training
(Passions of the Soul, I:50), and the avoidance of too much wonder in particular:
although it is good to be born with some inclination to this passion, since it
disposes us to the acquisition of the sciences, we should still try afterwards to
emancipate ourselves from it as much as possible. For it is easy to supplement a
deficiency of it by a particular [state of] reflection and attention to which our
will can always bind our understanding when we judge that the thing pre-
sented is worth the trouble. But to prevent excessive wonder there is no
remedy but to acquire the knowledge of many things, and to apply oneself to
the consideration of all those which may seem most rare and unusual (Passions
of the Soul II:76).
That we may seek a remedy for the development of too much wonder in the
comprehensive consideration of wonders seems paradoxical, even if it reflects the
same devotion to openness of thought promoted by Francis Bacon. How could we
know when to pull back from wonder? Descartes derives his confidence from three
things. First, there is his assumption that wonder loses its thrall with a loss of
novelty. As he explains: ‘because the more one encounters rare things one wonders
at, the more one routinely ceases wondering at them and comes to think that any
that may be presented thereafter will be ordinary …’ (Passions of the Soul, II:78).
We assume in this case that as we get older, fewer and fewer phenomena will
appear wonderful to us. Second, as we age and acquire more knowledge of our-
selves, we are less apt to be humbled by the esteem or scorn of the wondrous
phenomena we encounter, and attribute that esteem or scorn to ourselves (Passions
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of the Soul, III:170). We possess a stronger sense of self and will from which to
make judgements about the knowledge claims of others. Finally, and most funda-
mentally, Meditations on First Philosophy (hereafter Meditations) I and IV make it clear
that Descartes holds to strong voluntarism: full, direct control over passing or
withholding judgement. This strength of will makes the harnessing of wonder
possible and likely also explains why wonder loses its grip over us as we age.
Consider his thoughts on employing a shift towards falsehood to counteract the
pull of propositions that we find so plausible as to go without saying:
I shall never get out of the habit of confidently assenting to these opinions, so
long as I suppose them to be what in fact they are, namely highly probable
opinions—opinions which, despite the fact that they are in a sense doubtful, as
has just been shown, it is still much more reasonable to believe them than to
deny. In view of this, I think it will be a good plan to turn my will in com-
pletely the opposite direction and deceive myself, by pretending for a time
that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary (Meditations, in The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I: 15).
Through sheer force of will, Descartes is able to open his mind to propositions that
seem implausible, and thus to act with possession of mind.
Nathaniel Wanley’s Wonders is far from the sustained examination of the passions
that we find in Hobbes’ and Descartes’ writings. But their ideas clearly influenced
his vocabulary—‘admiration’ from Hobbes—and his positioning of wonder as the
first passion, and as prior to judgement. Wonders may be eccentric, but it takes its
steer from a philosophical age in which Francis Bacon railed against the foreclosure
of thought and both Hobbes and Descartes worked through the individual and
social implications of wondering before judgement. These writings bore a con-
fidence in the power of the human will both to prevent a slide into the addictive,
sinful, path of the curious, and to make sense of, order, and act upon a wider
description of phenomena than they saw in their predecessors’ books.
Aristotle held that philosophy begins with wonder, but somehow, along the
way, that wonder seemed to have been lost in what seem to have been exhaustive
logical descriptions of the universal. Early modern European wrote of wonder in
order to recapture an openness to the novel and the strange and to make sense of
the world through the ordering and categorisation of phenomena. In doing so, I
noted that they seemed to skip lightly from metaphysics to epistemology and to
ethics, and therefore from a sense of wonder as order, to wonder as the order of an
individual’s mind, to wonder as the order of a good society. Their works were
neither an expression of mindless consumerism nor the simple premise for posses-
sing others through imperial expansion. Rather, the early modern European his-
tories of Bodin, Bacon, Ralegh and Wanley were potent invitations for their
readers to seek enough control over their own powers of mind to open up the
positive possibilities of encountering Foucault’s ‘wild profusion of existing things’.
Their response was not a stark realisation of the impossibility of thinking some
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things, but an openness to the implausible in order to drive a better understanding
of the universal through the particular. That hope in wonder as the means for
achieving openness to the most basic kinds of being—and to being itself—remains
with us today.
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6
SPIRITED HISTORIES IN MODERN
EUROPE
Immanuel Kant | George William Frederick Hegel |
Daniel Defoe | William Howitt | Sarah Josepha
Hale | Leopold von Ranke
Modern historiography means Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). It is hard to avoid
him in histories of history, for he often forms the marker point for the emergence
of professional or ‘scientific’ history making. But he is also seen less positively, as
one of the twin shoals upon which the idea of history nearly came to be wrecked
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the extreme he is a writer who failed
to follow his own injunction that the historian is a colourless or transparent overlay
on the past.1 His binary is George William Frederick Hegel (1770–1831), who is
cast as the progenitor of ‘metaphysical history’ replete with ‘pseudo-statements’ and
speculation.2 In Hegel’s hands, purportedly, metaphysics came to be seen as short-
hand for a progressive narrative which ends with the triumph of the West to the
exclusion of everyone else.3 Both von Ranke and Hegel purportedly give history a
bad name, and in the case of Hegel, unmask the pursuit of metaphysics as socially,
politically and ethically dangerous. Making general sense of the world, on these
terms, means controlling it in your lights. This chapter breaks down the Ranke-
Hegel binary and shows that both were part of a wider movement that harnessed
metaphysics and history in the service of creating quite diverse visions of how
things make sense.
Described variously as the ‘nineteenth-century’s historical titan’4 and as the
progenitor of a ‘critical historical science’5, writers such as Georg Iggers, Peter
Novick and John Tosh have laboured to promote a nuanced understanding of von
Ranke’s contribution to historical scholarship. This has meant, in the main, arguing
against the collapse of his thought into a literal reading of a single passage:
History has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the
present for the benefit of ages to come. To such lofty functions this work does
not aspire. Its aim is merely to show how things actually were [wie es eigentlich
gewesen] (The Theory and Practice of History, p. 85).
Careful readings of this snippet from the preface to the first edition of Histories of
the Latin and Germanic Peoples emphasise Von Ranke’s place in an Idealistic tradition
dominated by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Hegel. In this tradition, the aim to
show ‘how things actually were’ is an endeavour to discern the universal in the
particular, which Iggers expresses as ‘how things essentially were’.6 Iggers reminds us
that Rankian histories were not simple mass aggregations of historical facts; they
offered an account of the essential nature of phenomena as well. So too, Peter
Novick has emphasised the reading of von Ranke’s claim as a creed used by him
and later writers to support the emerging idea of an historical profession. In that
profession, the rallying cry for an objective understanding of ‘how things actually
were’ served to broker a fragile peace between a burgeoning number of writers
with very different styles, interests and political beliefs.7
This idea of a peace brokered in the name of objectivity is seen by some as
having come at the price of wonder. Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, for
example, paint a picture of the age of Enlightenment and its wake as ushering in
the diminution and even the extinction of the ‘star of the marvellous’.8 This was
the age of the ‘new science’, a shaking free from assumed abstractions and the
embrace of rational observation and testing. Wonder was laid bare as the fixation of
the ‘ordinary person’—often assumed to be a woman or child—with vulgar odd-
ities and freaks. It would be a short step from there to the sideshow and to the
films that form the focus of the next chapter. Wonder not only enthralled and
entertained, but it was also discerned as a threat to hard fought scientific, religious
and political order alike. John Spencer’s A Discourse Concerning Prodigies (1663)
seems to capture this view well:
How mean a regard shall the issues of the severest debates, and the commands
of Authority find, if every pitiful Prodigy-monger have credit enough with
the People to blast them, by telling them that heaven frowns upon the laws,
and that God writes his displeasure against them in black and visible Characters
when some sad accident befals the complyers with them?9
Yet this was also the age of intuition. Iggers and Breisach remind us that von
Ranke had a metaphysical interest in discerning the hand of God in events, and
that this revelation of the universal was not to be achieved by rational induction
from the concrete to the abstract. Rather, Ranke argued for Ahnen, an intuitive
cognition that reveals the ideas that shape concrete phenomena.10 As he explains in
The Idealistic Theory of State:
Without a leap, without a new start you never can progress from the general
to the particular. The spiritual force which suddenly arises as concrete phe-
nomenon before your eyes in unimagined uniqueness cannot be derived from
a higher principle. From the particular, perhaps, you can ascend with careful
boldness to the general. But there is no way leading from the general theory
to the perception of the particular. (The Theory and Practice of History, pp. 63–4)
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He was far from singular in this interest: Kant’s meticulous Logic divides all cogni-
tions into intuitions and concepts, and Hegel treated it in his encyclopedia Philo-
sophy of Mind as the starting point for the self-realisation of rational thought.
It is important to pause and to note that writing on intuition and wonder does
not imply support for either idea. John Sallis, for example, sees Hegel’s writings
on intuition as dealing the double blow of displacing, and then extinguishing
wonder. Displacement, he argues, came with Hegel’s decision to treat intuition
and wonder in part three of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences—Philosophy
of Mind (1817),which has more of a practical, psychological focus than his other
works. Philosophy might have had its beginning with wonder in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, but it ended with its move out of metaphysics and into the new field
of psychology. This meant seeing the meaning of intuition and wonder as
exhausted with an understanding of mind, rather than an understanding of how
everything—including mind—hangs together and makes sense. Second, he
appraises Hegel as putting ‘an end to wonder still more decisively’ by linking it to
intuition. This is a claim he supports by reference to the following excerpt from
The Philosophy of Mind:
Aristotle refers to its [intuition’s] place when he says that all knowledge begins
from wonder [Verwunderung]. Initially, the object is still loaded with the form of
the irrational, and it is because it is within this that subjective reason as intui-
tion has the certainty, though only the indeterminate certainty, of finding itself
again, that its subject matter inspires it with wonder and awe. Philosophical
thought, however, has to raise itself above the standpoint of wonder. (§449)11
On this reading, we have reached the point when the shadow cast by the opening
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics over the idea of history begins to shrink.
As you might guess from the number of pages that follow this one, I do not
agree with Sallis’ reading of Hegel on intuition and wonder. Rather, as with
Martin Heidegger, it might be counter argued that this chapter marks the begin-
ning of the idea of history as wonder. This Heideggerian reading celebrates Hegel
as having understood the connection of history and philosophy in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics better than any writer before him. Had Sallis extended his quote from
Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind to incorporate the next few sentences, for example, we
would have seen a glimpse of an account of the historical self-realisation of mind in
which wonder is not left behind. Hegel writes:
In immediate intuition, I do indeed have the entire matter before me; but
only in the cognition that is unfolded in all its aspects and returns to the form of
simple does the matter stand before my mind as an internally articulated, systematic
totality. (§449)
Intuition and wonder are not left behind when higher forms of thought are
developed: they are a part of them.
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This chapter unfolds Hegel’s thought on the interconnection between history
and philosophy. To that end, it covers ground familiar to those who know
something of the contribution of Hegel to the philosophy of history. In dis-
tinction from those customary accounts, however, this chapter does not cele-
brate Hegel—as Heidegger did—for having thought ‘the philosophy of the
Greeks for the first time [zum ersten mal]’.12 Rather, I show that his interleaving
of wonder, intuition and thought in history is expressed in a much wider range
of works, from the metaphysical universal history of Kant to the empirical
histories of von Ranke and Sarah Josepha Hale (1788–1879), and to the para-
doxological histories of Daniel Defoe (1684–1731), and William Howitt (1792–
1879). Arguably none of them present philosophy in as an historicised manner
as Hegel and we may fault their logic and conclusions, but the gesture of
connecting metaphysics and historical phenomena is there. This interest, I
argue, stems from their desire to explain how we might gain an understanding
of the universal from concrete, particular, historical phenomenon and their
varying determinations to see the ‘leap’ from one to the other through the
more or less rational experiences of the sublime, intuition, and spirit. In the
case of von Ranke, there is an argument for the superiority of history over
philosophy in explaining the universal. But this argument, it will be shown,
bears fewer radical implications than the historical embodiment of intuition as
female in Hale’s world, or its realisation in the ghosts, revenants and poltergeists
of Defoe and Howitt’s spirited histories.
History as intuitive leap to the universal
It is not customary to think of the ‘father’ of the modern profession of history as
being interested in intuition, or indeed any other operations of mind and mean-
ing making. Our received understanding of von Ranke is very much that of a
technically adept historian, not a theorist. Indeed, as Iggers argues, Ranke’s very
interest in the uniqueness of historical agents and their contexts meant a rejection
of philosophical approaches like those proposed by Hegel or Kant.13 Historical
understanding demanded a critical interpretation of the evidence that points to
historical agents and events. This view of von Ranke might be seen as a liberating
challenge to the assumption that historians serve the philosophical cause of illu-
minating the universal through time. This was the moment to unshackle history
from metaphysics. Ranke’s vision of history is not ancillary to philosophy, but a
discipline in and of itself. In this discipline, truth is not to be found in the sha-
dows of Plato’s forms or Aristotle’s immanent universals realising themselves in
some grand world historical narrative, but in attention to archival detail by carefully
trained analysts.
Much of Ranke’s writing supports this interpretation of him as a technical
empiricist. History and philosophy are distinct, as he explains in an early manuscript
from the 1830s:
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There are two ways of acquiring knowledge about human affairs—through
the perception of the particular and through abstraction. The one is the way of
philosophy, the other that of history .… These two sources of knowledge are
therefore to be kept clearly distinguished. (‘On the Relations of History and
Philosophy’, in The Theory and Practice of History, p. 5).
So too, in the preface to his final work—Universal History (1884)—the limitations
of history are declared:
The province of History is limited by the means at her command, and the
historian would be overbold who should venture to unveil the mystery of the
primeval world, the relation of mankind to God and nature. The solution of
such problems must be entrusted to the joint efforts of Theology and Science.
(Universal History, p. ix)
To von Ranke’s mind, historical overstretch is there from the beginnings of history
making, with some accounts being no more than legends embellished with a
variety of fabulous and miraculous phenomena (Universal History, pp. 84, 97, 129).
This judgement sharpens further as he narrows in on the examples of Herodotus
and Thucydides, and the exemplar of the latter’s matter of fact approach to
sense making:
The miraculous, which has such charm for Herodotus, disappears in Thucy-
dides behind the unadorned fact. The tone of his narrative is sometimes as
simple as that of a chronicle; it impresses one as at once trustworthy and
intelligent (Universal History, p. 318; see also p. 171).
Yet across the corpus of von Ranke’s writings, we cannot help but notice his
wrestle with the universal in history. This point is played out most clearly in his
extended examination of the same two historians mentioned above: Herodotus and
Thucydides. Thucydides is trustworthy and intelligent, but he is also, Ranke tells
us, ‘circumstantial’ as a consequence of his impartiality. That is, Thucydides’ pro-
vision of a detail-laden narrative leaves the matter of judging those past phenomena
to readers. Herodotus’ recourse to the gods and to the miraculous, on the other
hand, relieves readers of some of the burden of judgement (Universal History, pp.
318–9). Moreover Thucydides’ recourse to detail as providing certainty and
authority, Ranke notes, is not consistent. He does not provide word for word
accounts of speeches or letters, thus offering a ‘moment in which the science of
history and the science of rhetoric… unite their forces’ (Universal History, p. 321).
This appears to be quite a concession to style, and one that might lead us to revisit
Ranke’s judgement of Herodotus. It is no fleeting comment, for it is reinforced by
a slightly earlier discussion of Thucydides’ speeches in Universal History, which
stresses their legitimacy as stemming from their encapsulation of principles at work
in concrete phenomena and actions:
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Alkibiades exerted all the power imparted both by his personal influence and
his prestige. The noble speech which Thucydides put in his mouth cannot be
regarded as an exact report of what he said, but the principles therein expres-
sed are of the greatest importance as illustrating the political views of the
period. (Universal History, p. 253)
Thucydides shows us how something essentially happened (wie es eigentlich gewesen)
without relaying all of its details.
Ranke’s analysis of Thucydides suggests that historians can opt to describe the
principles at work in particular phenomena without labouring the details. What it
does not show us, though, is a case for seeking those principles. We can discern
principles in phenomena, but ought we do so? It might be argued in the case of
Thucydides, for example, that he resorted to presenting principles in the absence of
a detailed archival record. Had more archival information been available, he might
not have relied so heavily on rhetoric. On this view, archival details would be
preferable to principles.
In stark contrast with the time of Thucydides, Ranke lived in an archivally rich
age. His work is grounded in a strong appreciation of the value of archives, and—
on the logic that I set out above—there might be seen as less necessity for him to
resort to principles. Yet he does present principles, and he does not see them as
functioning to fill archival gaps or a back-up option. This is because principles
point to the work of God. Ranke’s identification of the value of principles for
finding God in history date back to at least 1820, as seen in this excerpt from a
letter to his brother:
In all of history God dwells, lives, can be recognised. Every deed gives testi-
mony of him, every moment preaches His name, but most of all, it seems to
me, does so the connectedness of history (Zusammenhang der großen Geschichte).
He stands there like a holy heiroglyph, understood and preserved in His most
extreme manifestation (in seinem Äußersten aufgefaßt und bewahrt), perhaps in
order that He is not lost to more perceptive future centuries …. [L]et us do
our part to unveil this holy heiroglyph! In this way too we serve God, in this
way we are also priests and teachers. (‘The Young Ranke’s Vision of History
and God’ [1820s], in The Theory and Practice of History, p. 4; see also ‘On Pro-
gress in History’ [1854], in ibid., p. 21).
God’s universality is at work in the particular, making it possible for historians to
discern it and thus to contribute to divine understanding. Importantly, too, Ranke
sees spiritual discernment as not so much detected by historians as intuited (ahnen)
through an act of spiritual apperception (‘On the Character of Historical Science’
[1830s], p. 15, see also p. 12; and ‘On the Relations of Philosophy and History’
[1830s], in The Theory and Practice of History, p. 6). That detection appears to be
akin to the work of prophets in Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, as discussed in Chapter
Three. Closer inspection of von Ranke’s discussion, though, suggests that ahnen is
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not only open to those born with prophetic skills: as he suggests, we can all
be priests.
Ranke has very little to say about the nature of this historical intuition, apart
from noting that it leads to certain knowledge, and—as the quote that opens this
chapter suggests—that the move from the particular to the universal does not
require the same leap as needed in the move from the universal to the particular
(‘On the Relation of and Distinction Between History and Politics’ [1836], in The
Theory and Practice of History, p. 78; and ‘A Dialogue on Politics’ [1836], in Ibid., p.
62). These characterisations suggest that we are more likely to succeed in exercising
intuition in empirical sense making activities, rather than abstract considerations. As
such, they point us in the direction of suggesting that historians might be more able
to educate us in the universal than philosophers. Theory proceeds from the parti-
cular, not the other way around. Lest we leap to such a conclusion, however, it
should be noted that his characterisations might apply to other empirically-based
disciplines. God’s ‘heiroglyph’ might also be discerned in other empirical disciplines
such as science, geography or psychology.
World history in the service of spirit
Yet history is named specifically and repeatedly by Ranke as a means of attaining
universal history through a consideration of the concrete. Moreover, he saw a
role for intuition in achieving that consideration. Recourse to intuition did not
necessarily herald a turn from metaphysics to epistemology, or even the diminu-
tion of metaphysics by epistemology. In this sense, Ranke’s writing appears to
have a connection with the older currents of thought outlined in this book. We
recall from chapters two and three—on pre-modern European and Islamic his-
tories—for example, the connection of the metaphysical contemplation of history
with the contemplation of God’s work in the world. So too, we have to admit
the possibility that if Ranke was not the progenitor of these ways of thinking
about history, then there might have been other contemporary writers with
similar or even more extended interests in the connection of the universal and
the particular in history. In sum, Ranke might not have been the only writer
of his time to see historical contemplation as providing insight into the most
fundamental senses of being.
In making this point, I am not referring only to ‘metaphysical historians’ like
Kant and Hegel. History making boomed in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, fuelled by the growth of institutional education, circulating libraries, cheaper
forms of textual production, and liberal or even non-existent copyright laws. Even
the most cursory glance highlights that Ranke was not the only writer interested in
the idea that history making afforded the opportunity for intuition to support
metaphysical sense making. Nor, as it turns out, were his views on historical
intuition particularly radical. This is a point I am going to unpack through three
examples of histories that are yet to register in introductory historiographies both
by virtue of who their authors were, and the topics they took as their focus.
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We begin with the apparition histories of Daniel Defoe and William Howitt:
Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions (1727) and its second edition The
Secrets of the Invisible World Disclosed (1729) and The History of the Supernatural in All
Ages and Nations (1863) respectively. Defoe is best known to us as the author of
Robinson Crusoe (1719), but he was also a royalist pamphleteer and is acknowledged
for his blend of history and fiction in his journalistic accounts of the great storm of
1703 (The Storm, 1704) and the great plague that ravaged London in 1665 (Journal
of the Plague Year, 1722). William Howitt was a Quaker turned spiritualist, who
wrote prolifically on religion, science, literature, magic and his experiences as a
traveller to Australia (see for example A Popular History of Priestcraft in All Ages and
Nations, 1833; and Labour, Land, and Gold; or, Two Years in Victoria, 1855).
Neither Defoe’s nor Howitt’s apparition histories have attracted significant
attention by historiographers, and this is probably due to their subject matter. After
all, histories of ghosts and revenants do not seem to sit comfortably with our cur-
rent day notions of a discipline built upon professional standards. Professional his-
torians don’t do ghosts, paradoxologists do. Yet as we have noted throughout this
book, paradoxological writers employ topoi or literary devices that suggest shared
features with histories. On that basis, an examination might be warranted to con-
textualise them within that tradition. Michael McKeon and Jayne Lewis see appa-
rition histories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as having a further and
particular claim to our attention: that their extensive empirical descriptions func-
tion to help us to form vivid pictures that do not have moral or metaphysical
implications. In this way, they mimic the commitment to mass description birthed
in the new science, and reinforce Sallis’ claim that intuition functioned as a bar-
ometer of a shift from metaphysics to epistemology.14
Support for McKeon’s and Lewis’ point is easy to find, particularly in Defoe’s
History and the Reality of Apparitions. There is, for instance, Defoe’s logical point that
if all souls wandered the earth after life, ‘the inhabited and visible world would
have been continually haunted with ghosts, and we should never have been quiet’
(p. 99). Apparitions are occasional, and the world can make sense without them.
Moreover, there is his explicit likening of apparitions to paintings:
[a]n apparition assumes the shape and appearance of [a] man himself, clothes
himself in his likeness … as a painter clothes the cloth he paints on with figures,
postures, habits, garments, all in colours; while the passive person represented is
in no way affected with or concerned in the draught representing him (p. 132).
This leads Lewis to conclude that in apparition histories we see evidence of a commit-
ment simply to empirical description that sets ‘metaphysics on the run’. She explains:
In their emphasis on empirical verification … the apparitionists aimed to
impose new criteria of veracity on metaphysical phenomena—a gesture that in
itself tolled the death knell of such phenomena as a valid and authentic order
of experience.15
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A closer look at the second edition of Defoe’s work—The Secrets of the Invisible
World Disclosed—and Howitt’s The History of the Supernatural in All Ages and Nations,
however, complicates the picture. Defoe acknowledges that apparitions can be
conjured up by our imagination, but he further argues that this does not dismiss the
metaphysical implications of his enquiry. He argues:
… it does not follow from thence that there are therefore no such Things in
Nature; that there is no Intercourse or Communication between the World of
Spirits, and the World we live in … (p. 2).
There is an order of nature, constituted by the realm of God, the realm of the
living, the realm of the Devil, and the realm of the spirits. The boundaries
between these three realms are permeable. This turns out to be an important
premise for supporting the critical observation that God has appeared to us as a
voice (p. 9) and as a dove (p. 14); but also most importantly, as incarnated in
Christ (p. 11). If God has appeared to humanity in the past, then appearances
by those who herald from the realm of the spirits are also a worthy topic for
historical examination. Moreover, the appearance of spirits is documented in
the Bible, which Defoe classifies as an authentic and authoritative document
(p. 45), but at the same time, he makes it clear that he is not simply a cipher
or annotator of Biblical events. His own authority is built on the basis of
‘authentic’ written, visual and auditory evidence (see for example pp. 86; 90;
166), with the occasional qualification that he believes an account to be true
(pp. 101–2; 152; 167). Moreover, he judges that evidence in accordance with
his reasoned understanding of what makes sense, and that understanding—he
makes clear with a reference to Plato—is based upon the reality of things, not
their shadows (p. 320). In discussing Matthew 27:52, for example, he notes that
the bodies of saints resurrected after Christ’s ascension must have included their
souls because he has no sense of a bodily apparition that has no soul (p. 49; see
also pp. 198–9).
When Defoe shifts to the converse description of ignorance, he draws out
implications that are very like medieval warnings about what happens when mental
activities are unconstrained by reason. Ignorant people, he argues:
… [n]either know how or by what Rules to judge of such Things, or are
capable of right Conceptions about them; who do not give themselves time to
exercise that little Power of thinking that they are Masters of, and so are left to
the Darkness of their own Fancies, thinking everything they see is a Devil,
merely because they do not know what else to make of it … (p. 74).
This point is reiterated in a later discussion in which he notes that feelings of guilt
hinder reason to such an extent that the imagination is flooded with ‘sudden and
surprising’ delusions (p. 110; see also p. 111; 126; 390; 394). It is not simply that
delusions flood the mind of the weak. Defoe also wants us to appreciate that reason
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bestows an ability to judge the rules of phenomena, not just to describe their
appearance. This suggests that we not only judge on the basis of our experience:
the well-trained mind knows how the world hangs together. And this well-trained
mind is needed because God will not discern the right courses of action for us. If
God constantly sent apparitions warning us off courses of action, he notes, we
would have only weak powers of judgement and would be not much accountable
for our actions (p. 32). Moreover, he doubles back on the notion of appearances as
pictures, arguing that the depictions that we have created of the Devil are so varied
that he would have difficulty recognising himself (p. 364). A rational mind is
needed to discriminate between these appearances and to determine if the Devil
has ever crossed over into the realm of the living. On this argument, Defoe’s
detailed, descriptive language is not a new scientific end in itself—as Lewis holds—
but part of a sustained argument about looking beyond appearances to discern
universal forms.
The pictorial is the metaphysical and the moral. All of this suggests that Defoe
did not simply assemble The Secrets of the Invisible World Disclosed as an empirical
casebook in the service of the new science. Those who know Defoe’s writings well
sense that he is far too clever to have wrought a simple guidebook. What Defoe
shows us—in his own terminology—is that our world is neither empty of wonders
nor overwhelmed by them. Strength of reason and empirical sense making are
needed to get to grips with reality, and to explain it by recourse to rules that reflect
the invisible presence of God. The Secrets of the Invisible World Disclosed marks
therefore not the exit of metaphysics in an age of new science, but the co-opting
of belief in the value of extensive empirical observation to the service of meta-
physical sense making. Nor therefore does it mark the exit of wonder; it remains a
possibility given that God can appear.
The same expansionist co-opting of empirical observation to metaphysics is at
play in Howitt’s The History of the Supernatural in All Ages and Nations, but it is
expressed in the form of a sharp rebuke to scientists and philosophers for rejecting
the sense making claims of spiritualists who use their ‘spiritual eye’ (vol. 1, p. 7).
Whereas Defoe argued for the prevailing use of rationality, Howitt sees that as
the means by which humanity will experience its eclipse. He, like Defoe, holds
to the existence of both a physical, visible world, and of a spiritual, invisible
world (vol. 1, pp. ix; 227). But unlike Defoe, he views the loss of ability to dis-
cern the invisible world after the great flood of the Bible as a narrowing of sense
making activities (vol. 1, p. 229; see also vol. 2, p. 1). This contraction of abilities
produced a deadening of faith and the sacrilegious assumption that salvation
could be achieved through rational transaction and the rebuttal of wonder. For
Howitt, this approach—instantiated in the writings of Kant and to a lesser extent,
Hegel—is nothing more than slavery to Aristotelian logic (vol. 1, pp. viii; 115;
79–89; vol. 2, p. 87). Howitt’s history is a call to reverse the tide of thought, and
that reversal, he maintains, will best come about through the contemplation of a
detailed, empirical world history of appearances in all times and ages. This is
because, Howitt argues:
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There is God in history as well as in metaphysics. That deep and universal idea
in the human mind thus develops itself in perpetual majesty, and clothes the
abstract idea, the radical and innate faith of the race, as a body clothes the
spirit. (vol. 1, p. 81)
Moreover, we might harness the power of the imagination and the wonders it
generates to act on that knowledge in expressions of belief that include spiritualism
(vol. 2, p. 46). When we do so, we will have the ability again to know and to
understand human nature (vol. 1, p. 10). This is a duty that Howitt sees us needing
to embrace in order to arrest the downward trajectory of humanity caused by
shallowness of rational scientific and philosophical thought (vol. 1, p. 14).
Salvation is also at stake in Sarah Hale’s Women’s Record; or Sketches of all Dis-
tinguished Women, from “The Beginning” till AD 1850 (first edition 1853), but as we
shall see, that salvation results from a gendered notion of intuition. Like many
other pre-twentieth century women historians, Hale’s work has received scant
historiographical attention. She is known predominantly for being the editor of
Godey’s Lady’s Book from 1837–77 and as a champion for the education of girls.
Women’s Record is a 900-page world history compiled from the biographies of over
1650 women, including Hale herself. Whilst a cursory appraisal might locate the
text in the tradition of ‘women’s worthies’—texts that provide moral instruction
via the aggregation of the biographies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women—the preface
reveals a far more radical agenda. No previous women’s world history, to her
view, had provided a ‘true idea of woman’s nature and mission’ (Women’s Record,
p. vii). Hale is happy to oblige, starting with the premise that the history of the
world is a Christian narrative. This is a standard nineteenth century narrative
assumption, but she extends it in an unusual direction. Women, she insists,
are God’s agents of morality, and this leads her to conclude that world history is
the story of the progressive realisation of women into that appointed role
(Women’s Record, p. xxxv).
This is a conclusion that Hale arrives at on the basis of theology. Genesis, she
argues, narrates the fall of man, not woman. Woman was created second to man,
and that provided God with the chance to exercise greater care in creation and
thus to wrought a finer mold (p. xxxvi). This positions woman not only as com-
plementary to man, but also as superior:
Woman was the crown of all,— the last, and must therefore have been the best
in those qualities which raise human nature above animal life; the link which
pressed nearest towards the angelic, and drew its chief beauty and strength
from the invisible world. (Women’s Record, p. xxxvi)
Woman was not made to serve man, as Paul had assumed, but to refine and to
elevate his sensibilities and moral skills (Women’s Record, p. xxxvii). That superiority
is seen in women’s intuitive knowledge of God’s work, which puts them in closer
proximity to the angelic than men (Women’s Record, p. xxxix). Men, by contrast,
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are driven by thinly veiled animal propensities, which are expressed in physical
feats, lust, violence, patriotism and idolatry (Women’s Record, pp. xxxv–xxxvi).
The difference is an organic one of mind, which Hale explains on multiple
occasions. The first critical difference revisits the theme of the universal and par-
ticular at work in this book, but in a gendered, embodied fashion. In Hale’s view,
men inhabit and master the world of matter, whereas women inhabit and master
the world of the spirit. Hale is in no doubt that the latter is the superior power of
mind, because it draws us closer to God. This is explained in a passage that is
worth quoting at length:
That she reasons intuitively, or by inspiration, while he must plod through a
regular sequence of logical arguments, is admitted by all writers on mental
philosophy; but there is another difference which has not been noticed.
Woman never applies her intuitive reasoning to mechanical pursuits. It is the
world of life, not of things, which she inhabits. Man models the world of
matter. These manifestations are precisely such as would result from the dif-
ferences in the nature of the two sexes, as I have described them in Adam and
Eve. And also, we here find the perfect solution of the assertion of St. Paul,
that man ‘is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the
man.’— An image is something visible; the glory of God which men see, is in
the things He has created; consequently, to create is to show forth, or be the
‘glory of God.’ Man is the maker or creator on earth… He, therefore, represents
on earth the Creator’s glory.
But to create is not man’s greatest glory; it is to worship God in spirit and in
truth. The manifestation of this worship is moral goodness. Woman cannot
create or make, like man; but, better than he, she worships God in spirit and
in truth; and thus, showing forth the beauty of moral goodness, becomes ‘the
glory of the man.’(Women’s Record, p. xlvi)
At the same time, though, Hale concedes that if women are to redeem men, they
will have to explain the spiritual in material terms. This problem is solved if
women are trained like men:
Woman has a quicker capacity for comprehending moral truth or sentiment
than man, but she cannot explain this truth, nor expose error to his compre-
hension, unless her intellect has been, in some measure, trained like his. Men
have little sympathy with intuitive knowledge, or feeling;— ‘pure Reason’—
in the doctrine of Kant: hence they must have the truth set before them in its
relations with ‘practical Reason.’ The mother who can in this intelligible
manner aid the mind of her son in his pursuit of knowledge, will have over
him a double control; he will honour as well as love her. And the pious
woman who can give, clearly and wisely, a ‘reason for her hope,’ will often
silence the proud infidel who scoffs at believing what is only felt to be true.
(Women’s Record, p. xlvii).
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Here we see intimated the double superiority of women: they possess spiritual
intuition but they can also be trained to exercise material intellect. This is a clever
co-opting of the argument that women and men are distinct, but that women can
also think like men. But it also provides something of a response to Ranke’s posi-
tioning of the move from the particular to the universal as easier than the universal
to the particular. Ranke experiences that asymmetry as a man; Hale contends that
the ‘leap’ from the universal to the particular is natural to women, and that they
can be taught to leap the other way around.
Hale sees her provision of a detailed, empirical history of the spirit as proving
exactly this point. It is against the animal instincts of man that women enact their
intuition and moral strengths, and the record of history suggests the progressive
victory of women in doing so. That victory takes place both through incremental
changes and large events in four ages: from the creation to the birth of Christ; from
1 CE to 1500 CE; from 1500 CE to 1800 CE; from 1800 CE to Hale’s times.
Within that narrative there are two critical turning points after Adam’s fall. The
first comes with her assertion that as Christ ‘inherited his human nature entirely
from his mother (Women’s Record, p. 65), he was feminine:
[Christ’s] human soul, derived from a woman, trained by a woman, was most
truly womanly in its characteristics. Examine the doctrines he taught, the duties
and virtues he enforced, the examples he set—where, in any of these, are the
distinctive traits men vaunt as proofs of masculine greatness? Physical strength,
earthly honours, riches, worldly wisdom, even the gifts of intellect and the
pride of learning, our Saviour put all these down far, far beneath meekness,
mercy, purity, patience, charity, humility; qualities and graces always con-
sidered peculiarly feminine… (Women’s Record, p. 129)
This example may suggest that men can be trained to think like women, but as it is
Jesus, the exceptional nature of the case suggests that this is unlikely. The second
comes in the United States with the individual liberty protected in constitutional
laws. This accelerates the ability of women to shape the character of men in moral
ways, and delivers results that are evident to all: ‘[t]he result is before the world,—a
miracle of national advancement. American mothers train their sons to be Men!’
(Women’s Record, p. 564).
Hale’s belief in women is unfailing, leading her to question the portraits of
women like Cleopatra, Delilah, Xantippe, Zenobia and even Agrippina—the
mother of Nero—as bad. Her approach is to contextualise, noting that their views
and deeds paled in comparison to the actions of their fathers, sons and male con-
temporaries. They were of their time, but their underlying nature as women made
them less prone to extreme behaviour (Women’s Record, pp. 21–2; 32; 63;150). In
short, history proves that women are needed to make general sense of things. The
gendering of metaphysics is a theme I will return to in chapter eight, but for the
moment I simply want to observe that the combination of metaphysics and history
does not necessarily lead to the celebration of the achievements of white men.
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Thinking history as wonder for the first time
Hale, Howitt, Defoe and Ranke all present history as a means for testing whether
we are making the best use of our powers of mind to make sense of the world,
which for them has the purpose of appreciating God. Moreover, for all but Defoe,
that activity of sense making is identified with intuition, a mental power that
appears to leap the gap between the material and the spiritual worlds that they
assume to exist. Successful application of intuition accords with the achievement of
progress both on an individual and on a world historical level. Retraction from
intuition, Howitt warns us, sets the world into a degenerative spiral.
Were it not for their interest in intuition and the supernatural, they probably
would have already featured in histories of history. That historiography commonly
stresses the important contributions of Kant and Hegel in calling upon philoso-
phical reasoning to outline progressive world histories. Yet as we shall see, both
offer more expansive notions of reasoning than we might first credit.
Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784, hereafter Idea for
a Universal History) is very different to the histories discussed in the previous section.
That difference is evident most in the length of Kant’s work: around ten pages
versus the 300–900 pages of the other works reviewed. That length is a function of
Kant’s determination not to intuit the universal in a mass aggregation of historical
particulars, but to set forth nine logical propositions which explain all of the details
in those other works. The universal proceeds to the particular, not the other way
around. In this way, it is the inverse of the example-based approach to explanation
of historical principles we saw in Polybius’ Histories in Chapter One. Aristotle is
acknowledged as the primary inspiration for this approach, with Kant making it
clear in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that ‘our primary purpose is the same as
his [Aristotle’s], although widely diverging from it in manner of execution’ (A80/
B105).16 Kant agreed with Aristotle’s aim in writing the Categories—which we
encountered in the previous chapter—to describe the kinds of being that cannot
be further reduced. But he also thought Aristotle’s method of arriving at them to
be largely an accident of his empirical observations (Critique of Pure Reason, here-
after CPR, A81/B107). No doubt, he could have levelled the same criticism
against Polybius, or many of the historians that feature in this book. Kant’s
‘copernican revolution’ in philosophy (CPR, Bxvi–xviii), and in history, was to
insist that categories might be logically derived from a systematic analysis of the
forms of human judgement that structure our understanding of the sensible world.
On this view, the categories are a priori: justification for them is not dependent on
empirical observation or experience, but they explain how we make sense of
empirical observations.
Human reason gives shape to all of our experiences of the world, including the
writing of history, and experiences over historical time. Kant’s first and second
propositions in Idea for a Universal History suggest that it is natural for all organisms
to develop, and that human beings are distinctive not only because they develop
rational capabilities, but also because the development of that rationality plays out
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at species rather than at individual level. This means that if we are to understand
the ongoing development of rationality, we will need to think about history, and
not just about things like psychological observations (Idea for a Universal History,
p. 11). Quite distinctively, too, Kant proposes that the engine of the development
of rationality is the antagonism or ‘unsocial sociability’ of human beings (Idea for a
Universal History, p. 13). In simple terms, this is the adage of not being able to live
or live without others. We have a propensity to want to live in community, but
we also want to assert our independence and superiority over others. This drives a
competitiveness of mind that results in the innovations that gradually improve all of
our lives.
As to the nature of this unsocial sociability, and therefore on how it contributes
to our structuring of the sensible world, we have to look beyond Idea for a Universal
History to works such as Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his
account of the predispositions to humanity, Kant makes it clear that unsociability
requires reason, but that the comparing of self love at its heart generates a predis-
position towards the vices of jealousy, envy, hostility and superiority (Religion
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 1.2). This may suggest that unsocial sociability
is a form of akrasia, which in chapter two we learned about as the idea of weakness
of will. In simple terms this means that when we are selfish or adopt a stance of
superiority towards others, we act against our own better judgement. We know we
can act selflessly or with kindness towards others, but we do not. This way of
thinking about weakness of will suggests its potential connection with moral
choice, which Kant picks up on in his third predisposition in Religion Within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason. Weakness of will is weakness of moral will because it
leads to harm towards others. The paradox of this account of weakness of will is
that short-term exercise of the vices can lead to innovations which improve the
overall wellbeing of humans. Individual bad can lead to community good.
Kant is unclear about how we are to assess the moral wrong and the moral
good of individual actions that lead to good outcomes in the long run. Nor is it
clear from his account whether we know these longer term outcomes will come;
it took Hegel to present our lack of awareness of these outcomes in his phrase
‘the cunning of reason’. Kant’s key emphasis is on the way that the application of
rational choice shapes our experience of the world. That he connects rational
choice with the exercise of the vices suggests, however, a broader aetiology of
‘reason’ than we might assume. That is confirmed in accounts of ideas such as the
‘noble sublime’ in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764).
On Kant’s account, the spontaneous experience of pleasure, or pain—or as he
suggests in later works, sense of admiration or respect—we get when we con-
template phenomena such as a massive mountain range, the Egyptian pyramids or
poetry or art is accompanied by ‘quiet wonder’ (Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and the Sublime, 2:209; 48; Critique of Pure Judgement, 1790, 5:245). That
‘quiet wonder’, we learn in the Critique of Pure Judgement, is a sense of astonish-
ment or mental shock that arises when we experience a phenomenon that runs
against our expectations (5: 272).
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The reconciliation of Kant’s ideas across the full range of his writings should not
be assumed. What we can note, though, is an openness to the idea that our
understanding of the world is shaped by more than the rational choice of the best
course of action. His explanation of our mental world sees the potential of good
arising from vice-driven actions over the long term, and of moral contemplation
being accentuated by wonder at phenomena that do not fit with our notions of
how the world is or how it might be. In so arguing, he makes a case for the
writing of history, and for wonder in the writing of history.
What Kant does not offer us, though, is an account of how the mind comes to
be able to operate in these ways. That task, it is well known, became one of the
key contributions of Hegel.
Hegel’s Philosophy of History sets out the story of the realisation of Spirit. In a
manner akin to Kant, Hegel argues that Spirit is universal and that it cannot be
detected in an investigation of the actions of particular individuals. Rather, the
rationality in individuals contributes to the development of Spirit over time and
cannot necessarily be seen by them. This suggestion that the realisation of Spirit is
not apprehended by individuals, we recall from above, is described in the phrase ‘the
cunning of reason’. But Hegel also takes it a step further than Kant, arguing that the
development of rationality in individuals contributes to the development of Spirit. This
stems from his insistence in seeing the Spirit as immanent, which of course includes
people. And as the immanent develops, Spirit develops. This fundamental point in
Hegel’s philosophy is expressed well in this passage from the Philosophy of Mind:
Spirit was treated as a thing; [its] categories were regarded, in the general
manner of the abstractive intellect, as inert, fixed; as such they are incapable of
expressing the nature of Spirit. Spirit is not an inert being but, on the contrary,
absolutely restless being, pure activity … not an essence that is already finished
and complete before its manifestation, keeping itself aloof behind its host of
appearances, but an essence which is truly actual only through the specific
forms of its necessary self-manifestation [and] … inwardly bound to [the body]
…. The entire development of mind else but the raising of itself to truth, and
the so called psychic forces have no other meaning than to be the stages of this
ascent (Philosophy of Mind, §378; §397).
This double story of freedom unfolding through history, and the historical
unfolding of thought as philosophy stands as the reason for Heidegger’s appraisal—
noted in the introduction of this chapter—of Hegel as thinking the philosophy of
the Greeks for the first time. By this he explains that ‘[t]o this day there has been
no experience of history that, seen philosophically, could respond to this history’.17
And this thinking, Heidegger notes repeatedly throughout his writings, pays heed
to Aristotle’s invitation for us to see philosophy as beginning with wonder. It is not
simply that Hegel saw Spirit as being realised both in history and in the individuals
that are a part of history. He also saw individuals and histories retaining the vestiges
of what comes before the present. The idea of history is needed for us to see this,
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and as we recall from the introduction, Hegel perhaps overextended in his argu-
ment that only history can capture this. We cannot make sense of our own and the
world’s development in advance; we can only make sense of them by looking to
history. As he writes in Lectures on the Philosophy of World History:
Thought is of a universal and of a collective nature, so that it cannot die, but
always retains its identity. Each determinate form which the spirit assumes does
not simply fade away naturally with the passage of time, but is preserved in the
self-determining, self-conscious activity of the self-consciousness. Since this
preservation is an activity of thought, it is both a conservation and a transfig-
uration. Thus while the spirit on the one hand preserves the reality and the
continuity of its own nature, it is at the same time enriched by the essence, the
thought, the universal aspect of what was formerly its mere existence. (Lectures
on the Philosophy of World History, p. 61)
The logical consequence of this view for Hegel—and thus Heidegger—is that if
philosophy begins with wonder, then wonder must still be present in our mental
operations and metaphysical sense making today.
This is not obvious from a consideration of the work that is best known to his-
torians, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. In that work we see individual
and disciplinary development in the manifestation of three successive forms of his-
torical thought and action, which he labels original, critical, and philosophical.
According to Hegel, original historians ‘primarily [describe] the actions, events, and
conditions which they [have] before their own eyes and whose spirit they [share]’
(Philosophy of History, pp. 1–3). This view of history does not hold because histor-
ians realise that their own views and those of the people they write about may not
be in agreement. Moreover, the use of forms of evidence in addition to eyewitness
accounts does not restrict history to the description of contemporary events.
In critical history, which succeeds original history, surveys of a people, a country
or even the known world are offered. This represents an advance on the restriction
of original history to contemporary witness accounts of phenomena but they
struggle to provide a rationale for the restriction of their works or to accommodate
views of the world that differ from their explanations. Philosophical historians
acknowledge that different historical ideas and events are all part of the one reality
that is Spirit, that those ideas differ over time, and that they need to contemplate
their own activities of mind in laying out that history. In this way, Hegel signals
that history is philosophy, and philosophy history, and that bringing the two
together promises the reward of self-knowledge of ourselves as in a state of
becoming free individuals in local and global communities.
To see wonder, we have to acknowledge Hegel’s work as a whole, including
part three of The Philosophy of Mind, which Sallis treats as something of an empirical
ancillary to the main metaphysical game. It is not, as recognised not only by Hei-
degger, but also by his contemporary, R.G. Collingwood. Collingwood argued in
works such as Speculum Mentis (1924) that in order to explain historical thought,
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you also needed to explain artistic thought.18 This is because the vestiges of artistic
thought are a part of historical thought. In our world grown old, wonder is not left
behind; it remains as part of a more and more complex and nuanced operation of
mind that is needed to catch intimations of the Spirit.
Philosophy as history
For Hegel, it was never a case of either rationality orwonder. Both, in unity, are needed
to apprehend the universal in the immanent. So too, we see the same comingling of the
rational, wonder, intuition and the ‘spiritual eye’ of eighteenth and nineteenth century
historians such as Ranke, Defoe, Howitt, and Hale. None present the case for that
comingling in as sophisticated a manner as Hegel, but their attempts probably still made
sense to their readers. And the combined force of their cases needed to be made in
order for the diversity of a growing world of readers to appreciate the enduring value of
history in revealing the universal. Men, women and children all read history,19 and
history made sense to them in multiple, non-collapsible ways: in the revelation of
Spirit/Mind (e.g. Hegel), the unfolding of the good (e.g. Kant), proof of multiple,
permeable realms (e.g. Defoe), in expressing a case for a return to an old way of ‘seeing’
(e.g. Howitt) or the revelation of women as the world’s future (e.g. Hale).
Yet as we shall see from the last chapter in this book—which focuses on Hei-
degger and Hannah Arendt—those cases might not have been made persuasively
enough to generate awareness of the power of metaphysics and wonder in twen-
tieth-century historiography and philosophy. Somehow wonder was assumed to
have been lost in the transposition to rational scientific and philosophical thought at
the birth of the twentieth century, and it, like metaphysics, seemed to fall away. This
sets the stage for Heidegger’s argument for the protection of the discipline of history
from a banal death via a return to metaphysics and to wonder. In the chapters that
follow, it will be for us to judge whether the stakes have been that high.
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SEEING THE WONDER TRICK IN
HISTORIES OF THE MOVING IMAGE
Lynne Kirby | Tom Gunning | Walter Benjamin |
Roland Barthes | Jonathan Crary |
Mary Anne Doane |
A train rushes towards you. Do you dodge in fear? Or do you dodge in knowing,
performing an act of fear because that is what people do when they watch the film
The Arrival of a Train at Le Ciotat Station (1895)? Whether the first film audiences
were astonished or in on the act with what they saw is one of the core questions
posed in film histories. That we do not have a definitive answer to this question is
partly a reflection of the sheer technical difficulty of writing film viewers into his-
tory. Watching a film does not tell you how people might have looked at it in the
past: other sources such as diaries, media reports, scrap books, photo albums and
even cinema blueprints can help us to build up some sense of that. But it also turns
out that the metaphysical assumptions that researchers draw upon to explain film
and film audiences can make a big difference to their judgements of viewer
knowing or credulity, and therefore to their appraisal of whether film was an act
of, as film historian Tom Gunning puts it, ‘I know, but yet I see’ in an age when
the marvellous purportedly waned.
Welcome to what some commentators would see as the sideshow of this book.
Research on the history of film, and on historical films, has burgeoned over the last
40 years. Yet it still seems like early days in understanding how film might con-
tribute to the history of history. This is because film is sometimes seen as prioritis-
ing entertainment over an understanding of our world and its past, or even
contributing to the creation of a world in which nothing is real and everything is a
show.1 In an endeavour to take film seriously, Hayden White coined the term
‘historiophoty’—as distinct from historiography—in order to denote the ‘repre-
sentation of history and our thought about it in visual images and in filmic dis-
course’.2 I argued a while back that I do not find this distinction between the two
‘historios’ helpful, not least because it may contribute to the sense that written
history is the default approach to articulating the idea of history, and that other
forms of historical expression are ancillary or secondary.3 This chapter sees my view
unchanged, but for different reasons. My reasoning in this case reflects my scepti-
cism about historiophoty as a ‘most general’ kind of thing. Moreover, in thinking
about the study of film as distinctive from written texts, I believe we might have
overlooked a question shared by all forms of historical sense making.
What if the literal ways in which historians make general sense of things change?
Here we contemplate the idea that historians might see and hear differently over
time. The implications of granting this idea, as we shall see in this chapter, are
important in considering the role of history in, say, discerning the immanent. A
change in perception may improve our discernment of the immanent, or it may
make that discernment impossible. Moreover, any change in the nature of percep-
tion might have a knock-on effect with wonder, and position it as an aid or an
inhibitor in making general sense of things. This chapter charts the rise of scepticism
about perception as a universal in written and filmic histories, and tests whether there
was a knock-on effect to wonder. The mixed answer that I find—perception chan-
ged, but wonder didn’t—leads to a new way of thinking about the historicization of
metaphysics ushered in by Hegel, where the speed of change for immanent uni-
versals may vary.
Making sense of film, making sense of sight
We recall from chapter five Aristotle’s provision of what he saw as a systematic
categorisation of the most general, distinct kinds of things in Categories and in
Metaphysics. In general, these are taken to be categories that describe the actual
structure of the world, rather than grammatical or conceptual categories.4 His
categories are therefore a manifest of what is. A comparison of his list of categories
with those of later writers suggest that articulating such a manifest might be diffi-
cult, and even impossible. A double test for categories is suggested in the use of the
words ‘most general’, and ‘distinct’. Various philosophers have suggested that the
most general and distinct kinds of things are mutually exclusive, with their defini-
tions and methods of what that means varying.5 These approaches have not pro-
duced altogether reassuring results, and that has led other philosophers to take a
different tack in suggesting that categories could be thought of as differences in lin-
guistic structures rather than an expression of commitment about the way that the
world really is. This means that even if we do believe that a list of categories describing
the world has been articulated, we can still, as Daniel Nolan suggests, recognise the
value of questioning the concepts and relations and distinctions between concepts.6
Thinking about categories in these ways makes it difficult to justify the treatment of
historiophoty as distinctive from historiography. They share at least some of the same
technical vocabulary, methods and approaches to the presentation of research results.
More significantly, researchers of written and filmic histories share the same propensity
to make general sense of things, whether that is via thinking about their results as real,
or assuming the existence of boundaries between, for example, what is and is not
knowable. It was for similar reasons that I argued in chapter one that it is not possible
to draw a solid boundary between history and literature.
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Yet film histories may bring assumptions to the forefront that are relatively taken
for granted in the analysis of texts. Film is a visual medium, and it invites us to give
more attention to the nature of sight. Moreover, significantly, it challenges us to
consider whether sensory perception has been stable over time. I need to be clear at
the outset that film historians are not alone in this thinking. The last decades of the
twentieth century saw a wave of publications on the historical experience of the
senses. Typically, they took the form of histories of single senses. John E. Crowley’s
The Invention of Comfort (2001), for example, looks at how people thought about and
experienced light and dark in early modern Britain and early North America; Alain
Corbin’s The Foul and the Fragrant (1986) provides a vivid account of senses of smell,
and smells, in eighteenth and nineteenth century France; Constance Classon’s The
Deepest Sense (2012) offers a western history of touch; and Ana María Ochoa Gautier
has tracked in Aurality (2014) changing patterns of sound consumption in nine-
teenth-century Colombia.7 A smaller number of works provide more ambitious
accounts of entangled senses, or multi-sensory histories, as with Alex Holcombe,
Matej Hochel and Emilio Mílan’s short history of synaethesia (2008), Robert Jütte’s
A History of the Senses (2004) and David Howes’ Ways of Sensing (2013).8 Yet film
history has not just argued for the recognition of these sensory shifts, it has also noted
the implications of them for the general attempt to make sense of things.
If seeing changes, our ability to discern the immanent may change. Our dis-
cernment may improve, or take a backward step, or it may become impossible.
Consequently, the role of wonder may change too. It may aid the discernment of
the immanent, as Aristotle claimed, or it may block it. All of the thinkers canvassed
in this chapter— Lynne Kirby (1952–), Tom Gunning (1949–), Jonathan Crary
(1951–), Mary Ann Doane (1952–), Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) and Roland
Barthes (1915–1980)—argue that modernity ushered in seismic shifts in seeing and
knowing. At first glance, though, their opinions vary on whether there was a
knock-on change in wonder. In the case of Benjamin and Barthes, as we shall see,
it helps us to restore the real senses of depth perception—which relate to space,
time and the emotions—that they believed were extinguished or at least dimin-
ished with the onset of the modern. In the case of Crary and Doane, it abets
attention, which they characterise as a mental function that protects—and thereby
keeps—us from the raw experience of stimuli that might provoke an exploration of
the truths of the modern, capitalist world. For Doane it is simply a device for
making sense, but for Crary it serves the more sinister function of rendering us as
individual, manipulable consumers. At closer inspection, though, we see wonder as
stably presented across these four authors’ writings as being metaphysically impor-
tant, as an aid or a barrier to discernment and therefore as on the cusp of the par-
ticular and the general. Moreover, wonder is metaphysically conservative: it helps
or hinders us in seeing the world as it was, prior to modernity. Seeing might have
changed, but the long held idea of wonder as a threshold to making general sense
of things did not.
What we arrive at with the suggestion that seeing changed but that wonder did
not is an intimation of a different way of thinking about the historicisation of
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metaphysics. Hegel, we recall from the last chapter, saw immanent universals as
realising over time, as our minds realise over time. What went without saying in
his account is whether the pace of realisation is constant. It may not be. We
therefore close this chapter by noting that while the role of history in discerning
universals persists, those universals may come to be understood differently over
time, and the pace at which that understanding takes place may also vary across
universals and across time. It may be that our understanding of some basic ways of
thinking about the world improves or regresses, or the reality of that world may
change. Our chapter rounds out with the radical historicisation of metaphysics by
Rorty, Collingwood, Wittgenstein and Braudel, who argued in different ways that
our general sense making moves in the manner of a river or a wave.
Seeing double
We begin our analysis with what appears to be a simple example from film history.
In 1896, the writer Maxim Gorky documented his first experience of watching
some Lumière films, with one of them very likely being The Arrival of a Train at Le
Ciotat Station. One paragraph of that account provides us with some sense of Gorky
being shocked—and perhaps even frightened—by what he saw:
Suddenly something clicks, everything vanishes and a train appears on the
screen. It speeds straight at you—watch out! It seems as though it will plunge
into the darkness in which you sit, turning you into a ripped sack full of
lacerated flesh and splintered bones, and crushing into dust and into broken
fragments this hall and this building, so full of women, wine, music and vice.
But that paragraph is part of a longer text in which it appears clear that Gorky did
not labour under the illusion that what he saw was real. Here is the paragraph
again, with other parts of that larger body of text, highlighted by my use of italics:
Last night I was in the Kingdom of the Shadows.
If only you knew how strange it is to be there. It is a world without sound,
without colour. Everything there… is dipped in monotonous grey .…
Suddenly something clicks, everything vanishes and a train appears on the
screen. It speeds straight at you—watch out! It seems as though it will plunge
into the darkness in which you sit, turning you into a ripped sack full of
lacerated flesh and splintered bones, and crushing into dust and into broken
fragments this hall and this building, so full of women, wine, music and vice.
But this, too, is a train of shadows.9
This example shows that very little additional information is needed to render an
historical source complex. Gorky opens by acknowledging that his experience is
with a ‘kingdom of shadows’ that is strange. That strangeness arises from rendering
the everyday world—the familiar—without sound and colour. This might be read
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as a precondition for wonder in the Aristotelian sense. Yet his use of the word
shadows may also indicate a judgement of us being in Plato’s cave, so to speak, and
therefore that our encounter with film is not with ‘this hall, this building’, or
universals, or the real. His ‘watch out!’ might therefore have been a knowing
expression: I know that the film is not real, but I might call out ‘watch out!’ to go
along with the performance.
On balance, Gorky’s account of his experience suggests that he did not experi-
ence wonder, and therefore that we should consider it as an example of Gunning’s
‘I know, but yet I see’. Put more simply, Gorky is assumed to be a sophisticated,
rational viewer. But we have to stop at this point, and remind ourselves that Gorky
did not write his account as he watched the film. He wrote it afterwards. The gap
between the two might have been a matter of hours or days, but that gap is large
enough for the possibility of any transitory experience of wonder being explained
by rational thought, or being checked, constrained or constructed by the verbal
and non-verbal responses of others. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that
Gorky took into that screening his prior experiences of visual images, and of other
forms of entertainment. In short, Gorky does not provide us with an isolated ‘of
the moment’ account of his experience that would allow us to judge whether he
was astonished or not.
There is at least a double reading of Gorky’s experience. The first puts his film
viewing into the context of anterior, contemporary, and successor experiences. The
second, which is implied in the idea of ‘going along with the performance’, sug-
gests that Gorky’s physical response to the film might have been shared with others
as a cultural experience. Both readings historicise. The first historicises ‘Gorky’, and
might suggest at its most radical interpretation that there is no stable sense of self
that should be denoted with his proper name. The second historicises perception,
and it can also imply the historicisation of Gorky. It suggests that the act of making
sense might belong to a particular place and time. Put crudely, the way that the
first film audiences displayed wonder, or awe, may differ from the ways that we
might display wonder and awe. And their displays might have been deliberative,
and shared. I did that simply by saying that Gorky ‘went along with the perfor-
mance’. Just like that, and perhaps without realising it, I raised a question about
whether there is a stable notion of ‘making sense’ that may help us to contemplate
universals. I questioned the idea of a stable, universal approach to making general
sense of things.
Seeing the trick: shocked, or in on the act in film histories?
The same question seems to be at play in histories of the moving image from the
last half century. Early histories of film appear to have assumed that viewers were
genuinely shocked and awed by what they saw.10 With the appearance of the
writings of Tom Gunning, however, that assumption came to be slowly unravelled
via a close reading of a wide range of cinematic and pre-cinematic evidence.
Gunning noted, quite rightly, that the first film viewers took their experiences of
124 The wonder trick of moving images
other attractions to screenings. And those experiences, he notes, refracted the rise
of the modern and the apparent loss of the marvellous that followed as a con-
sequence of a far-reaching change in the way that people saw the world.
Today, Tom Gunning’s name is synonymous with the history of early cinema,
yet he generously acknowledges the inspiration of other writers like Lynne Kirby.
At the same time, he repeatedly makes the case for seeing film viewers in a differ-
ent way to Kirby. This is a reasonable assessment, given that Kirby and Gunning
draw upon two very different pre-cinematic precedents to support their claims
about viewer experiences: the railroad, and visual attractions respectively. Yet I
hold that they have more in common than might be first thought, and as we shall
see, that commonality is the assumption that perception was a cultural construct,
and as so subject to historical change.
Cinema emerged at a time of rapid rail expansion. We should therefore not be
surprised, Kirby argues in her 1988 Camera Obscura article ‘Male Hysteria and Early
Cinema’, that trains featured in so many early films. Indeed, legend has it that
Albert E. Smith, one of the founders of Vitagraph, solved the problem of film
flicker by considering how the rapid procession of telegraph poles he saw as a rail
passenger might be transposed into film cell frames.11 But the conjoining of film
and rail, Kirby further argues, was on an experiential, as well as a technological
level. She has in mind the changes in time management that the railways ushered
in, such as the standardisation of time zones. Moreover, railway travel also sped up
experiences of travelling, leading to a different view of landscapes to that seen by
foot or by horse. People looked at the world differently, and that different way of
seeing was, to Kirby’s mind, seamlessly transposed to the cinema because early
production was dominated by travel and scenic films (Parallel Tracks, pp. 7, 19, 44–5).
The acceleration of time and panoramic—wide and shallow—views of landscape
made possible by the railways implied sensory overload, which Kirby frames as an
‘experience of shock’ (Parallel Tracks, p. 7). As railway provision expanded, there
was an increase in accidents. These accidents not only injured people physically—
‘railway spine’, for example, described accident-induced spinal damage—but also
psychologically. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the condition of
‘railway brain’ emerged, and its application as a diagnosis soon spread to those who
were traumatised but otherwise physically uninjured in an accident. George Drinka
even notes that hysteria could be generated by simply being in proximity to a
train.12 Here, Kirby and Drinka gesture towards Freud, whose essay ‘The Infantile
Sexuality’ describes the railway phobia obsession of boys and men.13
What intrigues Kirby most about these cases is that they signalled the shift away
from the assumption that hysteria afflicted women because they had a more deli-
cate nervous system than men. Moreover, it was also assumed that the stimulus for
this hysteria could be proximity to a fairground or a cinematic train, as well as to a
real one. Yet exposure to these stimuli was also seen as providing the opportunity
for individuals to build up some form of resilience. Fairground attractions such as
simulated train rides and staged train collisions turned shock into—as Kirby puts
it—‘a programmed unit of mass consumption’ (p. 121), and Freud assumed that
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repeated exposure to these units of consumption could help individuals to build up
a ‘stimulus shield’ against the collapse of time and space experienced as a con-
sequence of accelerating mechanisation and urbanisation. The result was ‘[a]n
unstable western subject, embodied concretely in passengers and spectators … one
anticipating, yet immune, to shock’ (Parallel Tracks, p. 7). But Kirby also holds that
the same cultural shift also displaced some men from jobs, and that had a psycho-
cultural knock on effect. As she explains:
… nineteenth-century mechanisation and urbanisation—railway assisted—
made of its traumatized victims something like female hysterics. In other
words, it emasculated men, even if only, for some, those of a certain class.
Women, proletarian men, and the marginal thus bore the brunt of the shocks
of modernity. The ‘emasculated’ male, the male hysteric, might then be seen
as the boomerang of male, technological culture against itself, a vision of the
railroad neurotic as a man reduced to a female, or non-male state, like the
proverbial woman tied to the tracks and assaulted or traumatized by the train.
The paradox: investment, or, overinvestment in the male ‘culture of time and
space’ was emasculating. (p. 7)
Viewer responses to The Arrival of a Train at Le Ciotat Station (1896) are therefore
not necessarily just physiological, and they are not necessarily knowing. A wealthy
male viewer might have viewed films in a knowing fashion, safe from the possibi-
lity of mental instability. For the working-class man, on the other hand, watching
Arrival of a Train at Le Ciotat Station brought with it the risk of hysteria and there-
fore of being emasculated. He was suggestible, vulnerable, and hypnotizable (Par-
allel Tracks, p. 8). The threat of that emasculanisation could be known, Kirby
further argues, because films such as The Photographer’s Mishap (1901) and Asleep at
the Switch (1910) co-opted it as their topic. Visual culture played back emotional
culture, and there was therefore no guarantee that the working-class, male viewer
would be able to resist it. That threat, Kirby concludes, could only be corrected
with the rise of narrative films after 1909, when men were shown in relation to
women and qualities of ‘proper’ masculinity and femininity asserted (Parallel Tracks,
pp. 117–31). Those narratives set hysteria back into association with women.
Gunning’s film viewers appear to be very different to those of Kirby. Indeed he
argues for such an appraisal, albeit in the footnotes of his 1989 paper for Art and
Text, ‘An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator’.
At base, he agrees with Kirby that cinema prior to the end of the first decade of the
twentieth century was not dominated by narrative. Rather, this was the time of the
‘cinema of attractions’, when the exhibitionist presentation of the ‘magical’ prop-
erties of film technologies in actuality and visual illusion films dominated (‘The
Cinema of Attraction: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde’, Wide Angle,
1986). If you look at the films of the Lumière brothers and Georges Méliès, you
can see Gunning’s point. The Lumière brothers mounted a camera in close proxi-
mity to an oncoming train, and Méliès The Black Imp (1905)—which runs to just
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under four minutes—uses around 60 stop-motion cuts to suggest the appearance
and disappearance of an imp to a traveller. This is clever camera and post-production
editing work, and Gunning believes that film audiences knew that.
His grounds for arguing for the knowing viewer—as distinct from the poten-
tially hysterical viewer in Kirby’s analysis—comes from his argument that we
need to pay attention to pre-cinematic precedents, and that we have to identify
the right precedents. Railway fairground attractions were a precedent for railway
films, as Kirby notes. But there is a wider range of precedents to be considered,
Gunning argues, if we remember that the form of the earliest films is just as
important as their contents. This is not to suggest that narrative is absent from the
first films, but Gunning’s point is that film technologies themselves were at the
forefront of the first screenings. That is, people went to see films as much to
admire the equipment used to project them, and the forms of editing used to
structure them, as to see the images shown. If we think about film as a fore-
grounded technological bag of tricks, then other pre-cinematic precedents come
into view, such as magic or illusion shows, vaudeville, and fairground attractions.
Indeed, as Gunning notes, film was often itself a fair ground or variety show
attraction, with tours of the screening apparatus or the enclosure of a film within
an amusement ride both being possibilities.
Bringing this range of pre-cinematic precedents into view, Gunning asserts,
makes it difficult to sustain any systemic notion of the first film audiences being
stupefied, terrified, or credulous about the reality of what they saw. Rather, Gun-
ning characterises them as ‘sophisticated urban pleasure seekers’, who kept abreast
of trends in stagecraft. In short, they were in on the act and they performed
wonder and awe in a knowing way because that is what people did when they
went to the movies. Seen in that way, we begin to apprehend the logic of Gun-
ning’s claims about the appeal of Méliès work, which are captured in this extract:
Méliès’s theatre is inconceivable without a widespread decline in belief in the
marvellous, providing a fundamental rationalist context. The magic theatre
laboured to make visual that which it was impossible to believe. Its visual
power consisted of a trompe l’oeil play of give-and-take, an obsessive desire to
test the limits of an intellectual disavowal—I know, but yet I see. (‘An Aes-
thetic of Astonishment’, p. 35)
Gunning’s claims about the waning of the marvellous in the context of a rising
rationalism deserve some pause. It is not that he sees the end of the nineteenth
century as ushering in the end of magic or illusion. Rather, his claim is that these
kinds of attraction flourished in part because they presented ‘a conscious focus on
the fact that they were only illusions’ (‘An Aesthetic of Astonishment’, p. 117). So
the attraction of magic was a double focus on what appeared to be unbelievable,
and on the art that it made it possible for a viewer to appreciate something as
unbelievable. On this account, the viewer of The Black Imp, for example, appreci-
ates both the magic of an appearing and disappearing spirit, and the camera craft
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that made that possible. Moreover, this double sensibility provides Gunning with
the means to explain Gorky’s account of The Arrival of a Train at Le Ciotat Station as
‘[b]elief and terror … larded with an awareness of illusion and even … the ennui
of the insubstantial, the bleak disappointment of the ungraspable phantom of life’
(‘An Aesthetic of Astonishment’, p. 118).
Gunning’s idea of the cinema of attractions shifts the locus of shock, awe and wonder
from the content of films to their technologies and craft (‘An Aesthetic of Astonish-
ment’, p. 125). But he also explicitly connects this experience to Augustine’s idea of
curiositas. Gunning’s interpretation of curiositas sees film viewing characterised as a never-
sated, compelling distraction, particularly by unbeautiful or monstrous sights. This
accords with the account of Augustine’s writings I provided in chapter two. But Gun-
ning’s curiositas departs from Augustine’s account in an important way. While Augustine
saw the endless appeal of curiositas as an unthinking addiction—therefore rendering it
sinful in his eyes—Gunning’s curious viewer is knowingly dissatisfied by the limitations
of film. He or she experiences ennui; never able to see film overturn the ‘drying up of
experience and its replacement by a culture of distraction’ (‘An Aesthetic of Astonish-
ment’, p. 126). But he or she also does nothing about it. This is because, Gunning
concludes, the distanced, knowing stance of the film viewer is symptomatic of a
disempowering alienation which modern, and particularly urban life produces.
Kirby and Gunning appear to disagree about film viewers. Yet they both share
an ultimately negative appraisal of what film viewing offers us: hysteria or ennui.
This is because when we look beyond the surface of their accounts, we see the
same thing: film as abetting the alienation which results from modern, consumerist,
urban life. This conclusion is on one level unsurprising, for both openly acknowl-
edge their debt to the work of Walter Benjamin and Roland Barthes, and in par-
ticular Benjamin’s writings on modernity and shock (Parallel Tracks, p. 12). But
there is a further commonality in their thinking which turns our attention more
directly to the story of wonder narrated in this book. For their arguments to work,
it has to be assumed that—as Jonathan Crary puts it—‘the ways in which we
intently listen to, look at, or concentrate on anything have a deeply historical
character’ (Suspensions of Perception, p. 1).
Seeing as history, wonder as conservative metaphysics
Kirby and Gunning affirm—albeit in different ways—the historicisation of per-
ception. Put simply, this is perception as other than an unmediated physiological
phenomenon or as flowing from a universal rationality or from metaphysics. This
historicisation is denoted—rather than formally acknowledged—by Kirby’s and
Gunning’s citation of Walter Benjamin (1892–1940). So too, Benjamin’s encultu-
rated notion of perception sits at the base of other histories of the moving image
such as Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida (1980), Jonathan Crary’s Techniques of the
Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (1990) and Suspensions of
Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (1999), and Mary Ann Doane’s
The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (2002).
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Across a range of writings, Benjamin brings into focus the onset, experience, and
habituation of the modern. A predominant feature of that habituation is the daily
experience of shock brought on by perceptual overload. With a gesture towards Freud’s
Beyond the Pleasure Principle,14 Benjamin uses the writings of Baudelaire as a lens to
describe our acceptance and even need for perceptual stimulation in the modern world:
Moving through this traffic involves the individual in a series of shocks and
collisions. At dangerous intersections, nervous impulses flow though him in
rapid succession, like the energy from a battery. Baudelaire speaks of a man
who plunges into the crowd as into a reservoir of electric energy. Circum-
scribing the experience of the shock, he calls this man ‘a kaleidoscope equip-
ped with consciousness’. Whereas Poe’s passers-by cast glances in all directions
which still appeared to be aimless, today’s pedestrians are obliged to do so in
order to keep abreast of traffic signals. Thus, technology has subjected the
human sensorium to a complex kind of training. Then came a day when a
new and urgent need for stimuli was met by the film. In a film, perception in
the form of shocks was established as a formal principle. (‘On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire’, in Illuminations, p. 175)
The more consciousness acknowledges these stimuli by, in effect, date stamping
them, the less likely they are to cause trauma in the viewer (‘On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire’, p. 163). Technologies such as photography and film aid this process by
providing us with knowing exposure to snippets of stimuli that we can use to build
up resilience in the form of what Freud calls a ‘stimulus shield’ (Reischutz) (‘On
Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, p. 161–2). Trauma arises from a breach of this pro-
tective shield, undermining a person’s ability to navigate everyday life. That breach
can occur as a consequence of perceptual overload, where the level of overload
might vary as a consequence of a person’s prior exposure to, and therefore resilience
against, perceptual stimuli.
On Benjamin’s view, technologies such as photography and the cinema can have
a protective function, and it is not hard to imagine cinematic techniques such as
the jump cut—a literal snip in a sequence of snippets—as serving this function well.
Moreover, it is assumed that the more consciously the dissonances and stimulation
of photography and cinema are acknowledged, the less likely that viewer experi-
ence of them will leave behind a lasting memory trace (‘On Some Motifs in Bau-
delaire’, p. 160). Yet in engaging with photography and cinema, Benjamin also sees
us as paying the price of losing a sense of depth perception of both time and space.
This is because they present fast moving panoramic views of phenomena: they
offer wide and shallow space, as Kirby suggests. With the spread of photography
and film, we are diminished (‘A Short History of Photography’, pp. 20–21, 23; and
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in Illuminations,
p. 220). In essence, then, modernity ushered in a change in the fundamental act of
perception, and it was not necessarily good (‘The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction’, p. 222).
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On Benjamin’s view, photography and film help us to manage modernity, but
that management is within limits. At that limit is what Benjamin calls ‘aura’, and
what Roland Barthes calls ‘punctum’. Both writers give us the sense of aura and
punctum as a rarity, and as experiences of great value. Benjamin sees the waning
of aura at the beginning of photography, when the technology required the
subject to hold their pose and gaze for a longer time than is the case now.
Writing on Hill’s portrait of Elizabeth Johnstone the fishwife, for example, he
foreshadows loss:
… in that fishwife from Newhaven, who casts her eyes down with such
casual, seductive shame, there remains something that does not merely testify
to the art of Hill the photographer, but something that cannot be silenced,
that impudently demands the name of the person who lived at the time and
who, remaining real even now, will never yield herself up entirely into art .…
They had an aura about them, a medium which mingled with their manner
of looking and gave them a plenitude and a security. (‘A Short History of
Photography’, pp. 7, 18)
The loss of aura means the loss of perceptual depth. That was not to be expected,
as it appeared to be one of our ‘securest’ possessions. And that loss has far reaching
implications. Our world is leached of depth to such an extent that it is not even
clear that we can communicate with each other anymore:
… the art of storytelling is coming to an end. Less and less frequently do we
encounter people with the ability to tell a tale properly. More and more often
there is embarrassment all around when the wish to hear a story is expressed. It
is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest of our possessions,
were taken from us: the ability to exchange our experiences. (‘The Story-
teller’, in Illuminations, p. 83)
This loss of depth, this extract again makes clear, is not something to have been
expected. This was the ‘securest of our possessions’, Benjamin tells us, thereby
underscoring the fundamental change in perception wrought by the modern.
Changes in perception pull the ground out from language, leaving us all the
poorer.
But the loss of depth is not total. Aura can still be experienced fleetingly, and
unintentionally (‘The Image of Proust’, in Illuminations, pp. 201–16). It ‘flits by’, he
expands in ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, and the past, therefore, ‘can be
seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised
and is never seen again’ (Illuminations, p. 255). It is not conjured; it comes to us
much as Aristotle’s experience of wonder does. Aura is conservative in that it
returns depth perception to us, unfolding our superficial apprehension of the
world. And it is metaphysical in that it restores—albeit fleetingly—our ability to
make sense of the world to ourselves and with others.
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This, too, is the point of Barthes’ account of punctum in Camera Lucida. Pho-
tography—and to a lesser extent cinema—express meaning when a detail in an
image stands out. This is what he calls ‘punctum’:
… it is not I who seek it out … it is this element which rises from the scene,
shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate
this wound, this prick, this mark made by a pointed instrument: the word suits
me all the better in that it also refers to the notion of punctuation, and because
the photographs I am speaking of are in effect punctuated, sometimes even
speckled with these sensitive points; precisely, these marks, these wounds are
so many points … punctum is also: sting, speck, little hole—and also a cast of
the dice. A photographer’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also
bruises me, is poignant to me). (Camera Lucida, pp. 26–7)
Everything about this extract emphases the accident, the ‘roll of the dice’ of being
marked or pricked by punctum. Punctum is something done to me, not something
I initiate or seek out. Importantly, too, it is a wound, hurting us and making us
feel. Wounds are not necessarily inflicted by those who capture atrocities on film,
for someone else has ‘shuddered for us, reflected for us, judged for us’ (Camera
Lucida, p. 71). Nor is film a good vehicle for punctum, because of the rapid suc-
cession of images and details. It is also not possible to predict which film or image
will wound the viewer, even if the maker intends to do so. Rather, punctum is
more personal, and more poignant. It is in the eye of the viewer, which in the case
of Barthes comes from details of a photograph of his recently deceased mother as a
child. The photograph hurts him, reminding him of what he has lost, and thereby
makes his mourning all the more acute (Camera Lucida, pp. 76–7). That this is a
personal experience that might be lost on another reader is underscored by Barthes’
exclusion of the photograph from Camera Lucida. The highly personal scraps and
fragments of Mourning Diary, too, underscore Barthes’ discontinuous and sporadic
experience of being reminded of what he has lost, and of his own mortality
(pp. 67, 95). One day it is a word; the next day it is a cake; on another it is an
image or a sound. Again, he emphasises that none of these triggers are things that
he sought out. The pain of loss comes to him suddenly and with a crippling
intensity. He writes variously of ‘a violent crying jag’, of being ‘overwhelmed, on
the verge of tears’, and of experiencing ‘an onset of grief. I cry’ (pp. 83; 107; 141).
At the same time, he does not want to lose the intensity of his grief; he resists
encapsulating his experiences in a time stamped narrative in order to protect it and
to experience its depths for longer (pp. 50, 75). With punctum we feel again in
ways that the modern denies us. Depth of feeling is restored to each of us.
Barthes’ notion of punctum is far more personalised—and therefore idiosyn-
cratic—than Benjamin’s idea of aura. Nothing would seem to be further from the
contemplation of universals, therefore. But as his notes on mourning show us,
depth of feeling is something that we want to hold on to, to protect from
diminution or disappearance over time. We want to halt time, and to hold on to
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the pain forever, thereby rendering it a permanent feature of our mental world.
This is also a metaphysical move, as our discussion on Rorty in the final part of this
chapter will highlight.
Neither Benjamin nor Barthes use the term wonder to describe the fleeting,
intense moments in which the diminution of modernity is resisted. Time, depth
and pain are reclaimed, but all too rarely. Conceptually, though, ‘aura’ and
‘punctum’ share much in common with earlier ideas of wonder canvassed in this
book: they are something we experience, rather than consciously call upon, and
they are an aid to escape from habitual ways of thinking about the world.
Quite a different account of wonder appears to be at play in the writings of
Jonathan Crary, even though he shares Benjamin’s view that perception changed
with the onset of the modern. Techniques of the Observer does so via the argument
that post eighteenth-century biological sciences and technologies such as the
camera obscura presented observation as subjective rather than as passive and uni-
versal. That is, the mind and the self saw the world; the world did not impress itself
upon viewers in the same way across time and space. To this point, there is a rough
alignment with Benjamin on modernity. With Suspensions of Perception, though, we
see an argument that potentially forces us to rethink the ascription of wonder to
Benjamin’s notion of aura and Barthes’ notion of punctum.
From the mid-nineteenth century, Crary argues, new forms of perception and
attention—‘a fixation, or holding something in wonder’—served institutional
constructions of ‘a productive and manageable subjectivity’ (Suspensions of Percep-
tion, p. 2). Rather than being a liberator, wonder was part of a body ‘that could be
captured, shaped, or controlled by a range of external techniques’ (Suspensions of
Perception, pp. 3, 5, 10). As with Techniques of the Observer, it is argued that for this
to have happened, understandings of seeing had to shift from it being understood
as a priori and unmediated towards that of being contingent upon the complex
physiology of the observer. Seeing and perception came to be entangled in the
body. At the same time, modernity gave rise to a burgeoning group of seeing
technologies such as photography and film. The intersection of the two was seen in
the aim—or the worry—that exposure to technology would foster distraction and
a mind overwhelmed by contingency rather than an agentic attention. Here
wonder is not fleeting; it is an immersive experience from which one might not be
able to escape. This accords with concerns about curiositas, ‘aja’ib and obsession in
chapters two and three of this book. An individual’s weakness of will were assumed
to be the cause of irreversible absorption in those chapters. This is not argued in
Crary’s book, at least explicitly. What is implied is that technologies are developed
to take advantage of viewer subjectivities; rendering them as manageable, indivi-
dual consumers. This was aided and abetted by mores in which distraction and free
association were presented as socially, politically and mentally destructive. People
needed to pay attention—and thereby render themselves susceptible to wonder—
in order to avoid the chaos that would arise from an unstructured, open mind
(Suspensions of Perception, p. 14, 17–18). Moreover, they needed to pay attention as
individuals; it was a mental burden that all needed to carry. Again, this meant a
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‘logic of spectacle [which prescribe[d] the production of separate, isolated, but not
introspective individuals’ (Suspensions of Perception, p.79). Crary’s conclusion is thus
that the subjectivisation of vision—assisted by technologies which stimulated
wonder—made possible the subjection and discipline of people in modernity.
So too, Mary Ann Doane sees pre-cinematic technologies—including photo-
graphy—as being seen as structuring and representing time. Indeed, she sees them,
along with cinema, as critical to a ‘sea change in thinking’ about time, contingency,
and indexicality that were part of modernity (The Emergence of Cinematic Time,
p. 4). Time was standardised, stabilised, depersonalised and rationalised as, for
example, people began to travel with greater speed, and work set hours. Moreover,
it was visualised: more and more people wore watches, and the movement of
workers was captured with the trace of lightbulbs captured in photographs or films
called cyclographs and chronocyclographs respectively. Indeed film and photo-
graphy came to be seen as capturing the moment, as assuring their own indexi-
cality. That is, they were seen as imprints or inscriptions of the real. This is
captured well in Doane’s use of a quote from the theorist Sigfried Kracauer on the
burden of meaning we give to photographs in flattening time: ‘A shudder runs
through the viewer of old photographs. For they make visible not the knowledge
of the original but the spatial configuration of a moment’.15
At the same time, however, photography and films such as actualities also pro-
mised the chance capture of phenomena in the moment. The Lumière film
Workers Leaving the Lumière Factory (1895), for example, captured both the regula-
tion of working hours—multiple people leave work at the end of what we assume
to be a shift—but also the surprise of a dog entering the bottom right of the screen.
In this way, film simultaneously supports both the regulation of time implied in
modernity, and resistance against that regulation. Ultimately, however, Doane
argues, representations of contingency were both codified and contained as tiny
doses and therefore appropriated to modernity. Film may be seen as a form of
escapist entertainment, for example, but too much contingency was seen as a threat
to individual and social well-being. This is because she, like Gunning and Kirby,
acknowledges Benjamin’s reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The lure
of visual technologies, she argues:
… [i]s that of the passing moment, the fascination of the ephemeral, but Walter
Benjamin delineates the dark underside of such a relation to contingency as
shock or trauma.… Consciousness, for Freud, does not remember. Its most
important function is rather to protect the organism against excessive stimuli, to
act as a stimulus shield in operation against external energies. According to
Benjamin, ‘The threat from these energies is one of shocks. The more readily
consciousness registers these shocks, the less likely are they to have a traumatic
effect.’ (The Emergence of Cinematic Time, p. 13, see also pp. 31–5).
Thus, Doane’s account also provides us with an explanation of why film moves
from capturing moments in actualities—the confrontation of the ‘cinema of
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attractions’—towards narratives after the turn of the twentieth century: con-
tingency is contained and appropriated, and that makes the discernment of the
immanent impossible.
Through the use of snippets of historical time, cinema builds up what Doane
calls ‘fictional’ time (The Emergence of Cinematic Time, p. 143). This is seen particu-
larly in the use of jump cuts to move the film forward in action by removing
moments deemed to be less eventful. So too, pan shots of stationary objects might
suggest the extension of time. Panorama shots of localities interspersed with action
shots might also imply contemporaneity and presence in relation to the event, even
though there might have been a considerable gap in filming time. These prefigure
the use of jump cuts and fades and dissolves to denote both flashbacks and flash-
forwards to earlier and later events that are presented as significant. In the process,
time ‘is rewritten in such a way that contingency and unpredictability are reduced
as part of the process, reemerging as the signified’ (The Emergence of Cinematic Time,
pp. 161–2). In this way—the removal of dead moments and the suggestion of an
efficient linearity—cinema contributes to the rationalisation of time. It is the
negation of unorganised, unstructured time and the threat of the contingent. Thus,
ultimately, film might be seen as supporting the wonder-captured individual con-
sumer set out in Crary’s vision of modernity.
Crary’s and Doane’s views of wonder seem to be far removed from Benjamins’
and Barthes’ views of aura and punctum respectively. One is seen to manage per-
ception in the service of the modern; the other resists it. Both see wonder as
associated with the particular and contingent, however, albeit either as facilitating
openness to it, or preventing access to it. But they also share in common a con-
servative function: one sees us return to lost notions of depth; the other protects
modern perceptions of the world. And in seeking grounding in depth (Benjamin
and Barthes) or in stable notions of the modern (Crary and Doane) they both
support the project of metaphysics. So while it is fair to say that these histories of
the image assert the historicisation of perception, they simultaneously convey a
relatively stable, conservative and metaphysical notion of wonder.
Historicising metaphysics, contingency within limits
At the opening of this book, I confessed that writing a book on making general
sense of things in the discipline of history seemed a very odd thing to do. The
expectation was that, like oil and water, the two things—history and metaphysics—
could not mix, and that they would undoubtedly come into conflict with one
another, or at least exist in tension. This chapter appears to confirm that expectation.
If sense making is an historical activity, thus not universal, can we assume continuing
discernment of immanent universals? As this chapter has intimated, the answer to this
question depends on the extent to which we accept historicisation as affecting sense
making and its outcomes, and the seemingly associated concept of contingency.
An interesting starting point for us to consider—albeit briefly—are the claims of
Richard Rorty (1931–2007), who appears to veer towards the very hard end of
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contingency and historicisation. Rorty’s ‘ironist’ is committed to the end of meta-
physics and to the beginning of the search for new contingencies. That commit-
ment is pretty unapologetic, as it entails sloughing off both the effort ‘to achieve
universality by the transcendence of contingency’ and any ‘inherited con-
tingencies’.16 It is a project against assuming that everyday, ‘commonsense’ beliefs
should be secured and defended as necessary for others to use when thinking about
the world. At the end of metaphysics and in the embrace of the contingent, history
becomes a possibility. He writes, using language as an example:
It begins when somebody says ‘maybe we don’t have to talk the way we do,’
meaning not just ‘maybe we should call this Y rather than X’ but maybe the
language-game in which ‘X’ and ‘Y’ occur is the wrong one to be playing—
not for any particular reason, not because it fails to live up to some familiar
criterion, but just because it is, after all, only one among others.17
In short, words, languages and forms of communication are open to change. His-
tory is not just about being aware of the possibility of change, but actively seeking
it out. That only happens when new contingencies are created, when the ironist:
… is trying to get out from under inherited contingencies and make [their]
own contingencies, get out from under an old final vocabulary and fashion
one which will be all [their] own.18
The ironist does not want to subscribe to the categories posited by Aristotle, and
will also question the necessity of even having categories to understand the world.
Metaphysics was Aristotle’s contingency, writ universal.
Yet Rorty’s ironist is an ironist within limits. Treating all vocabularies as
‘optional descriptions’ might be understood as a universal claim.19 So too, the
autonomy sought from the recognition of beliefs and claims as contingent might
also be thought of as something to be desired by everyone. And there is one more
claim that might look like a reach for universality, which is highly relevant to this
and all chapters in this book. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity returns to the
beginning of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and sees that:
The wonder in which Aristotle believed philosophy to begin was wonder at
finding oneself in a world larger, stronger, nobler than oneself. The fear in
which [Allen] Bloom’s poets begin is the fear that one might end one’s days in
such a world, a world one never made, an inherited world.20
At the beginning of the world there is wonder, and at its end there is fear. Wonder
is the means by which the real and the rational are asserted; fear is the means by
which the world becomes an open question again.
It is right to ask the obvious question about whether Rorty posits autonomy,
contingency, wonder and fear as universals by stealth. At the least, we can question
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whether there are limits to his letting go. And this is a question that we turn back
on this chapter, asking why wonder persists in the accounts of Benjamin, Barthes,
Crary and Doane. Is it a universal that lurks, passing our notice, in a wider histor-
icisation of perception that they, and Gunning and Kirby, promote? It could be,
and serve as, the agent of the modern, keeping us from being positioned as indi-
vidual consumers. This is Crary’s view. Alternatively, it could be, and serve as the
liberator from modernity, as Benjamin and Barthes intimate. Either way, as with
Rorty’s Aristotle, it has a role to play in managing the contingent. It either takes us
from the surface fluctuations of modernity—as Benjamin and Barthes suggest—and
back to depth of perception, or protects us from being overwhelmed by the rapid
succession of sense perceptions that the modern presents. Either way, it is a persis-
tent and conservative feature of how we might make sense of the world, and
arguably we should let it go, or at least acknowledge that we need to let it go.
But it could also be a persistent historical mistaken for a universal. As I have
written elsewhere, a more stable, yet historical view of metaphysics is to be found
in the writings of the historian philosopher R. G. Collingwood, and in those of the
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his collection of notes, On Certainty. 21
Wittgenstein, who is not typically associated with metaphysics in any positive
sense, provides a very useful analogy in On Certainty that explains the idea quite
simply and briefly. Different parts of a river move at different speeds. Some parts—
such as the water, and small particles or floating objects—may be carried along
with great rapidity. Other parts—such as boulders—may move only imperceptibly,
generating the impression that they are fixed in place.22 They are not; they too
move. They just do so very slowly. The French historian Fernand Braudel (1902–
95) has a similarly evocative analogy concerning the historian’s encounter with
simultaneous, varying paces of change, which it is useful to recall here:
history, one might say on the scale not of man, but of individual men, what
Paul Lacombe and François Simiand called ‘l’histoire événementielle’, that is, the
history of events: surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history
carry on their strong backs. A history of brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations, by
definition ultrasensitive; the least tremor sets all its antennae quivering.23
Some events unfold rapidly, as with the crest of a wave, whilst other features of our
world persist in the manner of the base of that same wave.
The point of this analogy is to highlight that metaphysics is not an all-or-nothing
matter. We may accept the evidence that film historians present which suggest that
forms of perception are open to change, and that perception did indeed change at
the advent of the modern. But we can also accept that the need for wonder per-
sisted, regardless of whether it served the ends of the modern or not. It is the
boulder to the more rapid shifts in perception.
This opens up the intriguing idea of an historicised metaphysics with a varying
pace of historicisation implied. Here, some of the ways in which we may make
general sense of things may change quickly, whilst other ways may persist or
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change much more slowly. Hegel intimates as much in his Philosophy of History,
noting that the realisation of freedom sometimes proceeded slowing, and some-
times quickly. We may quibble—quite rightly—over the details of where and
when those changes happened, but the principle at work is still worthy of investi-
gation. It may be seen as delivering us some reprieve from the all-or-nothing
notion of ahistorical universals or absolute relativity in our experiences. Where the
dispute still lies, though, in whether these historicised approaches to making gen-
eral sense of things entail ontological commitment. To put it simply, with Witt-
genstein’s riverbed, or Braudel’s base of a wave change, is the real world changing,
or just our way of describing it? Hegel would have opted for the former—a
descriptive or conservative approach to metaphysics—but it is not clear whether
Wittgenstein or Braudel would have agreed. There is much dispute on whether
Wittgenstein was consistently or even at all interested in metaphysics, and Braudel
never articulated such a view. Regardless, their thought sits at the cusp of revi-
sionary metaphysics—the endeavour of producing a better way of making sense of
things—which is the focus of chapters eight and ten.
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HISTORY’S OTHERS, HISTORY’S ETHICS
Joan Wallach Scott | Lynn Hunt | Merry Wiesner-
Hanks | Luce Irigaray | Jacques Derrida |
Hélène Cixous | Marguerite La Caze
Early modern European history (roughly 1500–1800) is weird at the best of
times. Although no single historian is responsible for generating this impression,
it is hard not to be struck by the late twentieth-century historiographical wave
that has delivered us stories of women who gave birth to rabbits or cats,
farmers who fought witches in fields with sorghum stalks, a miller who likened
the universe to cheese with maggots, and the enacting of political revenge
through the killing of cats.1 No area of historiography, it would seem, is better
suited to the study of wonder.
Merry Wiesner-Hanks’ The Marvelous Hairy Girls sits broadly within this wave,
contributing to an important discussion on whether being human implies con-
tinuity in identity. As she explains:
When people looked at the Gonzales sisters, or their pictures, they saw beasts
or monsters as well as young women, but this was also true when they looked
at most women. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, whose ideas were
still powerful in the sixteenth century, had described women as monsters
because they were not as perfect as men. Medieval and Renaissance theolo-
gians and philosophers placed women between men and animals in the hier-
archy of creation, for women, in their view, had less reason than men and
were therefore more like animals. The lives of the Gonzales sisters highlight
this complex relationship between beastliness, monstrosity, and sex …. This
lens brings the world of all women in the sixteenth century into sharper focus,
for even among marvels the lives of women and men were very different. (The
Marvelous Hairy Girls, 2009, pp. 10–11)
In simple terms, we cannot assume that the Gonzales family of The Marvelous Hairy
Girls saw or experienced the world as you or I do. Their lives were overlaid with
traditions and explanations that saw their thick body hair as an expression, for
example, of God’s will. But Wiesner-Hanks’ specific focus on the Gonzales sisters
is also deliberate, because she wants to show us that gender and sex are powerful
lenses for making sense of the world. Aristotle’s framing of woman in Generation of
Animals (737a) as a ‘deformity’ which occurs routinely made it possible for sub-
sequent thinkers to see women as incomplete men, and even as monstrous. This
was not just a physical appraisal: as we noted in chapter two, Thomas Aquinas’
presentation of curiosity as incomplete wonder and rationality offered the oppor-
tunity to see women as mentally and physically incomplete, and therefore as doubly
monstrous. Moreover, the mental and the physical reinforced one another in a
cycle of deformity. With their imperfect bodies and minds, women were suscep-
tible to birth the monstrous (Marvelous Hairy Girls, ch. 4). The Gonzales sisters were
not just doubly monstrous, they were triply monstrous: they had female minds,
they had female bodies covered in hair, and they were the descendants of a hairy
man from the distant Canary Islands (p. 46). Like their father and brothers, they
were kept at the French court. They were never, however, given a courtly role,
and they were never taught to read or to write. What trace we have of them is
refracted through portraits and through men’s writing about them (p. 10).
As with many other Early Modern European historians, Wiesner-Hanks sees the
micro histories of the Gonzales sisters as drawing upon and as contributing to wider
themes in feminist history, postcolonial theory, queer theory, disability theory, and
monster history (p. 224). But on the final page of the book, she halts consideration
of the interplay between these theories and the specificities and generalities of his-
tory to ask the question ‘Is this fair?’. In answering her own question, a connection
between historical sense making and ethics is made:
Are we treating [the Gonzales sisters] simply as objects, just as the marchesa of
Soragna appears to have treated Antoinetta? Perhaps. But I have tried as much
as possible (and probably more than I should, as an historian and not a nove-
list) to include some speculations about what they themselves might have
thought, how they might have understood the worlds in which they lived.
That is as far as we can go, for not one shred of evidence survives from any
female member of the family. In that, they are like most girls of humanity’s
past. But they are more visible than most, and we can do one thing that no
one who wrote about them in their own day thought important to do. We
can remember them not simply as marvelous hairy girls, but as inviduals with
names: Maddalena, Francesca, and Antoinetta Gonzales (p. 225).
This is a theme she expands upon in her more recent reflections on empathy and
ethics and history, noting that sometimes imagination and empathy are needed to
bring voiceless people like the Gonzales sisters in to history. This may ruffle the
feathers of those who see history as strictly circumscribed by the known, but
Wiesner-Hanks rightly points out that decisions of exclusion are themselves ethical
decisions and in need of scrutiny.2
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This chapter is about the ethical implications of our attempt to make general
sense of things through the idea of history. It picks up from the last chapter in
highlighting the interest of various writers in revisionary, rather than descriptive
metaphysics. That is, they seek to move from outlining the most basic features of
things to making sense of things in new ways, including radically new ways. The
driver in this case is the question of how we ought to make sense of the world,
rather than that we simply make sense of the world. And that driver, in turn, arises
from the acknowledgement that metaphysicians might not have done as good a job
as they might have in making sense of things, because their claims about the world
either do not make sense to whole groups of people, or worse, their claims result
in harm against those groups of people. In this chapter, I look to gender history to
explore these claims. The intersection of gender and history is at least as old as the
first written histories, with Herodotus for example using the interrelations of men
and women as a diagnostic for the health of civilisations in his Histories. Women
and men have continued that tradition to this time, exploring shifting notions of
gender identity and gender relations through biographical catalogues that describe
the feats of worthy or problematic individuals, historical novels, national and world
histories, and children’s primers.3 Yet there is a prevailing perception that gender
history is a recent discovery. Work continues to rectify that perception, but its
persistence means that gender is often excluded as a topic from introductory his-
toriographical texts, or treated as a late, separate theme. This has meant in practice
that women are contained in one chapter, as if the remainder of texts somehow
function above gender. Gender is signalled late in this book too, and my signal is
deliberate as I want to place it in close proximity to the conclusion of this book.
Proximity will emerge as an important theme in this chapter, functioning as it does
to remind us of the personal, and ‘near miss’ nature of making sense of things.
Indeed, it will highlight the interaction of history with metaphysics as unsettling,
and even deeply unpleasant. But I have also worked to ensure that this chapter is
not a leak-proof container for women: my inclusion of Sarah Joseph Hale in
chapter six, for instance, locates a gendered metaphysics of history right at the heart
of what is often taken to be the beginning and the end of the modern story of
history. It is for all of us to see gender in our attempts to make the most basic sense
of things, even if we are not sure if gender is a universal itself.
More particularly, this chapter shows how contemporary historians such as
Weisner-Hanks (1952–), Joan Wallach Scott (1941–) and Lynn Hunt (1945–) have
identified gender and sex as key means for initiating an examination of the
assumptions that marginalise, subordinate or render invisible the experiences of
individuals or groups in historiography. Scott’s suggestion that we should not just
stir women in to history, but use their experiences to stir up historiography is
anchored primarily in Jacques Derrida’s (1930–2004) thoughts on how we should
treat others, which—like gender history—are only just gaining traction in the his-
tory of history.4 Ironically, as this chapter will show, Derrida—like the Hamlet he
describes—seems to be ‘always late’. I will extend Scott’s line of thought, showing
how Luce Irigiray (1930–) and Marguerite La Caze (1964–) use a gendered reading
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of Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul—a key text in chapter five of this book—to
show that wonder is indispensable to our hospitable treatment of others. In
unpacking those ideas, I will question Irigaray’s assumption of a given gender
binary, and note La Caze’s presumption of wonder needing generosity in order to
function as a trigger for their idea of an ethics of difference. Derrida’s writings
suggest no need of wonder, let alone wonder in connection with generosity. His
interest, rather, is in Unheimlichkeit—translated generally as the uncanny in Eng-
lish—which I unpack as a key part of his call for us to see the traces of what is not
present in our attempts to make sense of the world. This is a deliberate choice of
word which conveys our simultaneous attraction and revulsion to being ‘un
homed’ from a world that makes sense; a sensible world that is predicated upon the
silencing and exclusion of so many oppressed people, past, present, and future.
Additionally, I note his interest in describing our encounters with the unheimlich as
haunting; encounters with revenants who are neither dead, nor alive, and therefore
who confound our sense of how the world is. This drives his call for the conjura-
tion of Marx to usher in ‘democracy to come’ in Specters of Marx, and his reminder
of the ultimate impossibility of that democracy, as well as unconditional hospitality
in later writings such as Of Hospitality. In Derrida’s view, as with that of Irigaray
and La Caze, we need to take personal responsibility for ethics, but also acknowl-
edge that it cannot be fixed, determined or finalised. A final move in the chapter
explores Derrida’s concepts of the trace and home in the writings of Hélène
Cixous (1937–). Cixous, like Derrida, acknowledges the impossibility of definitive
notions of history, hospitality and generosity, but at the same time she sees us as
being ‘so close’ [si prés]. Her vision of the Unheimlich therefore serves as a reminder
that theories which place wonder at the beginning of philosophy, thought, or
ethics may imply its dissipation as understanding and ‘homing’ takes hold. On the
contrary, she makes the case for us never really getting hold, of wonder always
with us, and therefore for a world in which we are at dis-ease with ourselves,
others, and histories.
Stirring in, stirring up
Weisner-Hanks’ journey to acknowledging the Gonzales sisters starts with the
realisation in Gender in History that she—like every other history major—was only
taught half the story (Gender in History, p. 1). Women were either absent, or
minimally present. Yet, as she also acknowledges, ‘stirring in women’ was not a
remedy for this oversight either. This is because women’s experiences disrupt the
categories and paradigms of history making, such as ‘nation’, ‘social class’ or ‘reli-
gious allegiance’. So too, writing only about women ignores the conditions that
have so often rendered them invisible or marginal to history. Stirring up history is,
she is clear, not just beneficial for women: questioning and breaking down cus-
tomary narratives and categories brings into focus the different experiences of
individual men. History comes to be about individuals and the particular, not just
the abstract universal (p. 1). We cannot assume, for example, that women
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experienced space in the same way as men or transgendered individuals, as she
explains in the introduction to Mapping Gendered Routes and Spaces in the Early
Modern World (2015):
Real walls—of houses, convents, churches, courtyards, and market stalls—
separated (or were supposed to separate) women and men. Travel and com-
merce generally involved more men than women, which had an impact on
the families left behind on one end of a trade route and on those formed at the
other end or somewhere along the way. Voluntary and forced migrations
shifted the gender balance, necessitating new forms of marriage and other
forms of social and sexual relationships. Gender also figured in understandings
of spatialized activities, from dissecting the interior of the body to traveling
across the globe.5
Yet space is often treated as a universal category established by Aristotelian meta-
physics and only in need of philosophical fine-tuning. Sexuality has also assumed to
be a given, with Wiesner-Hanks advancing in her Christianity and Sexuality in the
Early Modern World the merits of Foucault’s view of it as discursively written upon
the body.6 Some categories have been kept separate from one another when they
clearly do intersect, as with ‘global history’ and ‘gender’, and ‘The Reformation’
and ‘women’, and others, like ‘empire’, ‘emotions’ and ‘religious belief’ intersect in
the fashion of a three set Venn diagram.7
Why particular categories take hold, are seen in particular ways or connected to
other categories is for Wiesner-Hanks a political matter, and suggestive of a revi-
sionary rather than a descriptive view of metaphysics. There is no doubt for
Wiesner-Hanks that the writing of history is clearly shaped by politics and by
political domination. For example, research on the experiences of individuals and
groups in English-language and European language contexts, she notes in a
number of publications, far outweighs the efforts of writers in developing contexts
(Gender in History, p. 10; see also The Cambridge World History, vol. 1, p. xix). This,
as Wiesner-Hanks notes, is a reality that we have to acknowledge and a curse for
anyone who wishes to write on the experiences of women, men and gender
diverse individuals around the globe (p. 11). Yet continue writing history we must,
navigating between the acknowledgement of difference and ‘telling the story of a
past that makes sense’.8 Like Simone de Beauvoir, she acknowledges, ‘no failure,
no ethics’.9
De Beauvoir’s point is that if you measure up to yourself and to God, then life
has no meaning. It is in falling short, in missing things, that we learn to live. But
that living comes only, as Wiesner-Hanks reminds us, in not mistaking the uni-
versal for the particular. Here she echoes the thought of Joan Wallach Scott in
understanding the far-reaching consequences of applying Jacques Derrida’s philo-
sophical insights on deconstruction to the making of history. Scott’s understanding
of deconstruction emphasises unravelling the idea of fixed categories, beginning
with the idea that the creation or assertion of a category implies the negation or the
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repression of that which is antithetical to it. In her view, the fixed opposition
between ideas such as man and woman:
conceal[s] the heterogeneity of either category, the extent to which terms
presented as oppositional are interdependent … Furthermore, the inter-
dependence is usually hierarchical, with one term dominant, prior, and visible,
the opposite subordinate, secondary, often absent or invisible. Yet precisely
through this arrangement, the second term is present and central because
required for the definition of the first. (‘Introduction’, Gender and the Politics of
History, p. 7)
Subjecting categories to inspection means being open to the idea of new cate-
gories, new oppositions, and to the inversion of hierarchies. Again, this suggests a
revisionary purpose for those interested in making general sense of things, not a
descriptive one. For all of these reasons, Scott prefers to talk of gender history
rather than women’s history because it connotes a focus on the relationship
between men and women over time, rather than one group in isolation (‘Intro-
duction’, Gender and the Politics of History, p. 2; see also The Fantasy of Feminist
History, p. 5).
Scott’s motivation for writing gender history is like that of Wiesner-Hanks,
political: her words stem from the desire to change the inequalities between
women and men. But she also notes the applicability of her ideas to addressing
inequalities that stem from race, ethnicity and class (‘Introduction’, Gender and the
Politics of History, p. 3). This is a commitment that plays out with strength in her
argument against the reductionist treatment of the intersection of gender and class
as the study of ‘words’ in ‘Language and Working-Class History’ (Gender and the
Politics of History, pp. 53–65). Words, treated as a data set, have little or no potential
to transform the discipline of history in ways that are needed to better help us to
understand gender and class (p. 54). What we need, as she argues on the basis of
Michel Foucault’s thought, is a more challenging exercise in which the conditions
of knowledge are illuminated and contested. If history making is to change, it
needs to be thought about epistemically (‘Introduction’, Gender and the Politics of
History, p. 2). On this reading, knowledge is particular and historical rather than
transcendent and abstract, but it is also descriptive of the real world. So particular
epistemologies are useful for recasting history, not just epistemology as a universal.
Foucault, for example, views the meaning of words to be both unstable and
reflective of power and relational dynamics (‘Language and Working-Class His-
tory’, Gender and the Politics of History, p. 59). Scott’s analysis of work in nineteenth-
century Paris, for example, highlights how the shop came to be associated with
skilled, male labour, and how work at home was gendered female and treated as
relatively unskilled (‘Work Identities for Men and Women: The Politics of Work
and Family in the Parisian Garment Trades in 1848’, Gender and the Politics of His-
tory, pp. 93–112). So too, she highlights the ambiguity of the term femmes isolées,
which in nineteenth-century France was used to describe both independent
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working women and clandestine prostitutes (‘“L’ouvrière! Mot impie, sordide…”-
Women Workers in the Discourse of French Political Economy, 1840–1860’,
Gender and the Politics of History, pp.139–63).
But which epistemologies to focus on? The trigger for epistemic illumination is
identified in Scott’s later work The Fantasy of Feminist History (2011) as psycho-
analysis because it emphasises the unknowability of sexual difference and therefore
the uncertainty of any claims to knowledge about it. Hers is not an epistemology
in which the unknowable is tamed as the knowable, and therefore there is not a
sense that we have with earlier writings on wonder that the shock of the strange
can be overcome through rational operation. In short, there is no recommended
epistemology. This, however, implies a valuation of openness over satisfaction with
the known. We assume that her grounds for that derive from the views of Derrida
and Foucault, but it is not expressed in a way that stretches beyond an interest in
epistemology.
Lynn Hunt shares an interest with Scott in contesting seemingly immutable
knowledge claims, but her writings also intimate at our need to contend with
metaphysics—as well as epistemology—in order to revise the discipline of history.
Her 2008 Natalie Zemon Davis Lectures, Measuring Time, Measuring History, are a
good case in point. As the title suggests, the topic is time, and more specifically
historical time. Arguably, there is no other ‘category’ that is so essential to how we
make sense of the idea of history (p. 48). History making without time would not
seem to make sense; its role seems to be beyond question. But question it we must,
because our understanding of historical time is an historical artefact that has flow on
effects which perpetuate the exclusion or minimisation of some phenomena. Like
Wiesner-Hanks, Hunt sees time as gendered.10 As she writes:
The power of a universal, homogenous, and deep notion of time is incon-
testible. The notion undergirds Western science, Western imperialism, globa-
lisation, and the current vogue of world history, which some might consider
all facets of the same phenomenon. (Measuring Time, Measuring History, p. 39)
Historical time is contestable for Hunt. Her grounds for thinking that are not
simply a logical step from considering those whose experiences are marginal to or
excluded by contemporary historiography towards additive categories of thinking
that might acknowledge them. She also hints at the need to work backwards to
reveal the sense making that set the course for that marginalisation. Revising his-
tory means unravelling it and resetting in upon a new course. That unravelling
reaches back to ancient Greek thought, as she notes in a discussion on the ‘tenacious’
concept of modernity:
Although there is some question as to whether modernity, as Aristotle said of
time more generally, belongs to the class of things that exist or to that of
things that do not exist, it does function as a category of our thinking, to judge
only by the number of times the word appears in book and article titles .… Of
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particular interest is the way the modern came to be seen as a distinct, and
eventually superior, category of time. (Measuring Time, Measuring History, p. 48;
see also p. 118)
She then passes on, leaving us to consider whether calling out the invention of
time is enough to think about it differently. In other works such as Writing History
in the Global Era (2014) and the book she co-authored with Joyce Appelby and
Margaret Jacob—Telling the Truth about History (1994)—the opportunity to square
up against Aristotle and rethink his very approach to metaphysics also appears to be
curtailed by her conflation of metaphysics with progress (Telling the Truth About
History, p. 246; Writing History in the Global Era, p. 125). Yet she—like Scott—also
reminds us of Derrida’s work to unravel ‘the binary categories of Western meta-
physics’ by showing how opposites indicate each other (Telling the Truth About
History, p. 212).
There is more to metaphysics than the notion of opposites, but Hunt and Scott
usefully call out the logic that leads opposites to be seen as relations of centre to
periphery, and of dominate to subordinate. And Hunt takes yet another step
beyond Scott in calling out the epistemic function that sets that logic in train:
empathy. This is most clearly seen in her analysis of the origin of the idea of
human rights. Eighteenth-century novels, she argues, fuelled the idea that we can
take the ‘leap of faith’ to achieve the psychological identification that renders
someone else like us (Inventing Human Rights, ch.1). So too, in their own way,
pornographic works from the eighteenth century onwards transgressed mores and
downplayed specificities of time, place, history and even language in order to
create an imagined community of male readers (The Invention of Pornography,
introduction).
Wonder’s other
In Hunt’s world, empathy creates affiliation and therefore has the function of
subordinating those who are different. How, then, might difference be illuminated
in order for metaphysics to be reconsidered? In contemporary feminist philosophy,
wonder has that role.
Luce Irigaray’s rereading of Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul positions wonder as
the departure point for an ethics of sexual difference (‘Wonder: A Reading of
Descartes, The Passions of the Soul’, in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, pp. 72–82). Her
claim is twofold: first, that sexual difference between male and female is funda-
mental to our making sense of the world (p. 74); and second, that wonder awakens
our surprise, curiosity and attraction to that difference (p. 75). How that surprise or
curiosity leads to an appreciation of the other derives from her agreement with
Descartes that as the first of all passions, wonder is prior to judgement and com-
parison. It is a visceral openness, if you like, that leads to a direct acknowledgement
of another’s difference rather than a likening of that person to ourselves or a pos-
session of them (pp. 75, 82). As she explains:
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This first passion is indispensable not only to life but also or still to the creation
of an ethics. Notably of and through sexual difference. This other, male or
female, should surprise us again and again, appear to us as new, very different
from what we knew or what we thought he or she should be. Which means
that we would look at the other, stop to look at him or her, ask ourselves,
come close to ourselves through questioning .… Wonder goes beyond that
which is or is not suitable for us. The other never suits us simply. We would
in some way have reduced the other to ourselves if he or she suited us com-
pletely .… Before and after appropriation, there is wonder (p. 74).
Wonder halts hierarchical assimilation, functioning as a bridge between two
worlds, marking ‘the advent of the other’ (pp. 75, 81).
Whether this openness is enough to sustain Irigaray’s vision of ethics is an active
question for writers like Elizabeth Grosz, Iris Marion Young and Marguerite La
Caze. Grosz, quite rightly, questions whether Irigaray’s vision of wonder rests upon
the assumption of a clean division of male and female, and the marginalisation of
other kinds of gender identity.11 Young has an even stronger objection, arguing
that Irigaray’s claims are insufficient protection against subordination. As she
explains in Intersecting Voices (1997):
The concept of wonder is dangerous. It would not be difficult to use it to
imagine the other person as exotic. One can interpret wonder as a kind of
distant awe before the Other that turns their transcendence into a human
inscrutability. Or wonder can become a kind of prurient curiosity. I can
recognise my ignorance about the other person’s experience and perspective
and adopt a probing, investigative mode toward her. Both stances convert
the openness of wonder into a dominative desire to know and master the
other person.12
Young’s solution lies in our adoption of moral humility, and an assumption that
our relationship with others is asymmetrical. That is, I should have enough respect
for others that I do not assume that they will see the world as I do. If I do adopt
that stance, she contends, then there is no reason why Irigaray’s view of wonder
cannot be applied to any significant social difference, such as race, gender, religion
or class.13
La Caze agrees with Young’s extension of an ethics of difference to social
structures other than sexual difference. Yet she also notes Young’s move in arguing
for a particular kind of wonder, one that is combined with respect. Wonder,
because of its being prior to judgement, is ultimately inadequate on its own as a
basis for ethics. Wonder may allow me to see the difference between my actions
and those of a person who harms others, but not judge that person. Wonder is an
initial response, as Aristotle noted. To realise the ethics that Irigaray suggests, La
Caze sees us as needing to step from wonder to other dispositions such as respect,
generosity, humility and compassion (Wonder and Generosity, pp. 24–5). Astutely,
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she notes that analyses of Descartes’ view of wonder typically extract it from his
wider discussion on generosity—an esteem that arises from the resolution to use
our free will well—as the means to achieving a good life (The Passions of the Soul,
pp. 103, 107). Generosity, to Descartes’ estimation, springs from the combination
of wonder with joy and love. And people of generous disposition are ‘easily con-
vinced’ that others have the capability to use their free will well too (p. 104).
How wonder and generosity combine or work together is not clearly spelled out
in either Descartes’ or La Caze’s writings, but we do get a sense of their com-
plementary relationship from La Caze, particularly in this passage:
Generosity can provide the limit that prevents wonder from falling over into
exoticizing, crass curiosity, or contempt since curiosity is an acceptance of a
fundamental sense in which we are all of worth, regardless of the differences
that exist between us. Generosity involves a proper judgement of both self and
other that forms the background against which we respond to others with
wonder .… Conversely, wonder can prevent the presumption that others will
think and act like oneself and desire the same kinds of things as oneself, such
that one could make decisions and judgements on their behalf. It helps us to
recognise the limitations on our own power and on our imaginations. Wonder
allows for openness to difference and change in the other. (pp. 31–2)
What this excerpt suggests is that generosity circumscribes wonder, and wonder
circumscribes generosity. Moreover, while wonder appears to need to precede
generosity to generate the openness upon which an ethics of difference turns,
generosity involves what La Caze labels ‘proper’ judgement, which lays the
groundwork for the possibility of wonder at others. Wonder and generosity are
distinct dispositions—each can exist without the other—but in La Caze’s combi-
nation they assume a circular relationship, the beginning and end of which is
unclear. Not knowing where wonder and generosity begin and end in relationship
with one another is philosophically perplexing. But it might also be thought of as
constraining when we recall Scott’s invitation for us to remain open to the shifting
and unstable nature of concepts.
Scott’s interest in concepts reflects Jacques Derrida’s challenge to the view of
linguistic structures such as words, scriptive symbols or sounds as stable and reflec-
tive of the mind, reality, the transcendent or the abstract (Positions, pp. 26–7).
Rather, he sees texts as referring to other texts in an endless chain of signification
that he calls différance. Thus there is nothing inherently superior about any single
view of wonder, or of generosity. Rather, the various views of wonder that have
been advanced reflect particular contexts and viewpoints, much as Scott high-
lighted different views of work in nineteenth-century France, and Wiesner-Hanks
detailed the particular experience of monstrousness for the Gonzales sisters.
Derrida argues for the deconstruction of concepts like wonder on the grounds of
it being an ‘unconditional ethical demand’ of openness to the other.14 Decon-
struction achieves this by illuminating the ‘blind spots’ of metaphysics, and by
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showing how our activities of sense making may be subject to change. It is an
ethical exercise because there is no God or transcendent to take responsibility for
decisions about concepts, truths and knowledge, as was suggested in chapters two
and three. And this responsibility lasts our lifetime, because we cannot believe that
our decisions will fix meaning for all time. This is not caprice, it is ethics, as he
explains in ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’:
I absolutely refuse a discourse that would assign me a single code, a single
language game, a single context, a single situation; and I claim this right not
simply out of caprice or because it is to my taste, but for ethical and political
reasons.15
In Derrida’s view, the possibility of ethical and political action requires individual
choice. This is not neo-liberal individualism, because his writings on the ideas of
‘self’ and ‘other’ point to a view of identities as fluid, and even porous. That is, as
with concepts, the boundaries of individuals are far from stable or fixed. This is
apparent when we consider his writings in particular on hospitality, which he sees
as shaping all human interaction and as ‘the whole and the principle of ethics’.16
Hospitality is both a familiar and a very unsettling idea. Individuals and groups
routinely welcome guests and strangers out of charity, civility and what Irigaray
would call generosity, and in response to legislated duty or a moral imperative.
Moreover, as with ancient and medieval practices, hospitality may serve to validate
one’s social identity and reputation in public life and thus be valued as a virtue or
even used to define humanity. Yet, as Derrida also notes, hospitality is incon-
ceivable and incomprehensible in an unconditional or absolute sense.17 In the case
of absolute hospitality, one gives all that one has to any other person without
question, restriction or compensation: it is not circumscribed, subject to ‘proper’
judgement or needing to be conjoined with other dispositions, as Irigaray sees as
necessary for generosity (Of Hospitality, pp. 25, 83).18
If we draw back from that, then our extension of hospitality is subjected to
limitations and a reciprocal exchange of ‘violence’ ensues (Of Hospitality, p. 55).
Inviting or giving gifts implies reciprocation, which is to Derrida’s mind inhos-
pitable. Here we may think of this situation as introducing the kind of symmetry
that Young sees as potentially dangerous for wonder.19 Must we, he explains, ‘ask
the foreigner to understand us, to speak our language… in all its possible exten-
sions, before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our country?’
(On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p. 15; Of Hospitality, p. 15). Conversely, in
inviting the stranger in, host becomes the hostage of the guest and the guest
becomes the one who is master. This introduces a dimension not seen in Irigaray’s
notion of generosity, that of divided authority: ‘As soon as I speak to the other, I
submit to the law of giving reason(s), I share a virtually universalizable medium, I
divide my authority’.20 It is the tension between the unconditional and conven-
tional and between the host and guest that keeps the idea of hospitality alive. It is
‘to come’: that is, there is no fixed or final state of hospitality, no end to its history
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because openness to the event is openness to others. This is his basis for his call for
us to acknowledge ethics.
Derrida does not look to wonder to trigger the rejection of metaphysics in
favour of a personal ethics. Yet Genevieve Lloyd holds that there is consonance
between the idea of wonder and Derrida’s sustained interest in the Socratic idea of
aporia, which he revisits both as the experience of us being stopped in our tracks
and as the possibility of thinking the impossible in texts such as Memoires of Paul
de Man:
I believe that we would misunderstand it if we tried to hold it to its most lit-
eral meaning: an absence of path, a paralysis before roadblocks, the immobili-
sation of thinking, the impossibility of advancing, a barrier blocking the future.
On the contrary, it seems to me that the experience of the aporia, such as de
Man deciphers it, gives or promises the thinking of the path, provokes the
thinking of the very possibility of what still remains unthinkable or unthought,
indeed, impossible. The figures of rationality are profiled and outlined in the
madness of the aporetic.21
Passages like this make the assimilation of aporia to wonder tempting, because terms
like ‘paralysis’, ‘roadblock’, ‘unthought’ seem to ring true with the various ways in
which wonder has been described throughout this book.
Derrida, however, was a deliberative wordsmith, and it should not pass our
attention that he does not use the term and does not rework it as he does aporia.
Rather, he opts for terms and phrases such as ‘haunting’, ‘time out of joint’, and
Unheimlichkeit. The last of these has the standard English translation of ‘uncanny’,
an experience that is simultaneously familiar and unfamiliar and which generates
feelings of both attraction and revulsion, and which leaves a sense of unease, eeri-
ness, and even of being haunted. The appeal of this word over wonder would
seem to arise from it being a strongly visceral experience, and of it simultaneously
entailing attraction and repulsion by something that is both familiar and strange.
Moreover, the combination of the familiar and the unfamiliar would seem on the
face of it to address Meno’s paradox—if you don’t know what you are looking for,
inquiry about it is impossible—without recourse to the Socratic idea that the
human soul has a vision of the transcendent forms before birth.22 We might assume
that we see the familiar as unfamiliar, and not the other way around.
Unheimlichkeit suggests a strongly affective experience, yet it is also ambiguous,
and unstable. Wonder, however, might also bear the same characteristics. Plato’s
Theaetetus might have experienced the uncanny when his head swam. But there is
also something to note about the German phrase that Derrida chooses—like Freud
and Heidegger—to use: the heim in Unheimlichkeit signals to us an estrangement
from, denial of or unsettling from home.
Aristotle’s example triggers for wonder were, we recall from chapter one, all
changes in natural phenomena. Plato reports on Socrates’ use of social and political
concepts as triggers for wonder. Derrida’s use of Unheimlichkeit gestures at experiences
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that are far more personal: the home is pulled from under our feet. This makes sense
if we note the discussion above that ideas such as hospitality implicate us as respon-
sible for ethics. Unsettling is not ‘out there’; it is with us. Moreover, his suggestion of
Unheim—un-homing—connotes the idea that what was might not be. The past is
implicated in our unsettling, as Derrida’s Specters of Marx and his wider thoughts on
Heidegger’s notion of the metaphysics of presence so persistently indicate.
Heidegger’s writing—as we will see more fully in the final chapter—takes aim at
our undue focus on what is, and our forgetting of the conditions and specificities
that make what is present to us possible. Derrida takes this cue from Heidegger to
prompt us to think not only about what is absent, but also the trace of what is not
present within what is.23 A key example suggested by this chapter, for example, is
thinking about the trace of ‘woman’ in contexts where the thought of ‘man’ is ever
present. This is also one of Derrida’s examples of ideas that in being present do not
seem to suggest the possibility of alternatives:
It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or
to the centre have always designated an invariable presence—eidos, arche- , telos,
energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), alethe-ia, transcendentality,
consciousness, God, man, and so forth.24
The Unheimlichkeit of the trace becomes apparent in Derrida’s writing when it
appears as the ghost, the spectre, and the revenant. Ghosts are neither present nor
absent, living nor dead, past nor present, and somehow they are also both of these
pairs as well. He explains:
It is a proper characteristic of the spectre, if there is any, that no one can be
sure if by returning it testifies to a living past or to a living future, for the
revenant may already mark the promised return of living being. Once again
untimeliness and disadjustment of the contemporary (Specters of Marx, p. 123).
They ought not appear, but they do, and they haunt us. As Katherine Withy
explains: ghosts ‘ … straddle the gaps between the joints in our ways of making
sense of the world and in doing so reveal that these joints do not match up per-
fectly’.25 Withy’s use of the word ‘joint’ points us to the opening of Derrida’s
Specters of Marx, in which we are reminded of Hamlet being haunted by his father’s
ghost and his declaration that ‘The time is out of joint’ (Hamlet, 1.4; Specters of
Marx, p. 1). This presages Hamlet’s tortured acknowledgement of the need to do
justice, the path to which will be violent and which will ultimately cost him his
life. This may seem too high a price to pay, but as Derrida reminds us, metaphysics
disguises its violence in presence, reducing difference to the ‘totalitarianism of the
same’.26 The queasy responsibility for justice is also ours, and that justice is in
the name of those past, present, and not yet born. We must take upon ourselves
the opening up of ethics, even though we know that—as with hospitality—it may
be impossible, or it may also cost us. We are to be un-homed, as Derrida’s
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invocation in the preface to Specters of Marx makes clear, and in that, we may learn
to live, finally:
If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and gen-
erations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not
present, nor presently living… it is in the name of justice .… No justice …
seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond
all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the
ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims
of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist,
sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist
imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism (Specters of Marx, p. xviii).
Historians are not excused from the need to take responsibility for justice and for
ethics. But it should also not be assumed that they are in the best position to
achieve it. Their narratives, after all, may suggest a seamless making sense of the
world, and contribute to the violence of the metaphysics of present. A key driver
for Derrida’s Specters of Marx, for example, was his twin discomfort with the tota-
lizing and even triumphalist tendencies of those who declared the end of Marxism
and thereby of a Hegelian history with a capital ‘H’, as well as those who see in
Marx the way of explaining past phenomena. Derrida’s response is to take a cue
from the first line of The Communist Manifesto—‘A spectre is haunting Europe’—
and to conjure Marx as well as Hamlet’s ghost.27 Marx, stripped of dogmatic
assumptions that have pinned his thought down, is needed to cry foul on a world
in which liberal democracy is not in evidence and in which the gap between rich
and poor grows ever bigger (Specters of Marx, pp. 53–4, 63–4, 78, 85). Our world
order is that of ten ‘plagues’: unemployment; the alienation of the homeless, the
poor and immigrants; economic wars; the idea and operation of the free market;
foreign debt; the influence of the arms industry; nuclear proliferation; the drugs
trade and organised crime; and the state of international law (pp. 78–82). The spirit
of Marx could illuminate these issues in the ways that Capital did for the nine-
teenth century, although Derrida also notes that the lenses of base/superstructure
and class alone will need to be rethought to ensure that the idea of ‘democracy to
come’ might be embraced as a goal (pp. 53–4; 63–4). That democracy is one that
sloughs off the ossified and alienating structures of histories, political parties and
organisations in favour of bringing the singularity of individuals to the fore (pp. 29,
85, 113–19). So, the spectre haunting the world at the time of The Communist
Manifesto remains prescient and unrelenting.
So close
Derrida’s writing against a metaphysics of presence and in favour of responsibility
for ethics is not another metaphysics of presence in disguise. Various commentators
have noted that while he returns again and again to the idea of the individual, his
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dynamic use of concepts and liberal use of neologisms act as reminders of our
world being out of joint. But his explorations are also personal and historical, ges-
turing at the complexity, ambiguity and proximity of his own life experiences with
a world of ghosts. Derrida was born to a Jewish family in pre-second world war
Algiers, grew up in Vichy Algeria, and moved to France post-second world war.
He is at once Jewish, Algerian and French, and also none of those things, un-
homed not only by international events that loom large in our histories of the
twentieth century, but also never at home with any of the identities that others
may have ascribed to him.
Derrida’s acknowledgement of his self complexity is interleaved throughout
many of his writings. But his writings also refer to, and are intertwined with the
trace of others who acknowledge the challenge of learning to live. A great case in
point is the counter-trace of Hélène Cixious’ writings with those of Derrida on
Algeria or what she calls her Algeriance, Disalgeria or malgeria in works such as ‘My
Algeriance’, Reveries of the Wild Woman, and So Close. Cixous’ life, as she notes,
shares many of the features and disjoints experienced by Derrida: she was born to a
Jewish family in Oran, Algeria, and relocated to France with her German-born
mother after the second world war.28 But greater emphasis on life writing by
Cixous brings the ‘so close’ aspect of unheimlichkeit to the fore: we are haunted not
only by the impossibility and ambiguity of a world that we want to simplify and to
fix in place, but also how proximate and elusive ethics and justice are to us.
Making general sense of things is deeply personal, and not a universal intellectual
abstraction.
Cixious’ writings on Algeria pick up the Derridian theme of the Unheimlich, with
‘My Algeriance’ setting it out as an adverse reaction to the homliness of others. Her
task is not to attach, to build, to settle, unlike ‘writers who plot their land, become
lord of a manor, search for houses, patrons and identify’ (‘My Algeriance’, p. 74).
Cixious’ own relationship with any, some or all of identities that she might claim—
Algerian, Jewish, French, woman—is an ambiguous bind. She can conjure up any
of these identities in the manner of the strange Chinese historians in chapter four,
but such an act also means conjuring the trace of what is not present. As she
explains in The Newly Born Woman:
there is no invention possible, whether it be philosophical or poetic, without
there being in the inventing subject an abundance of the other, of variety:
separate-people, thought-/people, whose populations issuing from the
unconscious, and in each suddenly animated desert, the springing up of selves
one didn’t know—our women, our monsters, our jackals, our Arabs, our
aliases, our frights (p. 84)
The language which describes that alterity—sense of the other—is not pleasant: it is
punctuated by the term ‘monsters’ and culminates in ‘frights’. So too, she outlines
in painful detail how others dissuade acknowledgement of the other. School in
Algeria ‘effaces’, ‘excises’, and ‘phantomizes’ Algerian identity, leaving her unable
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to ‘discern a trace not a single trace of malgeria’ (Reveries of the Wild Woman,
pp. 70–1). More acutely, her mother denies the possibility of trace, as Cixous recounts
in So Close:
—What is a tttrace? I was fleeing. I felt my mother’s breath on my neck:
tttrace! tttraß! The word trace was mutating, I felt it hissing in a foreign
tongue, it became agonizing, monstrous, we had entered a swampy country, I
was floundering. I interrogated my memory, ‘what is a trace?’ I said, I was
ashamed of clinging fast, ‘Ouch! ouch! ouch! my memory said, wait! Wait! I
have nothing to tell you other than what J[acques] D[errida] told you once
and for all, trace, trait, path-breaking .… My mother said: There’s no traces. She
was categorical.—What is a trace!? With what force of annihilation she had
struck the word trace with a closed fist. (pp. 58–9)
Trace is variously agonizing, monstrous and swampy, as opposed to both Derrida
and her mother telling her categorically that it does or it does not exist. So trace is
painful, unsettling, monstrous, but it is also elusive to the person who takes
responsibility for seeking it. Neither Derrida nor Cixious’ mother can act ethically
for Cixious, she has to do this for herself.
Derrida signals the impossibility of capturing the trace, for that would fix it as
the metaphysics of presence. Cixious, interestingly, sounds out the distance of this
gap and overlays it with the pain of us being ‘so close’, but not quite there. This is
not to suggest a quantifiable endeavour, but it indicates something asymptotic: it
tends to but does not reach a or the limit. It is a little like Achilles never being able
to outrun the tortoise in Zeno’s paradox. This is an idea that I will return to in the
analysis of Heidegger’s various writings on wonder, and its implications for history,
in the final chapter of this book. For now, it is simply worth noting that the trace is
spectral: it appears real but you cannot touch it. Cixious describes herself variously
as living in Algeria but never being ‘inside it’; dreaming of arriving in Algeria whilst
living there; trying to arrive; ‘not quite’ belonging; entering if only she had only
gotten out of it; separated by an ‘almost nothing of steel’; approaching and trying
to get closer (Reveries of the Wild Woman, p. 1; So Close, pp. 7, 8, 37, 38). Finally,
there is also the clever play of language in the French version of the title for So
Close: Si près (so close) sounds the same as cyprès (cypress), the elusive trees of her
Algeriance (see for example, So Close, pp. 58–60).
La Caze’s vision of wonder is gendered through the coupling of it with gener-
osity. But her views also continue Descartes’ idea—which stems right back to
Aristotle—that wonder is at the beginning of thought, of philosophy, of seeing the
world anew. This can be interpreted as presenting wonder as a trigger for thought
that is dissipated when understanding is achieved. Wonder is fleeting, and as
something difficult to analyse because rational consideration may bring it to an end.
Derrida and Cixous think otherwise. For them, the Unheimlich, the ‘uncanny’ never
ends. We might get close, but we never get to a final destination of thought. This
has important implications for history making. We may think of it as focused on
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the past, but Derrida and Cixious suggest that it may be too much of the present.
Any time we fix an historical narrative, tell or show a history, we conjure the
traces, the ghosts, of those we do not speak about. Justice and ethics, in their view,
demand that we recognise the disjoints in history, conjure its ghosts, and take
responsibility for it being unfinished, and unfinishable, business. History is unfin-
ished, and open. This is a painful counter path from which both others and our-
selves will seek to depart in order to settle into a ‘home’ of methods, approaches,
categories and identities that we hope will tell the truth about the past. Like Hamlet,
we have to reluctantly admit that we need to take responsibility for changing his-
toriography and for conjuring the ghosts that would call out the injustices of the
approaches that we set in place. With that admission, we shoulder the terrible
burden of accepting that metaphysics is revisionary, rather than descriptive. Wiesner-
Hanks’ conjuration of the names of the Gonzales sisters, therefore, is not the end of
The Marvellous Hairy Girls, but, as she notes, its very beginning.
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Ranajit Guha | Gayatri Spivak | Romila Thapar |
Rabindranath Tagore | Kalidas̄a ̄ | Abhinavagupta
Aristotle’s thought marks the limit of Indian historiography. This is how we must
think about the extensive reach of colonialism, Ranajit Guha (1922–) argues in
History at the Limit of World-History. Colonialism insinuates itself not only in the
everyday ways that people act towards one another, but also in whether they credit
each other with ideas, having a past, and histories. In chapter five, we became
acquainted with Daston and Park’s story of the rise of the discriminating and
refined wonder of the connoisseur collector in the early modern world. Their
collector, in the spirit of Francis Bacon, challenged existing categories of thought.
Yet Daston and Park’s Wonders and the Order of Nature was a history of Western
thinkers who wondered, rather than those who were the objects of that wonder,
or their wonders. In the previous chapter, we began to put a name to those
wonders—to the collected, rather than the collector—in the experiences of the
Gonzales sisters. We learned that you cannot just ‘stir in’ the experiences of indi-
viduals and groups who have traditionally been marginalised in history and histor-
iography without stirring up the categories and approaches we use to make sense of
the world. Metaphysics is exposed, unsettled. Women, for example, are not just
objects of thought; a consideration of their experiences in relation to men opens up
new opportunities for us to understand and to act upon our ethical responsibilities
towards others and to see metaphysics in new ways.
This chapter is not simply an extension of these arguments into the territories of
race and colonised peoples. It focuses, rather, on whether the acknowledgement of
what some postcolonialists call the subaltern—the traces of peoples ‘without his-
tory’ within the evidence record of the coloniser—implies the need to walk away
from historiography as we know it and towards an aesthetic ‘historicality’ (aitihasi-
kata) in which the possibility of adbhuta, vismaya or camatka-ra (wonder) is reclaimed.
Ranajit Guha charts this course by showing the affinity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics
with the philosophy of Abhinavagupta (950–1015 CE, also known as Abhinava) in
Rabindranath Tagore’s (1861–1941) idea of passing through the threshold limit of
wonder to experience the ‘historicality of what is humble and habitual’ (History at
the Limit of World-History, p. 94). Romila Thapar (1931–) navigates to a sense of
historicality via very different means: her idea of a Western ‘scientific’ idea of his-
tory. As we shall see, the key explanation for this difference of route is her pro-
fessed need for protection from historiographical interference from the state,
violent threats, and colonial portrayals of India as a timeless land of Europeanised
wonder. I suggest that the common link between these two writers—and
Tagore—could be their refraction of classical Indian metaphysics, and in particular
the metaphysics of light developed from various sources such as Kalidas̄a ̄ (fl. 5th
century CE) by Abhinavagupta. That metaphysics argues for immanence in all
things, including itihasa writings that take in history, and ourselves. Consciousness
of the divine light, and the light in ourselves comes via attunement to wonder,
which is latent in all experiences and built upon the preconditions of distanciation
and universalisation. Consequently, in the metaphysics of light it makes sense to
think of history as being in tune with wonder.
Histories of history rarely, if ever, include India. A notable exception to this
is George Iggers, Edward Wang and Supriya Mukherjee’s A Global History of
Historiography, which includes a good summary of why it has been a disciplinary
blind spot:
A major problem with including Indian historiography … is that not only
Western historians but also, until recently, Indian historians have maintained
that India possessed no history until the British colonizers introduced it in the
nineteenth century.1
Yet while they offer a detailed appraisal of records, annals and genealogies
before the introduction of Western historical forms, even they declare defeat in
judging whether India had a classical historiographical tradition in the manner
of ancient Greece and China. It is true, they acknowledge, citing Vinay Lal’s
The History of History:
… that ancient India did not have a tradition of history writing in the modern
form. ‘None … reveal any understanding of causation in history; none
demonstrate any familiarity with historical method and rules of evidence,’ it
has been said of the Sanskrit texts.2
More often than not modern Indian historiography is collapsed into the topic of
postcolonial historiography, for which there is no shortage of commentary.
Alongside summaries by, for example, Christopher Bayly, there are journals, read-
ers and whole conferences devoted to postcolonial ideas and methodologies.3
Ranajit Guha is credited as the creator of the first postcolonial journal, Subaltern
Studies: Writings on Indian History and Society, in 1982. As Dipesh Chakrabarty
notes, from there, subaltern studies broadened out to postcolonial studies via the
Renewing wonder in postcolonial history 159
broadening of its remit from India to the colonised world, and the successive
acknowledgement of work by, for example, Edward Said on orientalism, Gayatri
Spivak on deconstruction and Homi Bhabha on colonial hybridity and mimicry.4
With these developments came detractors, with Arif Dirlik, for instance, arguing that:
Most of the generalizations that appear in the discourse of postcolonial intel-
lectuals from India may appear novel in the historiography of India but are not
discoveries from broader perspectives … the historical writing[s] of Subaltern
Studies historians … represent the application in Indian historiography of
trends in historical writings that were quite widespread by the 1970s under the
impact of social historians such as E. P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, and a
host of others.5
Out of the combination of these arguments we arrive at a very mixed appraisal of
Indian historiography: new, now a global force, potentially methodologically
parasitic. The result is unfortunate, with the complexities of each of these claims
lost in the frame. Guha’s postcolonial history is a focus of this chapter, but so is the
scientific approach preferred by Romila Thapar. As noted above, I will conjoin
their efforts via an exploration of classical Indian metaphysics before asking whether
this reading, too, would benefit from Spivek’s critical deconstruction in search of
subaltern voices.
Return to historicality
When the British colonised India, they colonised history. History making was an
instrument of subordination that grafted classical Indian texts onto Western notions
of world history. This process, Guha argues in History at the Limit of World-History,
was aided by the double meaning of the term puran̄a (pp. 51–3). Puran̄a refers to an
extensive corpus of mostly Sanskrit texts that cover a wide range of topics, from
cosmology to medicine and traditional lore and myths. Additionally, puran̄a can
denote the cumulative nature of many Hindu classical texts: they are often the
work of multiple hands over centuries. These two features in combination—old,
cumulative texts—made it easy for both Indian elites and Western colonisers alike
to treat the Mahab̄har̄ata, Ramayana and story of Śakuntala,̄ for example, as history
that could be incorporated into western world history. Alternatively, others coun-
ted pre-colonial India as prehistory and started their narratives with the arrival of
the British, thereby rescuing India ‘from Prehistory by her own historians and
ushered by them across the border into World-history’ (p. 54).
To Guha’s view the colonisation of history was incomplete because colonial
histories carried the trace of those colonised, particularly if they were treated as
opposites such as savage versus civilised or rebel versus lawful (Elementary Aspects of
Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, 1999, pp. 2, 17; see also Dominance without
Hegemony and A Rule of Property for Bengal). Moreover, even when historians wrote
about ruins or seemingly emptied lands, the presence of others was implied. This
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will be a familiar point from the discussion on gender in the previous chapter, but
Guha frames this phenomenon in ways that differ on two counts. First, he describes
it as dominance without hegemony, rather than as a haunting. This difference can
be explained through an example: you can write about colonisers but the colonised
are implied in that writing. They are there in the sense of Derrida’s idea of a ‘trace’.
As ghosts, I may think that they can unsettle me and make me feel ‘unhomed’, but
as those dominated without hegemony, I may sense that there is a potential threat
of insurrection. Guha’s ideas are not incompatible with those of Derrida, but his
use of the terms ‘dominance’ and ‘hegemony’ drives home the political force of
marginalising or excluding others, and his use of the word ‘without’ makes it clear
that colonial domination is never complete. Second, he talks of world history being
‘at the limit’ of its meaning, despite the sense that ‘scientific’ world history pre-
vailed over wonder. He writes:
… the battle of paradigms was won for the West. Experience triumphed over
wonder. World-history over itihasa. … But that was also the moment of our
admission to World-history. Until then we, ‘people without history’, had been
left out in the cold of Prehistory. However, once enfranchised, we outdid our
European rulers and teachers in our enthusiasm for the prose of history. The
wide open fields of historicality beyond the precincts of statist narrative were
all but forgotten by the historians. No one among them paid heed to the
alarm sounded once in a while by a creative voice to complain how schooled
academic writing on the Indian past had cut itself off from the prose of the
world and the stories it had to tell. (p. 72)
It is tempting for us to read this as history having reached a dead end, but Guha
wants us to think of it as akin to an Aristotelian threshold in which we experience
wonder and then begin to think about history in new ways (pp. 7, 48–9). World
history is not a natural feature of our world, and it is not beyond negotiation. Nor,
he goes on, are the general metaphysical principles that prompted its birth. It is not,
for example, incumbent upon us to read Aristotle’s opening edict in Posterior Ana-
lytics that all teaching and learning come from pre-existing knowledge as binding
(p. 50).6 Teaching and learning are not just conservative activities; they can be
generative too.
The generation of new knowledge and new ways of thinking about the world
does not need to stem from an encounter with novel phenomena. We can also
experience wonder when we are taken aback by the everyday, or on hearing a
familiar story again. The perplexities that Aristotle describes need not be such
because we sense them in a first encounter. I can note changes in the moon many
times before I experience wonder at them, for instance. To help us understand the
significance of his claim, Guha reminds us of the opening of the Mahab̄har̄ata, in
which a traveller is asked to tell stories that his audience has already heard, rather
than new stories. It is hard to think of a more Indian and less Western beginning to
a story, Guha observes (p. 61). He sees Western thought as having fallen into the
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habitual expectation that novelty generates historical and philosophical knowledge.
Novelty is not assumed for the Indian concepts of adbhuta or adbhutarasa, which
Guha translates as an attunement to wonder or mood of wonder (p. 63). It is not
an exceptional experience or the experience of a person who has particular training
or gifts: it is always present, in every form of life. Consequently, wonder is not tied
to any particular experience and never exhausted by retelling (p.67). This embraces
the past, and notions of history, as he explains:
[Itihasa] has the past as its essence. But it is a past anchored to no experience in
particular. It is precisely such indefiniteness and openness that enables it to
produce … an infinite number of stories and the latter to generate wonder
without end …. Yet, if they have proved to be an inexhaustible source of
wonder for their audience, it is only because they allow language to illuminate
what is unusual about the usual in everyday life. There is no reason why they
should not be acknowledged as the stuff that constitutes a broad and compre-
hensive historicality …. The tale of wonder lives happily with the past. Indeed
the relationship of time and story there is one of playfulness, each renewing
the other in the course of an interaction that can never end if only because it
has never been tied to a beginning (pp. 68–9).
By this account, it is possible to experience wonder via the everyday and different
retellings of the same story. It renews our sense of the world in an everyday sense
of history—aitihasikata or historicality—that is in no way confined to a discipline or
to a genre of writing. In short, history can be everywhere because wonder is
everywhere.
Guha’s History at the Limit of World-History is an argument for an appreciation of
abhutarasa and everyday historicality. In arguing for this, Guha takes his cue from
Tagore, India’s first Nobel Laureate for literature (Tagore, ‘Historicality in Litera-
ture’, in History at the Limit of World-History, pp. 95–9). Tagore did not wish to see
the end of history, but its renewal, or suchana. As Guha explains:
That word could mean inauguration or commencement or an indication to
disclose what is unknown or not quite explicit yet. Whichever way one takes
it, to go back to suchana is to retrace a development to its source and to let it
show up in its history .… Tagore is evidently not interested in taking a stand
against history as such but in pleading for a different approach to it (p. 77).
That different approach, Guha puts it, means ‘travelling over the fence’ of
the existing boundaries of history to neighbouring fields like literature and
aesthetics in which wonder is perenially renewed, as with the creative gaze of
a child observing dew, clouds, or a cow lick a foal (pp. 5, 78).
Tagore’s idea of history is immanent: there is a latent historicality in every gesture,
movement, word and action inside every house and across every field in India.
This is not the immanent transcendence of Western historians who abstract out
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linear stories of states, politics and battles. Nor does it take Western historical form,
with strict verisimilitude. Poetry, the short story, myth, music and art may express
aitihasikata as a ‘history of human mind and belief’ in which the historian is an
active participant. 7 It is, for example, this experience by Rabindranath:
One day I had just come back from school at about four-thirty and found a
dark blue cumulus suspended high above the third storey of our house. What
a marvellous sight that was. Even now I remember that day. But in the history
of that day there was no one other than myself who saw those clouds in quite
the same way as I did or was similarly thrilled. Rabindranath happened to be all by
himself in that instance. Once after school I saw a most amazing spectacle from
our western verandah. A donkey—not one of those donkeys manufactured by
British imperial policy but the animal that had always belonged to our own
society and has not changed in its ways since the beginning of time—one such
donkey had come up from the washermen’s quarters and was grazing on the
grass while a cow fondly licked its body. The attraction of one living being for
another that then caught my eye has remained unforgettable for me until
today. In the entire history of that day it was Rabindranath alone who witnessed the
scene with enchanted eyes. This I know for certain. No one else was instructed by
the history of that day in the profound significance of the sight as was
Rabindranath. In his own field of creativity Rabindranath has been entirely alone and
tied to no public by history. (‘Historicality in Literature’, p. 97).
Here we see that which is unforgettable and beautiful in the everyday, and the
importance of Tagore as a meaning maker who has no need for the public
approval for his efforts. In being alone, Tagore is ‘enchanted’, open to being with
the world and the ‘hunger of history’.8
The radical nature of Tagore’s ‘travelling over the fence’ to historicality is hard
to spot if you interpret as simply being an Indian take on what Western historians
have called ‘history from below’ or the history of everyday people.9 It is not, as
Guha’s short discussion of Heidegger’s treatment of Aristotle’s idea of thaumazein or
wonder in the Metaphysics reveals. Heidegger renders thaumazein as Befindlichkeit,
and Guha renders this in English as attunement. Attunement, as in the mood of
wonder captured in adbhutarasa. With this line of translation offered, Guha sets
down his argument:
[Befindlichkeit] refers not only to a position but focuses on the moment of
positing to indicate how one is to find oneself positioned or disposed.
Understood thus, certain aspects of a long lost European tradition show up in
the light of an unmistakable affinity with the ancient Indian concept of
wonder (p. 65).
In two short sentences, Guha unravels historiography back to Heidegger and on to
Aristotle, and then interprets their thought—modern German and ancient Greek—
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in affinity with ancient Indian thought. Not Indian thought in affinity with Eur-
opean thought—the gesture of the coloniser who harnesses puran̄a to world his-
tory—but the other way around. Aristotle’s thaumazein can make sense in an Indian
tradition that celebrates endless renewal in repetition, and in the everyday. The
renewal of Indian historiography is therefore a renewal of Western historiography
as well.
It is very tempting to argue that Guha’s Tagore-led call for ‘history as creative
writing’ exists far away from the day to day complexities of Indian historio-
graphy.10 Consider, as an example, the reflections of the eminent historian of
ancient India, Romila Thapar, on the consequences she has faced in not wanting to
see history serve Hindu nationalism or any other political agenda:
If some of us feel that Hindutva history is less history and more mythology we
should have the right to say so, without being personally abused, being called
‘anti-national’, ‘academic terrorists worse than the cross-border variety’ and
‘perverts,’ and being threatened with arrest and with being physically put
down. Indeed, a leading Hindutva ideologue, Arun Shourie, even sarcastically
said we ‘eminent historians’ all had hymens so thick that we thought that we
had retained our virginity even when we published signed articles in publica-
tions of the Left. Apart from the sheer crassness and vulgarity of this statement,
if men cannot have hymens, even figuratively speaking, presumably this
remark was directed at women historians (‘In Defence of History’, in The Past
as Present, p. 70).
Thapar’s appointment to the Kluge Chair at the US Library of Congress spawned a
petition which protested her ‘anti-Hinduism’ and school texts she produced were
edited without her consent by the Indian government to remove references to
ancient Indians eating beef (‘Writing History Textbooks: A Memoir’, in The Past as
Present, pp. 73–89).
Thapar expresses support for the blossoming of Indian historiography driven by
writers like Guha. Across her writings, however, she professes the need for a more
pragmatic approach to counter Hindu nationalist historiography and colonialist
tendencies to see India variously as gripped by magic; or historically backward or
stagnant; or as characterised by a timeless Sanskrit culture (‘History and the Public:
An Introduction’, in The Past as Present, pp. 7–8; and A History of India, volume 1,
pp. 15–16). Her pragmatism sees her argue in favour of a ‘scientific’ methodology,
which would seem to be at odds with Guha’s everyday historicality (see for
example History and Beyond). It may even be argued that hers is the historio-
graphical voice of a coloniser, or an outperformance of the historiographical voice
of a coloniser who demolishes myths in order to call out political excesses in the
treatment of the past.11
Yet her work also arguably bears the imprint of classical Indian philosophical
metaphysics, particularly on the preconditions for wonder—which we learn about
as distanciation and universalisation later in this chapter—in making general sense
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of things. This is seen most clearly in her treatment of the Śakuntala ̄ and
Somanatha narratives, including puran̄ic versions of these. Śakuntala ̄ (also
known as Shakuntala) is a key figure in ancient and modern Indian texts. The
earliest account of her story is found in the Mahab̄har̄ata, with subsequent,
varying accounts of her experiences offered, for example, in the play Abhijnana-
sakuntalam (The Recognition of Sakuntala) by Kalidas̄a,̄ in paintings by Ravi
Varma, the poem ‘Sakuntala Its Inner Meaning’ by Tagore, through to William
Jones’ translation Sacontala and films like Anantyatra (1985). At one glimpse,
Śakuntala ̄ is wife of Dushyanta and bearer of his heir, Bharat, and at another
she is the focus of a romantic, tragic epic punctuated by seduction, anguish and
happiness. Her story has shifted over time to match expectations both about the
relations of men and women, and the purpose of writing. The cumulative
result is, as Thapar expresses it, akin to the Alice that grew and grew in Alice in
Wonderland (Śakuntala,̄ p. vii).
It would be fair to expect Thapar to approach the study of Śakuntala ̄ as a win-
nowing down to the historical basis of the story. This would seem, after all, to be
in alignment with her call for a scientific approach to the past. Yet she does not do
that. Rather, the intention of Śakuntala,̄ she is at pains to point out:
Is not to present a definitive study of the narrative and its treatment, but rather
to suggest that when a theme changes in accordance with its location at a
historical moment, the change can illuminate that moment, and the moment
in turn may account for the change (p. vii).
Telling and retelling illuminate the moment, allowing us to appreciate change. A
couple of pages on, she reiterates the point at greater length, making her stance as
an historian even clearer:
Historians comb literature for historical facts, references to events or descrip-
tions of a particular historical time: all of which continues to be a legitimate
historical exercise. My intention here is to change the focus somewhat. I
would like to take a literary item—such as a narrative—retold a few times and
treat this repetition as a prism through which to view points of historical
change … Underlying this exercise is the suggestion that an item of literature,
as a narrative, relates to history, not for what it says which is anyway fictional,
but what it might indicate as being historically significant (p. 1).
Her Śakuntala ̄ will be an acknowledgement of the social power of retelling, an
echo of the opening idea of the Mahab̄har̄ata that it is in hearing a story over and
again that our minds take flight. Moreover, arguably it evinces Tagore’s ‘hunger of
history’ in aitihasikata. Linearity and verisimilitude take a back seat to the idea that
in repetition we might think and feel about the world in new ways.
This is not an isolated historiographical excursion for Thapar. Somanatha is a
revisitation of this approach; an exploration of how Turko-Persian, Sanskrit, Jaina,
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Colonial and twentieth-century Indian nationalists have written about the 1026
raid on the temple at Somanatha, Gujarat. Her point is that there is no received
version of the raid that can be used to justify the politics of Hindu-Muslim rela-
tions in contemporary India (Somanatha, p. x). As with Śakuntala,̄ this is akin to a
negative finding in ‘scientific’ history. Yet there is also an acknowledgement of the
value of multiple tellings beyond that of simply deflating a political claim, as
she explains:
In analysing the various perspectives on Somanatha after the raid of Mahmud,
I would like to explore the idea that the historiography and the narratives that
grow out of an event are significant to an understanding of the historical
complexity of how the event and the space where it occurs is remembered or
forgotten by a range of people (Somanatha, pp. 3–4).
This is reflected in her generous analysis of a broad range of narratives,
including extracts from the relevant texts. This is not the laboured, circuitous
route of a scientific historian that has not made up her mind in favour of a
single telling of events. Her point—as with her arguments in Śakuntala—̄is to
note that sometimes resolution in favour of a single account is not possible, and
that from situations like this, we can learn the value of telling and retelling for
driving thoughts and actions.
Thapar’s approach is not restricted to individuals, events or even—as she argues
in the forward to Exotic Aliens—the history of animals such as lions in India
(Exotic Aliens, pp. 25–61). Her methodological interest in tellings and retellings
underpins her complication of the customary punctuation of early Indian history
into three periods: Hindu, Muslim and British, or ancient, medieval and modern
(‘Interpretations of Early Indian History’, in The Past as Present, pp. 9–28; see also
A History of India, Cultural Pasts, and The Past Before Us). These variations
emphasise differences of view within what is now called India, as well as the
interest that travellers and explorers had in India in early times. And again,
Thapar does not insist on their resolution, allowing the fine-grained differences in
accounts of the past to rebut the colonial impression of a nation suspended in
timeless thrall like the audience who watches a snake charmer over and over
again (History of India, p. 15).
Even the most minor, unresolved variations in poetic, literary, historical,
filmic and artistic tellings of the same story have the potential to trigger a
change in the ways in which we make sense of the world. It is not clear,
therefore, whether we need a linear, singular narrative of events in the form
of Western histories. This logic underpins both Thapar’s and Guha’s visions of
history, even though their arrival reflects very different routes. Thapar is
aware of Guha’s writings, but many of her observations pre-date History at the
Limit of World-History. My view is that classical Indian metaphysics is a
touchstone for both of them, even though its influence plays out in very
different ways.
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The metaphysics of light, wonder in Itihasa
The wonder of itihasa, Guha tells us in History at the Limit of World-History,
lives happily with the past. Indeed, the relationship of time and story there is
one of playfulness, each renewing the other in the course of an interaction that
can never end if only because it has never been tied to a beginning. (p. 69)
These are features he claims for the historicality of Tagore, and which we might also
claim for Thapar’s sustained interest in historical textual variations. At a very general
level, what is at play across their writings is the idea of the general sense of things
being immanent in the world; of us not needing to abstract or to force an under-
standing of that sense but of us being open to the experience of it; and of that
immanence implicating us but us also managing a distanciated understanding of it.
It is possible to read the works of Guha, Tagore and—at a stretch—Thapar as
refractions and renewals of philosophical thought that stretches back at least as far as
the first Sanskrit treatises, the Upanisads (c 1000 BCE), and in particular themes
valued by the tenth century Kashmir Saivist or Tantric philosopher Abhinavagupta.
This particular reading is encouraged by Guha, who writes of the wonder experi-
enced with historicality in this way:
Disengaged from experience, it does not claim to produce anything out of a
given set of causes nor inform anybody of objects attainable by the common
means of knowledge. Neither productive nor informative by intention, it is
still a knowledge in the most profound sense of the term. For the apprehen-
sion of rasa is indistinguishable from self-knowledge, and the rapture generated
by camatkara or wonder approaches ananda, the most profound state of spiritual
bliss. (History at the Limit of World-History, p. 67)
What stands out is Guha’s use of three key Sanskrit terms—rasa, camatkara, and
ananda—that all play an important role in the metaphysics that Abhinavagupta sets
out in his consideration of aesthetic experiences, including the experience of what
Tagore calls historicality.
Abhinavagupta was one of the key progenitors of what Paul Muller-Ortega and
Kirk Templeton have called a Saivist metaphysics of light.12 This metaphysics
ranges across ontology, epistemology and cosmology, but also takes in aesthetics.
Divine light—Siva—is immanent in all things, including ourselves, but it is
immanent without the sense of essentialism that some would see at play in Plato’s
idea of forms or Aristotle’s immanence in things. Without that light, particular
things would not ‘shine’ or exist (Parat̄ris̄íka ̄ Vivaranạ, p. 31).13 Here is Abhinava-
gupta’s way of explaining this, from Tantrasar̄a:
Light, rather than being is the fundamental determinate of reality and
existence. The innate nature of all entities is of the nature of Light as that
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which is not Light cannot be shown to have an innate nature (that is, self-
evidence). (1.55
The reality of that light is understood, and our own selves are liberated, through
the pulsing, throbbing light of a supreme, reflective self-consciousness (prakas̄a).
Here the self is both what illuminates and what is illuminated. Consequently,
ontology and epistemology are thought of as one in metaphysics. Moreover, they
are united in a realist metaphysics: what is illuminated and what illuminates is real
in that it is independent of cognition. What the light reveals is a general sense of
things about reality, not my thoughts or language describing reality. As Abhinava-
gupta explains it:
… the Highest Lord manifests the universe in diverse forms, the ultimate rea-
lity of which consists in shining. The universe is essentially identical with Self.
It is real in its nature. Its highest reality lies in its being one with the Light
of consciousness, and its oneness with the Light of consciousness is never
disrupted (Is̄varapratyabhijñav̄imarsíni, 4.20).14
In this world, consciousness is consequently considered active and creative, realiz-
ing itself through will (icchasákti), knowledge (jñanasákti), and action (kriyasákti) (Sri
Tantral̄oka, 1.4). It pulses or vibrates outwards into manifestation, and back again
from manifestation into the self (Sri Tantral̄oka, 4.181–7).
Every perception, thought, sensation or emotion is a pulsation of consciousness,
an expansion towards the perception of an individual object and contraction back
to subjectivity (Is̄v́arapratyabhijñav̄imarsíni,̄ 1.5.14). Words, too, have the capability
of revealing the most general sense of things as categories (tattvas) that are united in
the light of consciousness. To see this, consider the way that Abhinavagupta
describes the phonemes of Sanskrit as part of metaphysics:
The letters from ‘a’ to visarga denote Śiva tattva; those from ka to nȧ denote
the five elements from the earth up to the ether; those from ca up to ña
denote the five tanmat̄ras from smell up to sound; those from tạ to nạ denote
the five karmendriyas (organs of action) from the feet up to the tongue;
those from ta to na denote five jñanendriyas from the nose up to the ears;
those from pa to ma denote the group of five i.e., manas, ahaṃkar̄a, buddhi,
prakrṭi, and purusạ; those from ya to va denote through raga, vidya,̄ kala ̄ and
maȳa ̄ tattvas …. The letters from ‘sá’ to ‘ksạ’denote the group of five cate-
gories, viz., Maham̄aȳa,̄ Śuddhavidya, Is̄v́ara, Sadas̄íva and Śakti. (Parat̄ris̄íka ̄
Vivaran ̣a, pp. 98–101)
This everyday metaphysics also embraces Abhinavagupta’s aesthetics, and in parti-
cular his philosophy of theatrics, where we find lines of thought on consciousness,
pulsation and camatkara that run back to the great playwright Kalidas̄a,̄ and onwards
to Tagore, Guha, and Thapar.
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Everything and every experience radiates light, including ourselves. Yet there
were some experiences that captured Abhinavagupta’s attention as highlighting the
pulsation of consciousness well. Words are one example, as we discovered above.
Aesthetic experiences such as going to the theatre are another. Rasa, the Sanskrit
term for aesthetics, captures the idea of the essence of things in the manner of the
emanating sap of a plant, and the experience of wonder in aesthetics—abdhurasa—
can be thought of as tasting that essence or sap cognitively, via perceptions,
thoughts and emotions. There is a dynamism here that aligns well with light, the
light which shines from everything. Aesthetics, and the theatre in particular, distils
the general essence of things in ways that are conducive to our experience of
wonder and consciousness of the light. We can see this way of thinking at work in
Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Bharati Muni’s (fl. 300 BCE–100 CE) older work
on aesthetics, the Natyasastra:
When we go to the theatre, we do not have any inclination to think: today, I
will have to accomplish something real. Rather we feel: I will listen to and see
something beyond my everyday experience, something worthy of my atten-
tion, whose innermost essence is pure joy. I will share this experience with the
whole audience. One’s heart becomes like a spotless mirror; for all one’s pre-
occupations have been completely forgotten and one is lost in aesthetic rap-
ture, listening to the fine singing and music. At this moment, we can identify
ourselves with joy, with sorrow, in fact with any one of the feelings evoked in
us by the performance of the actors. Listening to the dramatic text, looking at
the different figures on the stage, we get an intuitive knowledge of what
Rama or Ravana, for instance, are. And such a knowledge is not circum-
scribed by a definite time or place. Our mind, carried away by wondering
(camatkara), takes for a couple of days the very form of its own Self and sees the
whole world through it. (Natỵasás̄tra of Bharatamuni, 1.107)
The potential for wonder is in all of us, and our experiences with all things—even
unreal things such as fictional characters—can trigger wonder (Tantraloka, 91.1.53).
Yet wonder is not the same as more everyday experiences of cognition such as acts
of memory and inference. It is a state of immersion in which we taste the light
through expansion in perception and contraction back to subjectivity (Natỵasás̄tra of
Bharatamuni, 1.279). 15 Moreover, we may experience wonder in some contexts
more than others. The generative power of theatre as fuelling consciousness of
light stems from two characteristics, all of which are intimated in the extract above.
Abhinavagupta sees the generative power of the theatre at work first in what we
might think of as distanciation or depersonalisation. What we see on the stage is
disjoined from our everyday experiences, including the expectations and worries
that we might have. Theatres support this shift through the use of design features
such as curtains and a proscenium that are quite unlike the features of our everyday
world. As Abhinavagupta puts it, ‘I will listen to and see something beyond my
everyday experience’. Second, our experience of the theatre is an experience in
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universalisation. The play that I see is not a mimetic experience of real life. It
promises representations whose ‘innermost essence is pure joy’, representations that
I can share with the whole audience and which give us intuitive knowledge of the
human and the divine which are ‘not circumscribed by a definite time or place’.
Distanciation and universalisation provide the ground conditions for the connec-
tion of the self with the light in things and the light in ourselves. We are absorbed
by wonder (camatkara) in the world of the players, and in this wonder, we are lib-
erated from our individuality—the ‘I’—and the boundaries between me and things
(subject-object dualities). By the repeated, and renewing consideration of what we
perceive in the theatre and ourselves, achieve the ‘bliss which is the true nature of
one’s own self … the bliss the comes from realising [the light of the self] with the
highest Brahman [Divine light]’ (Natỵasás̄tra of Bharatamuni, 1.277).16 We are
implicated in the theatre—as with the world—and it is connected back to us.
Wonder as camatkara denotes a threshold when I pass beyond the world of
dualities and come to appreciate the unity that is light in all things, including
myself. This is not to suggest that the experience of the theatre is all about me, for
the case of tragedies highlights our active immersion in experiences in which
compassion and concern for others, return to reflection on our ourselves and then
renewed attention to others is a key part of any serenity that we achieve from
apprehension of the light. As he reflects in Paratrimshikavivarana:
… this wondering (camatkara) is present in the very heart of suffering: some
sort of internal joy, made of energy, what a wife or a son used to give us in
former times blossoms out once again at the view of people who look like
them, or on hearing some moaning. We think ‘They will never come back,’
and that is the very essence of suffering: a particular wonderment made up of
despair. As it has been said: ‘Even confronted with pain, there is a possibility,
thanks to the blossoming forth of consciousness, of gaining access to
serenity’.17
The source for the quote that rounds out this extract is the poet and playwright
Kalidas̄a,̄ who reflects in his retelling of the Śakuntala ̄ story on how tragedy begets
the connection back to consciousness. He writes:
Often a man, though happy, becomes uneasy of mind on seeing beautiful
objects and hearing sweet music. Surely, he remembers in his soul, though
vaguely, associations of former births, deeply implanted in him (The Recognition
of Sakuntala, in The Theatre of Memory, 5.2).
I wish to say more on Kalidas̄a ̄ in just a moment, but for now I want to return to
the example of historicality given by Tagore that I included earlier in this chap-
ter—from page 97 of Guha’s translation of ‘Historicality in Literature’—for it bears
the characteristics of theatrical experiences that fuel wonder. We recall that it cap-
tures Tagore’s perceptions after he has returned home from school. Seen in the
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light of Abhinavagupta’s writings above, we can also sense its conveyance of dis-
tanciation. Tagore tells us that he ‘happened to be all by himself’, alone, and ‘tied
to no public by history’. Moreover, it captures the general, the universal in his sight
of a ‘donkey—not one of those donkeys manufactured by British imperial policy
but the animal that had always belonged to our own society and has not changed
in its ways since the beginning of time’ and the universal attraction of one living
being for another when the cow licks the donkey. He is not a passive witness to
events but is ‘in the field of his own creativity’, and because of all these elements
above in combination, he experiences ‘a marvellous sight’, an unforgettable thrill.
Aesthetic experiences, we learn from this example, need not take place in a spe-
cially designed place such as a theatre. Nor are they confined to a single genre or
textual format: the range of texts in itihasa captures this sense well. Any experience
that sees us distanced from ordinary actions and expectations and in which we are
open to the contemplation of the universal is grounds for wonder. Itihasa, Tagore’s
history, is grounds for wonder.
Kalidas̄a ̄ is the common thread between Abhinavagupta and Tagore. At one
level this is hardly surprising given that his plays and poems are appreciated in India
at a level akin to that of Shakespeare in the UK. My point is, however, that Kali-
das̄a ̄ is more than a reference point for Tagore; he engages with him aesthetically,
in the sense of Abhinavagupta’s metaphysics of light. We have seen above Abhi-
navagupta’s referencing of Recognition of Sakuntala to make the case that tragedies
can like other theatrical genres provide the conditions for experiences of wonder.
This is just one example not of citation, but of reflection that deepens the author’s
movement from self to other in seeking the light.
So too, the relation of Kalidas̄a ̄ to Tagore is rich and iterative, suggestive of a
lifetime of excursions out via reading and reflection back on self-practice. A search
for, and experience of, wonder. At the opening of Tagore’s poem ‘The Meghadu-ta’
(‘The Cloud Messenger’), for example, we see him address Kalidas̄a ̄ directly as
‘supreme poet’ of the first, and ‘hallowed’ version of the Meghadu-ta’ (Selected Poems,
p. 50).18 Later in life he returns to describe his first encounter with the Meghadu-ta,
emphasising his sense of what Abhinavagupta would call the light of its words:
I can recollect many things which I did not understand, but which stirred me
deeply. Once, on the roof terrace of our riverside villa, at the sudden gathering
of clouds my eldest brother repeated aloud some stanzas from The Cloud Mes-
senger by Kalidas. I could not understand a word of the Sanskrit, neither did I
need to. His ecstatic declamation and the sonorous rhythm were enough for
me (Reminiscences, in Tagore Omnibus, vol. 1, p. 266).
In between, Tagore draws Kalidas̄a ̄ to itihasa, noting that the lack of what the West
would call historical information about his life makes it possible to create stories—
even theatre—about him in which distance and universality trigger our own search
for the unity of light in self and all things. In Kalidas̄a’̄s works, there is an ‘emo-
tionally rich, learned, strange otherworldliness,’19 where the ‘emotionally rich’ is
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rasa and otherworldliness denotes the experience of wonder. In short, Tagore
experiences Kalidas̄a ̄ in the metaphysics of light.
In this historicality, the idea of history is far from the presentation of universals at
work, linearly, in the actions of individuals or of communities or nations. Rather,
Kalidas̄a’̄s works trigger in us an appreciation of our need to engage and to con-
sistently reengage with the categories and the universal that emanate in the world
and in ourselves. This will mean an aversion to received history, any singular telling
or timeline that attempts to set the record straight. It will also mean distancing
ourselves from boundaries that Western notions of the idea of history draw
between past and present, fiction and history, and theatre and history.
With this reading of Tagore and Kalidas̄a ̄ in hand, we return to Guha and to
Thapar. As I noted above, Guha’s call upon Tagore’s idea of historicality is explicit.
Moreover, we should now note that he also acknowledges Abhinavagupta for his
understanding of camatkara or wonder as omnipresent and as a trigger for histori-
cality. It is in acknowledgement of Abhinavagupta that Guha first talks of itihasa as
wonder, as not tied to any particular experience, and as therefore never exhausted
of retelling (History at the Limit of World-History, p. 67). This serves as a preface to
the description of itihasa at pages 67–8 of History at the Limit of World-History that I
provided earlier in this chapter. As with Tagore’s example of historicality, I will
revisit it in the context of our discussion on the metaphysics of light. The presence
of distanciation is sounded in the past of itihasa as not ‘anchored’ to any particular
experience. Universality is denoted in there being no need to be ‘tied to a begin-
ning’, and in the idea of ‘indefiniteness and openness’. Both distanciation and
universality come together in wonder to ‘illuminate what is unusual about the
usual in everyday life’, a wonder in which we move outwards to time and to story,
and back to ourselves in a course of interaction that forever renews, and which
therefore never ends.
The renewing process of camatkara takes in all things, which in Guha’s case also
extends to Western notions of history, philosophy, and metaphysics. We recall my
earlier suggestion that History at the Limit of World-History was a reading of Aris-
totle’s idea of wonder and metaphysics as being in alignment with the Sanskrit idea
of camatkara. It turns out that this is not a one off, for he also renews our under-
standing of Hegel through historicality. Imagine, he asks us,
If the writing of history were to ground itself in such historicality, it would
have a subject-matter as comprehensive as the human condition itself. The
world would open up with all of its pasts ready to serve for its narratives. No
continent, no culture, no rank or condition of social being would be con-
sidered too small or too simple for its prose. On the contrary, we would be
ushered into a complex universe ‘of finitude and mutability, of entanglement
with the relative, of the pressure of necessity from which the individual is in
no position to withdraw.’ As one can see from this description, it would be
the world of the prose of the world itself. And what stories would it have to
tell! (History at the Limit of World-History, p. 22)
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The Hegel cited in this extract, we should note, is the Hegel of Aesthetics, not the
Hegel of The Philosophy of History that is cited elsewhere in Guha’s book. Everything
emanates light, including ourselves, and in the experience of aesthetics that is the
telling of history we have no right to separate ourselves out from it, not even Hegel.
This brings us to Thapar, whom we might see as connected by the longest bow
to itihasa. In The Past Before Us: Historical Traditions of Early North India, Thapar
makes an extended case for a conjoined puran̄a-itihasa tradition. She sees this as
contributing to an ancient Indian history in which both history and historical
consciousness took shape from a diverse range of historiographies, including those
which took the form of historical writing akin to that produced in the West.
(p. 701). Itihasa has a history, but she also argues that our search for it is the search
for a chimera because its purpose is to:
project an earlier age and its ideals, as well as to introduce the different context
of the later time when the composition was re-edited.… Thus, the archae-
ological search for material culture as the counterpart of the epic becomes
something of a chimera. The manipulation of time in the epic is too complex
for there to be a correlation with archaeological periodization. At most, arte-
facts may provide tangible forms to some descriptions in the epic. (The Past is
Before Us, p. 163).
This plays out not just in her words, but in her work with various texts in Sakun-
tala and Somanatha. We recall two excerpts from Śakuntala,̄ which I included earlier
in this chapter. The first, from the seventh page of the preface, stresses that hers
will not be a definitive study, but rather a play between the universal and the
specific, and the other way around. A couple of pages on, at page one, she stresses
her distanciation from the expectation that the scientific historian will come down
in favour of one version of the truth and her predilection instead for repetitions
and variations as a ‘prism’ on change. This universality provides the ground for her
delight in the variations of the past, her wish to break away from straightened
nationalist histories that alienate the diversity of experiences that constitute India.
Hers is a wonder in tune with the metaphysics of light.
Yet Thapar is in one way more metaphysically insistent than Guha in her
exploration of itihasa. She relocates Tagore and Kalidas̄a ̄ in a sense of historicality.
Neither is a reified, a singular source for her idea of history: they jostle with each
other and with versions of the past from the Mahab̄har̄ata, Monier Williams, Jones
and the theatre of the cinema today. These tellings of the past are entwined with one
another—East and West—cross over genres and times, and implicate us, as she notes,
in our use of them to illuminate how we think the world ought to be. In holding
back from distilling them all down, she invites us to reopen our appreciation of the
world, including our being in it. In a way, they might contribute to what Tagore
called swadesh, a non-geopolitical construct, a deterritorialised imagined community
in which no single voice speaks and we are open to the world.20 Her writings are a
powerful reminder that itihasa comes clothed in many forms.
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Can the subaltern speak?
It might not have escaped your attention that, I, a woman from a different settler
society which is yet to substantively credit Aboriginal peoples with a notion of
historicality, have tidily grounded Indian historiography in a classical Saivist
metaphysics of light. That was very tidy of me. Tidy is the problem, Gayatri
Spivak argues in key texts such as Critique of Postcolonial Reason. In the last chap-
ter, I noted that Jacques Derrida’s writings refer to, and are intertwined with, the
trace of others who acknowledge the burden of learning to live. In that light, I
positioned Hélène Cixous’ writings as a counter trace to Derrida, arguing that her
exploration of her relationship with Algeria is an acknowledgement of us being
‘so close’ but never at a final destination of thought. Every attempt at making
general sense of things conjures up the trace of those who are denied our hospi-
tality. Those denied haunt us. Derrida’s and Cixious’ challenge to us was to
recognise metaphysics not only as descriptive, but as prescriptive, an attempt to fix
the world in ways that lifts from us the personal burden of an ethics lived in our
openness and hospitality to others.
Spivak is another counter trace to Derrida, literally in her translation of his Of
Grammatology (1967), but philosophically and historically in her challenge to him
and to all of us about whether we will let the subaltern—particularly women—
speak. Critique of Postcolonial Reason unmasks the legacy of European metaphysics in
denying the subaltern humanity and voice, right through to today. For just as the
‘three wise men of the Continental (European) tradition’—Kant, Hegel and
Marx—stripped humanity down to its European lights, so too postcolonial theorists
have not been immune from creating historiography with an elitist bent (pp. 111,
276). Their own privilege—of lives lived, for example, outside of India and inside
the well-endowed universities of the US—can be too easily forgotten when we
read their history, philosophy and literature. In the case of India, what might result
is not a breaking down of the metaphysics of presence, as Derrida called it, but the
reinscription and masking of the privilege of Sanskritic Brahmans over dalits, out-
castes, yadavs and the various Aboriginal groups of India. The strength and diffi-
culty of Spivak’s prose have made her an easy target for critics. But she reminds us
of the import of the two phases of deconstruction described in the last chapter. The
first focuses on how ideas are defined by their traces; the second moves beyond the
positioning and counter positioning of those opposites to a personalised sense of
ethics that seeks openness and affirmative relations with the ‘other’, particularly
women. These phases play out in the move from what she calls colonial discourse
studies to transnational cultural studies, the complication of economics, philosophy,
literature, history and other cultural forms, by the lived experience of women. We
cannot escape metaphysics, but we can let the subaltern speak, she urges, if only we
are prepared to listen.
Spivak’s argument that there is no escape from metaphysics aligns with many of
the ideas laid out in my discussion of Derrida and Cixous in the last chapter. But
she extends their thinking in laying out the argument that we can encourage
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multiple, even conflicting attempts, at metaphysics by listening to groups who have
formally been cast as the ‘native’, particularly women. Guha and Thapar would
seem to be far from this suggestion, but it is important to consider the implications
of their understandings of itihasa. Guha opts for the everyday historicality that is
latent in all of us. He does so by consciously appropriating Western metaphysics
and reading it in the light of Saivism. Thapar holds back from coming down in
favour of a single telling of India’s early past. Indeed, she complicates it, much to
the frustration of those who would wish to harness it more firmly to political ends.
These inclinations, I believe, suggest an interest in listening.
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THE BANALITY OF HISTORY
Martin Heidegger | Hannah Arendt
I have faced writing this chapter with dread. Dread because Martin Heidegger
(1889–76) stands as both accused and accuser. Accused for his unquestionably anti-
Semitic remarks and his endorsement of National Socialism, all brought to a head
again by the publication in 2014 of his so-called Black Notebooks from 1931 to
1941. Accuser as the one who wishes to shake us from our state of sleepwalk and
to return to Aristotle’s idea of philosophy beginning with wonder so that we might
wrestle with the question of what it means to be. You can of course treat the
accused and the accuser as two Heideggers, and deal with them separately. Yet
Aristotle never suggested that wonder was a pleasant experience, and none of us,
Hannah Arendt (1906–75) has argued, are exempt from being overtaken at wonder
at the simple and of succumbing to the banality of evil (‘Martin Heidegger at
Eighty’, and Eichmann in Jerusalem).
At the limit: the Holocaust
There is no shelter or stillness apart from the Holocaust. The depth and the
scale of the individual horrors and collective destruction involved challenge
us even today to think about whether any sense can be made of it at all.
Representation may seem necessary, but also abhorrent, as Theodor Adorno
argues:
The so-called artistic rendering of the naked physical pain of those who were
beaten down with rifle butts contains, however distantly, the possibility that
pleasure can be squeezed from it. The morality that forbids us to forget this for
a second slides off into the abyss of its opposite .… By this alone an injustice is
done to the victims, yet no art that avoided the victims could stand up to the
demands of justice.1
He is not the only one to see the Holocaust as demanding an invidious choice: Primo
Levi recounts the decision of survivors about whether to speak or to remain silent.2 Their
struggle, David Carroll has argued, is due to the Holocaust being ‘a limit case of
knowledge and feeling, in terms of which all such systems of belief and thought, all forms
of literary and artistic expression seem irrelevant or even criminal’.3 Saul Friedlander has
also spoken of the Holocaust as an ‘event at the limits’, and Berel Lang on how ‘certain
limits based on a combination of historical and ethical constraints’ shape what repre-
sentations can be made of it as a matter of ‘fact and right’.4 The limit posited in all of these
cases is not an outer boundary, beyond which we cannot pass. This much is suggested
by Lang when she notes that talk of the impossibility of representing the Holocaust
comes with a ‘negative rhetoric’, but which we might also think of as a ‘un rhetoric’:
We hear it referred to as unspeakable, and we usually afterward a fairly
detailed description of what is unspeakable, that description intended, of
course, to prove that the designation was warranted.5
Thomas Tresize takes all of these descriptions of the Holocaust as a limit as sug-
gesting that it is ‘taboo’. This means that there will be limits to the evidence about
it and what forms of representation of it will be accepted by historians, their read-
ers, survivors and their families, and the wider community. There is nothing to
stop people from crossing over the boundaries implied, but it is extremely unlikely
that other people will accept their efforts.6 In this case, the limit is something we
will not cross if we wish to remain in good standing with other people.
Dominick LaCapra sees the ‘limit event’ of the Holocaust differently, as an
extreme trauma that makes third person writing by historians unsuitable. Historians
can negotiate that limit via the ‘empathetic unsettlement’—the blurring of the
boundary between the perspective of the historian and the victim of the extreme
trauma—which can presage psychoanalytical historiographical ‘acting out’ and
‘working through’. Acting out is seen in the compulsive living out of the trauma,
rehearsing its details over and over again; working through on the other hand is an
open-ended process seen in getting distance on the trauma, thinking about the
experience in the comparative frame of life then and life now.7 Not everyone
agrees with him that the Holocaust can be part of a process of ‘normalisation’ via
working through, even it that process is seen as open ended. So how should we
think of this talk of the Holocaust being at ‘the limit’?
Dwelling in wonder
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle suggests that a limit can be thought of as:
the last of each thing, and the first point outside which no part of a thing can
be found … it is obvious that ‘limit’ has not only as many senses as ‘beginning’
but even more; because the beginning is a kind of limit, but not every limit is
a beginning. (Metaphysics V.17.1022a4–5)
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A limit can be an end, but it can also be a beginning: it is the ‘last’ and it is the
‘first’. Aristotle’s logic can be applied to ideas as well as to spatial or topographical
considerations. The Holocaust as taboo, for example might be seen as circum-
scribing socially unacceptable publications, whereas the Holocaust as extreme
trauma might be seen as the beginning of ‘empathetic unsettlement’ and learning
to live again. This latter sense of limit as beginning runs through Heidegger’s
thought, starting in section 12 of Being and Time with his interpretation of the ‘in’
in ‘being in’ as residing, dwelling in, or a state of familiarity with something, rather
than topographical containment. This idea is then played out in his definition of
curiosity as ‘not dwelling anywhere’, as restlessness and excitement at novelty and
change in section 36, and then again in the contrasting definitions he offers for
curiosity and wonder. The curious, he tells us, have nothing to do with the con-
templation ‘that wonders at’ being, or wondering to the point of not under-
standing. They know just in order to know and are shaped by idle talk of the kind
described in the quote that opens this chapter (1.V.172, p. 166; see also History of
the Concept of Time, 1925, §29.376–8, p. 273).8
Heidegger revisits and expands on the idea of wonder many times across his
writings, but the sense of it as dwelling remains. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
we learn that it banishes illusions that ‘settle’ with stubbornness in philosophy
(466–468, p. 328) and in Introduction to Metaphysics the philosophical illusions
wonder contends with are described as a ‘mature sureness’ of thought and a ‘rich-
ness in word and stone’ (p. 126). Those illusions are not everyday matters, for in
the fifth Black Notebook, wonder is described as working on the ‘question-worthy’,
the rare and the essential (Ponderings II–VI, V.71.352–3, p. 257) and in ‘The Origin
of the Work of Art’ the historical mistaken for the natural. He writes:
The way that we talk about the thingness of things may seem natural to us,
tradition has simply forgotten the unfamiliar source from which it arose, which
struck people as strange and caused them to wonder (Poetry, Language,
Thought, p. 24).
In summary, wonder opens what is thought to be locked (Discourse on Thinking,
p. 90). It opens our understanding that the ways in which we make general sense
of the world are historical, and therefore that they are open to change.
We should therefore not be surprised to see Heidegger argue for the role of
wonder in returning us to Plato’s perplexity at the idea of being and to a first
beginning in which being is sufficiently unsettled, unconcealed or historicised that
we can ask questions about it (Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), I. Prospect.
4, 6, 17, pp. 10, 18, 37; Being and Time, Int. II.19, p. 18). He is aware of the dif-
ficulty of the project, and the limited success of his predecessors in even starting it.
Hegel is a rare exception, showing with his illumination of metaphysics as history
and history as metaphysics that he was the ‘first’ to think the philosophy of the
Greeks as a whole (‘Hegel and the Greeks’, p. 324). Yet wonder is not a blanket
state of perplexity in that return. Heidegger’s Freiburg lecture series from 1937–8,
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published as Basic Questions of Philosophy, provides a fine-grained analysis of the
distinction between wonder as Thaumazein and the ‘ordinary wonder’ of curiosity
or marvelling (Verwunderung), admiration (Bewunderung), astonishment (Staunen)
and awe (Bestaunen). Those who are curious are ‘bewitched and encharmed’ with
the novel, exceptional, unexpected, surprising and exciting and eschew the familiar
and the ordinary. This description will be familiar from my earlier account of
curiosity in Being and Time, but Heidegger also adds a coda that the objects of the
curious remind him of the endless variety of offerings in the cinema (pp. 136–7). In
admiration, the production and nature of objects of curiosity are explicitly
acknowledged, evaluated and appreciated (p. 142). Finally Staunen and Bestaunen
are seen in degrees of stupefaction or dumbfoundedness at one extraordinary thing
(p. 143). What distinguishes the varieties of ordinary wonder from Thaumazein is
that the former takes the ordinary for granted (pp. 144–145, 149). Thaumazein, as
Mary-Jane Rubenstein puts it, ‘wonders at the inscrutability of the ordinary’.9
Moreover, it ‘dwells’, or as Heidegger argues ‘[p]hilosophy becomes more won-
drous the more it becomes what it really is,’ away from the idle talk of those who
are unknowingly lodged within the confines of habitual metaphysics; the accel-
erating domination of technology over nature and people; the treatment of people
as objects of consumption; and psychologists who wish to disenchant and to dis-
possess philosophy of the wondrous (pp. 141, 153–6).
Wonder as Thaumazein dwells upon the ordinary, rendering it uncanny
(unheimlich) and un-homing us in ways that we learned about in chapter eight.10 It
does not dissipate after Theaetetus’ head swims. It is the first point at the limit. In
extreme wonder, there is no escape because to explain the inscrutable would be to
destroy it (Basic Questions of Philosophy, pp. 145, 150). But with this disposition,
history can begin (p. 147). History, Heidegger tells us in an earlier part of the
Freiburg lectures, is not the conservative description of the past through the lens of
the present. On Heidegger’s terms, this is better called ‘historiography’. History, by
contrast, is revolutionary: ‘an upheaval and recreating of the customary so that the
beginning might be restructured’ (p. 39). History historicises what we assume is
natural, showing us that there are other possibilities. History, in short, is creative
metaphysics or the possibility of a new beginning with no metaphysics; historio-
graphy is conservative, descriptive metaphysics.
Returning to difference
Heidegger doubted whether dwelling in wonder could be started, let alone sus-
tained (Basic Questions of Philosophy, pp. 159–60). Nonetheless, his writing shows
persistence with the idea that this disposition is needed if we are to begin to un-
home our notions of being. Arendt sees Heidegger’s dwelling with wonder as
decisive in reflecting on who he was (‘Martin Heidegger is Eighty’).11 This, in her
view, starts with his idiosyncratic reading of Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideas of wonder
as dwelling with the ordinary as strange. It continues with him eschewing the idle
talk of the curious—including the academic curious described in the quote at the
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start of this chapter—in favour of the concealed and the clearing of the solitary
thinker. The stage is thereby set for the ‘hidden king’ to lay down Holzwege, ‘wood
paths’ which lead nowhere out of the wood. He is, Arendt concludes, Thales in
Theaetetus:
While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a
neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so
eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there
before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in
philosophy.12
What lay before Heidegger’s feet was the rise of Hitler and National Socialism, the
second world war and the Holocaust. These events, unlike the well that Thales fell
into, were not something that he did not see. The publication of his Black Note-
books in 2014 dispel any doubts we might have about his involvement with the
Nazi Party from 1930–34 and the anti-Semitic nature of some of his writings. He
was implicated, and then he withdrew. He wanted no part of ‘folkish-racist’ slo-
gans and saw universities as having failed to speak beyond their rapidly growing
public relations departments (Ponderings II–VI, 94, pp. 191; 148). Heidegger with-
drew and chose to dwell with wonder, Arendt argues. He lived a long life, during
which the scale and the horror of the crimes committed became apparent. He said
little about what happened in Germany and across Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.
What we are left with, Ingo Farin observes:
Is the ghostly absence of almost any sympathy for the humiliated, the wron-
ged, and mistreated victims of Nazi violence, the lack of moral or ethical cri-
tique of the perpetrators themselves, and the outright contempt with which
Heidegger dismisses all moderate or principled voices attempting to hold up
traditional standards and values of a Christian or liberal-democratic prove-
nance, all of which he considers hopelessly implicated in the very same mod-
ernity that caused the problems in the first place.13
This absence is the ghostly trace of Chapter Eight in this book.
Arendt’s fable-like story about the hidden king suggests the jagged view of the
servant girl who jeered at Thales. Some would say she fell in a well of her own
making in having a relationship with Heidegger, and in putting forward the gen-
eralisation in Eichmann in Jerusalem that Jewish leaders—particularly those on Jewish
Councils—abetted Nazi atrocities through their cooperation.14 Yet she, like Hei-
degger, argues for a return to the beginnings of philosophy in order to re-set it on
a different course. The course that she argues for—the return of the philosopher to
a new philosophical-political-historical realm of thought and doing—appears to
differ markedly from that of Heidegger’s solitary thinker. As we shall see, however,
they share a focus on the ordinary, as the determinant of reality. Regardless of
whether we agree with Heidegger that the ordinary needs to be unconcealed, or
182 The banality of history
with Arendt that consensus is good, their approaches skew the focus of wonder
towards the inscrutability of the ordinary and away from the unusual, the rare, or
extraordinary. Even with Arendt’s determination to treat humans as ends in
themselves, and not means to various ends, neither thinker protects us from the risk
of falling down the well of the Holocaust.
As you might expect with a discussion on Arendt, we begin with Adolf Eich-
mann, but the path of our thought will soon travel beyond the well-worn lines set
out in Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Origins of Totalitarianism, to the origins of
Western philosophy with Plato. What unsettled Arendt most about the actions of
the Nazi bureaucrat Eichmann was how little mental effort he brought to actions
that would result in the extermination of countless men, women and children. He
was not Hitler, spouting hate from the top. He wanted job advancement and
brought his best to minute keeping, operational targets, business processes and
logistical efficiencies. He was a SS-Obersturmbannführer—lieutenant colonel—who
made sure that the trains ran on time and that ever more efficient means were
found to exterminate innocent people. He was not stupid, Arendt stresses:
It was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means identical with stupid-
ity—that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that
period. And if this is ‘banal’ and even funny, if with the best will in the world
one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann, that
is still far from calling it commonplace. (Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
Banality of Evil, pp. 287–88)
Banality arises when we relinquish responsibility and act without thinking or even
remembering. We forget to think of others and to treat them with respect, as ends in
themselves. Eichmann is not singular in this regard, for the absence of convictions and
thoughtlessness, Arendt elaborates in The Human Condition, is one of the ‘outstanding
characteristics of our time’, as seen in ‘the heedless recklessness and hopeless confusion
or complacent repetition of “truths” which have become trivial and empty’ (p. 5; see
also The Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 473–4). History plays its part in maintaining this
world, ‘historifying’ people as enacting the will of a leader or party or instantiating a
scientific theory. In this world there are no contingent acts and no acts due to indivi-
dual responsibility (Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 307). Eichmann is therefore not the
cause, but the result of a world gone wrong, but we can address it if we simply think
about what we are doing and take responsibility for our actions.
It sounds like simple advice, Arendt suggests, but the return to responsibility and
care for one another means dealing with a deep-seated problem, one set in course
by Plato in his Republic. Socrates noted, Plato tells us, ‘that many opinions held by
many people about such matters as beauty and justice are floating around some-
where in between reality and unreality’ and that ‘[m]ost people are denizens of that
intermediate zone of flux’. Like Heidegger’s ‘idle talkers’, they are content to
inspect ‘swarms of irrelevancies’ instead of seeking the Eternal or the Good (480d).
It is for these reasons, Plato records Socrates as saying, that:
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the philosopher holds his peace and minds his own business, standing aside
and, as it were, seeking a sheltering wall against the storm and blast of dust and
rain. Observing others given over to lawlessness, he is content if he can keep
himself free of iniquities and evil deeds and depart this life content, at peace,
and with blessed hope. (496d)
Similarly, in Sophist 263e, Plato defines thought as ‘silent inner conversation of
the soul with itself’. This ‘standing aside’ or ‘seeking a sheltering wall’ lays the
ground for what Arendt describes as the ‘world alienation’ at work in Des-
cartes’ philosophy, which Kant’s ‘enlarged mentality’ of dialogue in the pre-
sence of others was not enough to remedy. So too, history from the time of
Herodotus served this cause by prioritising thoughts and words over the things
that people did or made (‘The Concept of History’, in Between Past and Future,
p. 54). Philosophy became the generator of ideal types—what Kwame Appiah
has described as the ‘as if’ feature of human thought—and its practitioners
revered seclusion.15
Moreover, Arendt argues, philosophy came to conflate the idea of an ideal type
with that of an abstract individual (The Promise of Politics, pp. 76, 123; and ‘Philoso-
phy and Politics’). The course of the world was set, a course that would eventually
lead to Eichmann. Arendt sums up the current state of affairs by saying:
Our tradition of political thought began when Plato discovered that it is
somehow inherent in the philosophical experience to turn away from the
common world of human affairs; it ended when nothing was left of this
experience but the opposition of thinking and acting, which, depriving
thought of reality and action of sense, makes both meaningless. (‘Tradition and
the Modern Age’, p. 25; see also ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, p. 162)
Into the vacuum comes the dictator, who makes it all too easy—banal, indeed—for
people to relinquish responsibility.
Resetting the political realm means unwinding the split between philosophy and
politics ushered in by Plato. A conjoined philosophy-politics would, Arendt
believes, provide a remedy through the study of the ‘coexistence and association of
different men’ (The Promise of Politics, p. 93). Her basis for this argument is the
point that freedom and equality are nonsensical terms when looked at in the light
of the abstract individual: they can only develop in a group because they have no
meaning inside individuals but only between them (‘Introduction into Politics’,
p. 170). Arendt’s point looks to be political and epistemological, but it also turns
out that she also sees it as ontologically, even metaphysically:
The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us
of the reality of the world and ourselves …. For us appearance—something
that is being seen and heard by others as well as ourselves—constitutes reality’
(The Human Condition, p. 186).
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Perceptual consensus constitutes reality, and it is historical. This means that meta-
physics is historical: if views on what is seen and heard change, our general ways of
making sense of things will also change too. This would appear to run up against
her prioritization of the study of ‘different men’ in the philosophical-political
world, but that too functions to underscore reality. As she explains:
If it is true that a thing is real … only if it can show itself and be perceived
from all sides, then there must always be a plurality of individuals or peoples
and a plurality of standpoints to make reality even possible and to guarantee its
continuation. In other words, the world comes into being only if there are
perspectives; it exists as the order of worldly things only if it is viewed, now
this way, now that, at any given time. (pp. 20–30)
Hence, she sees her new world as allowing for contingency, differences and a
‘haphazardness’ of facts that philosophy and history have struggled to deal with in
the past (‘Truth and Politics’, in Beyond Past and Future, pp. 242–3).
The banality of history
Siobhan Kattago sees in Arendt’s visions of metaphysics, epistemology and poli-
tics the restoration of ‘wonder to the political realm of appearance, opinion, and
plurality’.16 She appears to have a good point. Plato’s Theaetetus wondered as a
consequence of his interactions with Socrates, not as the apparently sole thinker
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I am not convinced, however, that Arendt’s conjoined
philosophical-political realm protects us from falling down the well of the
Holocaust any more than Heidegger’s historicisation of being. My logic is as
follows. Arendt and Heidegger share an interest in returning to the beginnings of
philosophy in order to set it on to a new course. Heidegger saw that beginning in
Aristotle’s naming of wonder in Metaphysics; Arendt in Plato’s voicing of Socrates’
frustrations with the public, political realm in the Republic. They also part com-
pany in their respective visions of how philosophy ought to be practiced. Hei-
degger combines a reading of Aristotle’s definition of a limit in Metaphysics with
Plato’s various ideas on thought as a silent conversation with oneself and philo-
sophy as standing aside to argue for wonder as dwelling apart with the ordinary.
Arendt, on the contrary, calls the philosopher back from their shelter and asks
them to engage with a world in which plurality is assumed, freedom and equality
are achieved in company, and reality is constituted by consensus. Yet both of
their approaches show an interest in the ordinary as the means by which meta-
physics is created and potentially recreated, in the notion of Thaumazein (Hei-
degger) and in reality by consensus (Arendt). I am not suggesting that both are
the progenitors of idle talk, as Heidegger would put it, but I do wonder, as
Arendt did, whether ‘it is in the nature of academic quarrels that methodological
problems are likely to overshadow more fundamental issues’ (‘The Concept of
History’, in Between Past and Future, p. 53).
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What appears to have got missed here is whether their entangled notions of
history and metaphysics is more interested in the ordinary than the extraordinary.
Heidegger dismissed the extraordinary as the fleeting focus of the curious in
‘everyday wonder’. Arendt argues for plurality yet still insists on consensus, even
if that does not mean reduction to a single point. Persistent interest in the
strange, the edge case, the minority voice, the little or big change in action, the
other, as we have learned in this book, can be seen as the realm of the curious.
Curiosity, it has been argued by various thinkers, leads at least to distraction and
at worst to eternal damnation. Yet consensus, as Arendt acknowledges in Eich-
mann in Jerusalem can lead to situations where evil happens because ‘[n]obody …
came to me and reproached me for anything in the performance of my duties’
(p. 131). A counter argument for Arendt is her recognition of Kant’s ‘enlarged
mentality’ in the treatment of others as ends in themselves. But you have to notice
others in order to do that. Consensus, the ordinary, as chapters eight and nine
stressed, renders people invisible.
So, it is that we return to, and begin with, the Holocaust. It is important to note
that this is an umbrella term for a constellation of acts that obliterated entire
families and which left tragic gaps in others. You can break it down into those
individual acts in recognition of the individuality of the lives extinguished. But you
cannot render it ordinary, whether you look at it from the perspective of the pre-
sent, or you lived with it as Heidegger and Eichmann did. It did not make sense,
whether you thought about it metaphysically or as someone just turning up to
work. It is no wonder that various historians have therefore talked about it as a
limit case. A limit, we recall from our discussion of a section in Aristotle’s Meta-
physics V can denote an end point, particularly in topology. But it can also be a first
point. Perplexity takes us to an end point and a first point at the beginning of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and at the beginning of philosophy. The strange, the edge
case, the minority voice, the little or big change in action, the other are not outside
of our writings of history and philosophy as general attempts to make sense of
things. As we noted in chapters eight and nine, they can mark its beginning.
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CONCLUSION
I wonder as I wander: everyday historiography,
everyday metaphysics?
You can sing a single line many different ways, as John Jacob Niles notes:
A girl had stepped out to the edge of the little platform attached to the
automobile. She began to sing. Her clothes were unbelievable dirty and
ragged, and she, too, was unwashed. Her ash-blond hair hung down in long
skeins …. But, best of all, she was beautiful, and in her untutored way, she
could sing. She smiled as she sang, smiled rather sadly, and sang only a single
line of a song.1
You can sing it in ways that brings people comfort, makes them sad, or which
helps them to think of the divine. You can help people to make general sense of
things despite the first impression that you are small, unwashed, ragged and
untutored.
This book has wandered through what Foucault would probably have called a
‘wild profusion’ of existing histories and philosophies.2 Some of the works featured
will have made frequent appearances in histories of history or histories of meta-
physics, and they might have been known to you. Others will have made their
debut appearance in a historiography book, and you may think that this is long-
overdue recognition. Some will have appeared, at first appearance, small, unwa-
shed, ragged and untutored. And some will not have shaken that first impression.
What right did I have to include them?
It is true that histories of history, and histories of metaphysics have until recently
taken the form of ‘great white men’ compilations. On that count, I am not with-
out guilt in having written Fifty Key Thinkers on History, where the number of
women is only just beginning to go up after three editions. I have included more
women in this book, and historians and philosophers from different times, and
cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. But I do not want you to mistake this for
a work of history or metaphysics ‘from below’ or what might be called everyday
historiography and everyday metaphysics. There are too many thinkers from elite
backgrounds to sustain any such claim.
More importantly, however, the wandering path of this book has been an
argument against the assumption that the boundaries of the idea of history and the
idea of metaphysics are firmly inscribed, both against one another, and against
other forms of intellectual enterprise. The authors of the first written histories that
we know about engaged with, appropriated and adapted ideas from philosophy,
and we also see evidence of engagement, appropriation and adaption in reverse.
This set in train an entangled history in which the concept of wonder plays an
important role. Similar stories might be told for literature, poetry, science and art.
It is also the case that the use of the word ‘everyday’ would suggest a distinction
from history or metaphysics without an adjective, as if there is an amateur and a
professional league, to put it bluntly. It is certainly true that some of the thinkers
included in this book—and others that you will no doubt think of—do not appear
to do a very good job of writing history or of making general sense of things. They
advance contradictions, forget what they are arguing, include masses of details for
little apparent reason and set up trails of thought quite like Heidegger’s Holzwege or
wood paths. As I noted in the introduction to this book, there is the Euclidean
idea of a triangle, and there is the triangle that someone drew on the plastic seat of
a moving bus. That is not the same as saying, however, that there is a firm
boundary between the two. Historians and philosophers are often included in his-
tories because we still find their ways of thinking about the world engaging, chal-
lenging and even provocative. They help us with our own attempts at sense
making. They might not have been professional historians or philosophers as we
understand them today.
Still others are included because they have been included in earlier histories, and
we may hold an expectation that the history offered will not make sense without
them. They help the story to hang together, as is the case with the citation of
Leopold von Ranke to support the narrative that historiography took a professional
and national turn in the nineteenth century. With a new analytical frame, though,
it is still possible to see writers like von Ranke in renewed ways, and as part of
wider intellectual movements.
Finally, others may be included to show that there were wider approaches to
writing history and philosophy than are generally credited, and these approaches
may reflect a creativity that we are only beginning to appreciate. They may also
show us that some people produced works under very restrictive conditions: this
book includes at least one work written in prison and works by authors who did
not enjoy full access to information or to discussion by dint of their social status. It
is important to note, too, that some of these writers enjoyed popular success far
beyond that of their better-known peers. Their works are important because they
remind us that histories and philosophies are not just produced, they are also
received. Daniel Defoe’s attempt to make general sense of the realms of God, the
living and spirits may have been more influential than Immanuel Kant’s universal
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history in their day. Recovering that reception history is no easy matter, as chapter
seven has reminded us, but it is a powerful reminder that history and philosophy
have never been detached exercises.
As you can see from the above discussion, it is possible to draw the boundaries
around activities in many ways. If this history of wonder in history and philosophy
has taught us anything, it is that boundaries are there to be transgressed. They mark
the limit of our thinking, and as Aristotle taught us, a limit can be both an end and
a beginning. You cross boundaries to go from old ways of thinking to new ways of
thinking. And when you do cross boundaries, you reinscribe your attempts to
make general sense of the world along the way. History and metaphysics are not
conservative and purely descriptive enterprises. If you know that boundaries are
subject to change over time, then you can think about whether they might be
revised or even removed to create better ways of thinking about the past, and
thinking and acting in the present, and the future. History and metaphysics can
therefore be generative and ethical. Wonder, as I said at the start of this book,
marks the beginning of historiography.
Notes
1 Ron Pen, I Wonder as I Wander: The Life of John Jacob Niles, Lexington, KY: University
Press of Kentucky, 2010, p.150.
2 M. Foucault, The Order of Things, London: Vintage, 1994, p. xv.
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